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Since the 1960s, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has financed missionary efforts to Muslims 
around the world, attempting to spread a Salafi form of Islam that professes strict adherence to 
Islamic sacred scripture. The effects of this transnational proselytization have depended on 
numerous factors in “host countries.” This project explores the various impacts of Saudi 
transnational religious influence in the United States among African-Americans. By relying on 
previously unused documentary sources and fresh oral histories, it shows how Saudi “soft power” 
attempted to effect change in religious practices of African-American Muslims from 1975 
through 2000. It provides the most detailed examination and interpretation yet of Wallace 
Mohammed’s groundbreaking tenure as leader of the Nation of Islam and its successor groups 
after 1975, showing how he led his organization to variously accept and resist Saudi efforts to 
dictate the terms of Islam in America to African-Americans, while he oversaw a general 
acceptance of Sunni Islam. This project also describes and interprets the acceptance of quietist 
Salafi religious ideals and practices by thousands of African-Americans, in a Salafi movement 
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Note on Transliteration  
 
When transliterating Arabic words, I have relied on the system of the International 
Journal of Middle East Studies. One exception is that plurals for Arabic words have been given a 
slightly simplified English-style plural (hadiths, masjids, madhhabs, shaykhs), rather than their 
actual Arabic plural (ahadith, masajid, madhahab, shuyukh.) Another exception is that, on 
second and additional references of each chapter, I have removed the al- from last names that, in 
Arabic, are preceded by it (Shakyh Nasir al-Din al-Albani and Shaykh Rabi al-Madkhali become 



















Not a day passes without multiple reminders that other people helped me do this. Back in 
2008, my loving wife was unflinchingly and enthusiastically supportive, in every way possible, 
when the possibility arose I would “transition” from my journalism career to academia. She has 
remained the same wonderful life partner that I have long known her to be, not to mention an 
encouraging, sharp and constructively critical editor. My parents have also been supportive in 
every way possible, and their confidence in my mid-career switch was extremely helpful in 
solidifying my own. Meanwhile, the professors who helped me at the CUNY Graduate Center 
and elsewhere all lived up to their excellent reputations for brilliance and depth and breadth of 
expertise in their various fields. Clarence Taylor, my adviser, enthusiastically supported this 
project from the start, providing expert advice at each step and serving as a sage guide through 
the entire process. He consistently dazzled me with his thorough knowledge of the 
historiography. Beth Baron challenged me at every step to examine problematic preconceptions I 
hadn’t even realized I had, while wisely urging me to widen my range of sources. Her critiques 
helped me shape this project in essential ways. Simon Davis generously lent his encouragement 
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and a holistic outlook on my subject matter, one that very impressively merged high levels of 
expertise in the areas of diplomatic history, Middle Eastern affairs and African-American history. 
Edward E. Curtis IV graciously lent his critical expertise from six hundred miles away in Indiana, 
helping to both expand and sharpen my focus while never letting my confidence flag. Bernard 
Haykel generously offered his advice from Princeton, admitting me into his graduate courses on 
Saudi history and Salafism and offering valuable guidance along the way. Martin Burke, K.C. 
Johnson, Kathleen McCarthy and Andrew Robertson, who taught my first-year seminars at the 
CUNY Graduate Center, lent me their ears and their minds at critical junctures. My fellow 
fellows at the Scholars-in-Residence program of the Schomburg Center for Research in Black 
Culture – Caree Banton, Andrianna Campbell, Sylvia Chan-Malik, Tanisha Ford, Kaiama Glover, 
Tsitsi Jaji, Soyica Roberts, Sonia Sanchez, C. Riley Snorton, Nicole Wright, and our incredible 
leader Farah Jasmine Griffin – accepted me fully as a junior member. The Committee for the 
Study of Religion at CUNY, led by Bryan Turner and his administrator Lydia Wilson, proved a 
helpful presence throughout my graduate study, as did Anny Bakalian of the Middle East and 
Middle Eastern American Center at CUNY. Years earlier, while I was still a journalist, Benjamin 
Madley, Randall Balmer, Amaney Jamal, Robert Snider, Robert Wister, Jonathan Sarna, 
Alexander Schenker, Ihsan Bagby, Judith Weisenfeld and John Green all coached, encouraged or 
otherwise helped me as I considered the transition to graduate school.  
I also benefited from the help and time of many Muslims whose recollections, juxtaposed 
with accounts in contemporary periodicals, proved essential as I worked to develop historical 
narratives that comprise this dissertation. Three people stand out for the care and concern they 
showed with my work: Agieb Bilal, Alfred Mohammed and Shakoor Mustafa. Over the years 
each of them introduced me to and facilitated interviews with numerous people and were always 
xi 
 
candid about what, from their knowledge, could and could not be supported by available 
evidence. Others who were especially helpful in this regard included Ahmed Burhani, Abdul 
Wasi, Cynthia Wilson, Tahir Wyatt, and Mustafa El-Amin, as well as my Arabic teachers 
Muhammad and Yusuf Jaaber. A special mention to George Jordan, a former Star-Ledger 
colleague, for introducing me to Alfred Muhammad in 2007, and to Star-Ledger editors Suzanne 
Pavkovic, David Tucker and Jim Willse for allowing me time in 2007 and 2008 to report on 
African-American Muslim communities in East Orange and Newark, New Jersey, for what we 
thought would be a single Sunday story in the paper.  Back again to my family: my wife, two 
kids, parents, brother, and everyone else, including friends and colleagues whose love, friendship 
























The roots of this project trace to a phone call I received in the newsroom of the Newark 
Star-Ledger in April 2007. The caller, an African American Muslim man, knew I was the 
Ledger’s religious affairs reporter, and he voiced frustration with recent articles I had written on 
Muslims and Islam in the United States.  
Why is it, he asked me, that every time you write about Muslims, you interview 
immigrant Muslims as the experts? He reminded me that I worked in a city and region with a 
large black population, a rich Islamic history, and plenty of African-American Muslims to 
interview as authorities about Islam. Why didn’t I ever quote any of them? 
I was stuck for an answer. Like many other journalists, not to mention many Muslims, I 
had come instinctively to view Islamic authority as emanating from overseas. When I needed to 
interview Muslim “experts” for a story, I had sought to quote imams and Muslim professors who 
were born abroad, or whose parents were born abroad. Part of this pattern was related to the post-
9/11 state of journalism’s “religion beat” in the United States. African-American Muslim 
communities faced far less public scrutiny and were subjects of far less news coverage than 
immigrant Muslim communities, and New Jersey had sizable immigrant Muslim populations in 
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the South Brunswick, Jersey City and Paterson areas. Still, the totality of my work could be seen 
as contributing to the impression that African-American Muslims were incapable of answering 
questions that journalists and the American public might have about Islam. 
As I remember it, the caller did not tell me his name. He relayed his concern and politely 
hung up. But the obvious agitation in his voice, and, more importantly, the substance of his 
complaint, resonated with me. I began regularly visiting African-American mosques in Newark 
and the surrounding cities of East Orange and Irvington. I learned about their histories and that, 
during the 1990s, the area had been a focal point of a national Salafi movement among African-
American Muslims. This was a transnational movement that had important links to the Islamic 
University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, where the movement’s most important leaders had studied 
for years, on scholarship. African American Salafis maintained links to shaykhs there.  
I persuaded my Star-Ledger editors, in that summer of 2007, to let me report a large 
project on the Salafi movement among African Americans. I was particularly intrigued by 
transnational angles: To what degrees did African American Muslims accept or resist the 
religious guidance of Saudi shaykhs? What were the relationships like between African 
American Salafis and other African American Muslim groups? What led some African American 
Muslims to identify as Salafis, and others not to, or to avoid the movement entirely?  
In 2008, my newspaper experienced first-hand the financial difficulties that had long 
plagued the broader newspaper industry, and for reasons related to that the project was never 
published. Yet I wanted to pursue it further as a writer, having become increasingly drawn to the 
topic as a matter of American religious history. In 2010, I was fortunate to receive a five-year 
fellowship to the doctoral program in History at the Graduate Center of the City University of 
New York. With my professors’ encouragement I expanded my topic beyond Salafism to also 
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encompass broader trends in post-1975 African-American Muslim engagement with the Sunni 
world in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, starting with Wallace Mohammed’s movement. 
A dissertation-completion fellowship followed in 2015, to the Schomburg Center for Research in 
Black Culture. Along the way, I learned of the excellent existing scholarly research on African-
American Muslim history. It is my hope that the pages that follow will be a valued contribution 














“Don’t think any Arab is coming here to tell you anything. If he comes  
here, he will have to come by me. I don’t care if he’s been reading the  
Holy Qur’an since the day Arabia became sandy. He’s not coming here  




-- Imam Wallace Mohammed,
 
 
   February 25, 1975,  





In the first hours of a critical new era in Muslim-American history, new concerns about 
Islamic religious autonomy and authority already loomed large. On the evening of February 25, 
1975, hours after his father died, the Nation of Islam’s new leader reassured his increasingly 
nervous ministers with the words above, saying that the power to interpret Islam for their 
African-American community would remain in their African-American community. Wallace 
Mohammed had long aligned himself with Sunni Islamic beliefs that were more popular among 
                                                          
1
 “Ministers Meeting, February 25, 1975,” Ministers Kit March 14, 1975, 7 (26), NOI Collection, SCRBC, New 
York. 
2
 Wallace Mohammed, who died in 2008, changed the spelling of his name several times throughout his life. 
Monikers included W.D. Mohammed, W.D. Muhammad, Wallace Muhammad, and Warith Deen Mohammed. 
Excepting references, this paper will use Wallace Mohammed, which he used late in life.  
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Muslims than with his father’s followers. But he insisted his organization would not defer to 
Arabs or other Muslims from elsewhere.
3
  
And yet in coming months and years, increased interactions between African American 
Muslims and Muslims from other countries would force a slew of uncomfortable questions 
related to authority: Did Muslims in Wallace Mohammed’s organization in fact require religious 
guidance from other Muslims? From whom and from where might they receive it? Should they 
and other African American Muslims defer to religious leaders and political agendas from 
Muslim-majority countries such as Saudi Arabia?  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would prove the most persistent and well-funded of 
Islamic missionaries in the United States. Seeking to position itself as the most Islamically 
authentic government, able to unify and lead the Muslim world (umma), the House of Saud 
created several international institutions in the 1960s in a massive international proselytizing 
campaign designed to affect the contours of Sunni Islamic practices and ideals wherever Islam 
was practiced. Yet the Saudis were not operating on a blank slate. The NOI since the 1930s had 
developed its own system of beliefs including controversial teachings on issues of divinity, 
prophethood, race and the afterlife that other Muslims criticized as heterodox.
4
 The NOI also had 
its own economics program, characterized by successful businesses it owned and operated, and 
by a do-for-self philosophy taught by longtime leader Elijah Muhammad.
5
  
The leader’s death, and his replacement by his son Wallace, would lead to dramatic 
change in the group’s religious worldview. Wallace Mohammed had long questioned the NOI’s 
                                                          
3
 “Ministers Meeting, February 25, 1975,” Ministers Kit March 14, 1975, 7 (26), NOI Collection, SCRBC, New 
York. 
4
 The NOI taught that God had appeared on earthy in the twentieth-century as a human, in the form of Master Fard 
Muhammad, the NOI’s founder. It also taught that Elijah Muhammad was a prophet, that the white race had been 
created by an evil black scientist, and that there was no afterlife.  
5
 The NOI operated profitable restaurants (Steak ‘n Take) and a fish business (Whiting H&G). 
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heterodoxies, instead supporting more conventional Sunni Islamic norms. In the aforementioned 
meeting with NOI ministers the night of his father’s death, in a basement of the NOI’s Chicago 
headquarters, he reiterated those preferences, expressing his intention to rely on Qur’anic 
teachings more than his father had. At the same time, he remained sensitive to his followers’ 
fears that he would sacrifice their group’s autonomy. With this in mind, he insisted the NOI 
would not rely on the guidance of outsiders. Muslims from abroad, whether from Saudi Arabia 
or elsewhere, were “not coming here to lead these sheep.”
6
 
Still, in the years to come Wallace Mohammed’s group would engage deeply with Saudi-
financed missionary efforts. The same would be true for a separate group of African American 
Muslims known as Salafis, whose very development as a movement in the United States was 
directly linked to Saudi Arabia and its network of Islamic universities. Adherents of Salafism 
emphasized an intent to replicate Islamic practices from the religion’s first three generations, 
dating to the seventh century. African-American Salafis broadly accepted the quietist Salafi 
worldview favored by the kingdom, where the most prominent African American Salafi leaders 
had studied on Saudi-funded scholarships.
7
 The Salafi community, unlike Wallace Mohammed’s 
group, was a willing recipient of Saudi religious guidance, and its leaders and members broadly 
accepted the notion that U.S. Muslim communities lacked the resources and knowledge to 
properly train their own religious leaders. This explains why African American Salafis often 
looked to Muslim authorities in other countries, especially Saudi Arabia, for rulings on matters 
                                                          
6
 Ministers Meeting,” February 25, 1975, Ministers Kit March 14, 1975, 7 (26), NOI Collection, SCRBC, New 
York. 
7
 Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action,” in Roel Meijer, ed., Global Salafism: Islam’s New 





 One of the founders of a prominent African-American Salafi mosque in 
Newark, New Jersey, succinctly expressed this point of view in an interview with me:  
Some people are under the impression that there are [Islamic] scholars  
in America. There are actually no scholars in America, no scholars in  
the West. What we do have in the West, we have students who have  
graduated [from Saudi universities], and when you graduate they give  
you the title Shaykh…, but they are actually what we would call daw’is 
[missionaries], people who bring the message. They are not scholars.  




During the quarter-century examined in this study, the Muslim population in the United 
States grew by leaps and bounds. This study, though, is less about the spread of Islam in 
America than about the internal dialogues of people who were already Muslim. Being recipients 
of Saudi attention would raise a host of contentious issues for African American Muslims. The 
related transnational exchanges would force questions not only about what kind of Muslims they 
wanted to be, but also about what kind they did not want to be. It forced them to ask whether to 
direct their religious worldviews around interpretations of Islam prevalent in a different country. 
It raised the question of whether they should adhere to the strictest interpretations of sacred 
scripture and oral traditions, even when these appeared to conflict with Western sensibilities. It 
led to re-orderings of religious, racial and national loyalties, which have often tugged from 
different directions, as they do for people of other religious backgrounds as well. (Members of 
Wallace Mohammed’s group would express concern that Muslims from abroad viewed them as a 





                                                          
8
 Shadee Elmasry, “The Salafis in America: The Rise, Decline and Prospects for a Sunni Muslim Movement among 
African Americans,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 30:2 (2010): 217-236. 
9
 Author’s interview with Abdul Wasi, telephone, January 26, 2016. 
10
 Author’s interview with Agieb Bilal, telephone, September 28, 2015; “How to be Muslim in America, Part 1: W. 
Deen Muhammad,” Tony Brown’s Journal, 2001 (precise date unavailable). 
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Religious Authority and Transnationalism 
The central components of African American Muslim history have been transnational in 
nature since the first Muslim slaves were forced from Africa and taken to American shores in the 
antebellum South. Later, in the early 20th century, an Indian immigrant found success 
proselytizing thousands of African Americans into the Islamic Ahmadiyya movement, while 
African Americans in the Moorish Science Temple of America and the Nation of Islam 
envisioned themselves as “Moors” and “Asiatics,” rather than as Americans. A deeper 
transnational engagement occurred in the mid-20th century, when the NOI politically aligned 
itself with Arab nationalists and the so-called “Muslim International,” a deterritorialized entity 
that opposed Western (and Soviet) dominance in geopolitics.
11
 After 1975, the two Muslim 
groups studied here would emphasize religious politics over racial and class politics, while 
nurturing relationships with religious and political leaders in Saudi Arabia. These two African 
American Muslim groups – Wallace Mohammed’s organization and the Salafi movement – each 
favored distinct approaches in their relationships with Saudis, as we shall see.  
The transnational nature of Saudi proselytization is similarly self-evident. The Muslim 
World League, Islamic University of Medina, and World Association of Muslim Youth were all 
created by the Saudi royal family during the 1960s to proselytize around the world and to 
increase the kingdom’s regional and international influence. The extent of Saudi missionary 
efforts has been so widespread that Muslim communities in virtually every country can be said to 
have a transnational relationship with the kingdom.
12
  
                                                          
11
 Sohail Daulatzai coined the term “Muslim International,” defining it as an entity consisting of “those who struggle 
for dignity by other means after being left at the margins by the violence of neoliberalism.”
 
Sohail Daulatzai, Black 
Star, Crescent Moon: The Muslim International and Black Freedom beyond America (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012). 
12
 For discussions on how Saudi universities may have affected Muslim movements in different countries, see, for 




Another transnational aspect of Islam among African Americans is the migration 
narrative, which occupies essential spaces within communal histories and imaginations of almost 
every American ethnic and religious group. Migration narratives are central to both African-
American and Islamic histories, both independently of one another and when intertwined. The 
initial “migration” in African American history, of course, was a forced one, depositing 
kidnapped Africans into the United States where they were sold into slavery; a more traditional 
moving of peoples, the “Great Migration” of the early 20th century, brought millions of African 
Americans from the South to northern cities and western lands. Throughout, the possibilities of 
migration embedded in the biblical Exodus story, in which Hebrews fled Egypt for the Promised 
Land, have lent comfort to African Americans enduring antebellum slavery and the various 
discriminations thereafter. For Muslims – whether of African American or other backgrounds -- 
migration carries meaning as well, stemming from the prophet Muhammad’s migration in the 
year 622 C.E. from Mecca to Medina to escape persecution. The contemporary idea of Muslim 
migration from the West, where Muslims constitute a religious minority, to the Muslim-majority 
world in the Middle East retains its own hold on Muslim imaginations, even when in competition 
with the desire to remain in the West. The early African-American Muslim groups – the 
aforementioned Ahmadiyya movement and the NOI – combined these black and Islamic 
migration narratives into a worldview directing their identities toward the Muslim world abroad 
as a way to contend with racism and segregation in the United States.  
This study, then, explores the transnational spread of religious beliefs and how they were 
received in a “host” country, the United States. It illuminates important efforts by African-
American Muslims to determine the nature of Islam for themselves, to orient themselves 
culturally and politically, and to decide whether religious authority was properly sited in the 
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United States or in the Middle East. It also measures the reach of Saudi global efforts to affect 
the contours of Islamic practices around the world, demonstrating how the kingdom’s religious 
authorities since the mid-1970s variously succeeded and failed in attempts to influence the 
Islamic practices of African-American Muslims. It shows that African American Muslims were 
hardly passive recipients of the Saudis’ proselytizing efforts. And it places the transnational 
encounters within the framework of longstanding debates over religious authority, identity, 
gender, and cultural diplomacy, asking core questions that include:  
 Who is given the religious authority to lead Muslim communities? On what basis is 
that authority constructed?  
 How do Muslim-Americans balance their perceptions of “universalistic” Islamic 
values that are common across the Muslim world, on the one hand, and 
“particularistic” ones of greater importance to regional Muslim communities, on the 
other?  
 What is the nature of religious authority in a period of mass globalization, when ideas 
about religion and authority are increasingly spread across cultures and national 
boundaries?  
Far from being consigned to the realm of scholarly debate, these questions on the 
transnationalism of religious authority have resonated across the Muslim world, especially where 
Islam is a minority religion and certainly among African-American Muslims in the United States. 
Within the Islamic world, African American Muslims held an unusual historical position in the 
1970s, due to Elijah Muhammad’s heterodox teachings. Many of his former followers had 
concluded by the mid-1970s that he had promoted a false religious worldview to them in the 
previous decades. They did not want to be fooled again, so they sought an Islamic belief system 
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aligned with more conventional Sunni norms, accepted by Muslims around the world. At the 
same time, their grounding in ideas relating to autonomy and Black Nationalism cautioned them 
against accepting leadership from outside their community.  
As a result, tensions over authority often arose when African-American Muslims engaged 
with Muslims from historically Muslim lands, who were better grounded in classical Islamic 
studies and practices. The Islamic Studies professor Sherman Jackson wrote in 1999 that 
African-American Muslims too often found themselves “reduced to a position of abject 
intellectual and ideological dependency,” and that many of them “lost confidence in their ability 
to articulate themselves in terms that were likely to be recognized and accepted as Islamic.”
13
 
The paradoxes and choices facing African-American Muslims – and other hyphenated 
Muslims – have been broadly addressed by scholars and other writers in various fields, as has 
Saudi involvement in international missionary campaigns. Within the disciplines of 
Anthropology and American Studies, scholars have examined how Muslim-Americans have 
constructed and perceived lines of religious authority in the Muslim world, while positing that 
African-American Muslims have often “imagined” ties to Muslims overseas in attempts to re-
map personal and communal identities sullied by American racism.
14
 Within the disciplines of 
History, Sociology and Religious Studies, scholars have analyzed the NOI within the context of 
the social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s, debating whether it was guided during these years 
mainly by religious ideals or political ones, and whether that dichotomy is a false one.
15
 
Meanwhile, within the disciplines of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, scholars have 
                                                          
13
 Sherman Jackson, “Islam and Affirmative Action,” Journal of Law and Religion 14:2 (1999-2000): 408, 409. 
14
 See, for example, Daulatzai, Black Star, Crescent Moon; Zareena Grewal, Islam is a Foreign Country: American 
Muslims and the Global Crisis of Authority (New York: NYU Press, 2013); Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: 
Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East Since 1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 
15
 See, for example, C. Eric Lincoln, The Black Muslims in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961); E.U. Essien 
Odom, Black Nationalism: A Search for Identity in America (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1967); Edward 




examined efforts by Saudi Arabia to influence Islamic practices in Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Great Britain, while exploring the vast scope of the kingdom’s reach and 
questioning its actual impact.
16
  
However, to date, very few scholars have examined where these issues come together in 
the United States; that is, how the NOI’s transition to Sunni Islam and the later development of a 
Salafi movement among African-Americans
17
 were related to the increase in interactions 
between African-American Muslims and Saudi leaders and institutions.  
 
The Universal and the Particular 
Longstanding tensions between the notion of a “universal” form of Islam and “particular” 
forms are pervasive in debates over Islamic practices and religious authority. As Edward E. 
Curtis IV observed,  
The tension exists between the idea, on the one hand, that a religious  
tradition is universally applicable to the experiences of all human beings, 
and the idea, on the other hand, that a religious experience is applicable  
to one particular group of human beings. The history of African-American  
Islam provides an especially useful vantage point from which to view  
this problem, since it has been so central to both African-American  




Curtis argues that the very ideal of a universal Islam -- meaning one form that is supreme 
over all others and must be applicable to all Muslims -- is just that, an ideal. While many modern 
Muslims try to emulate the practices of the earliest Muslims, the rearview mirror is not as clear 
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 See, for example, Meijer, ed., Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009); Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York; Columbia 
University Press, 2004); Richard Gauvain, Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2012); and Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012); Quintan Wiktorowizcz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 29 (2006) 207-239.  
17
 The term Salafism is used to describe an Islamic movement whose adherents emphasize the beliefs and practices 
of the earliest Muslims, as perceived through the lenses of modernity. 
18
 Edward Curtis, Islam in Black America: Identity, Liberation and Differences in African-American Islamic 
Thought (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 1. 
10 
 
as it may seem; even early Muslims engaged in disputes over Islam’s teachings and expectations 
of leadership. What is perceived to be universal, the political theorist Ernest Laclau has 
suggested, is often assumed so only because of temporal political victories that bestow credibility 
and resources.
19
 For scholars who are not theologians, there is an additional problem – a 
professional one – in assuming the existence of a universal Islam, Curtis writes. The danger is 
that in using it as a comparative tool, they place themselves “in the position of determining the 
essential, and by implication, the true Islam.”
20
 As a result of the comparisons that have 
nevertheless occurred, he argues, the academic study of African-American Islam “has been too 
consumed with dismissing certain Muslims as cultists, heretics, and sectarian. All of these 
pejorative and unhelpful labels presume, by their comparison to “orthodox” Muslims, a 
normative Islam that in no time and in no place has ever existed.”
21
  
And yet, the ideal of a pristine, Qur’an- and Sunnah-centered universalistic Islam remains 
a powerful force within popular and scholarly discourse on Muslims, an ideal propagated by 
Western and non-Western writers alike, as well as by Islamic reformers.
22
 African-American 
Muslims have indeed tried to measure their religious development against a perceived universal 
Islam whose geographic source was outside the United States, its correctness often assumed. The 
nature of this quest presented many questions. Were Wallace Mohammed’s followers 
comfortable with Islam as taught by their own leader and his imams? Had they instead developed 
more faith in Islam as presented to them by the Saudi-funded Muslim World League (MWL)? 
And how much, if at all, should racial identity and awareness matter in their religious 
consciousness? For almost a century, religious debates among African-American Muslims have 
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engaged this perceived spectrum of particularism to universalism, from the NOI’s early 
dismissals of other Muslims’ criticism in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s; to acceptance of more 
conventional Sunni Islamic ideals by Malcolm X and Wallace Mohammed starting in the 1960s 
and 1970s; and to the Salafi movement starting in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Conflicts between perceptions of the universal, on one hand, and perceptions of the 
particular, on the other, are present throughout this study, relating to rituals, authority, and 
gender roles. What role was race to play in a Muslim’s identity? On authority from what country 
should a moon sighting herald the start of Ramadan? What constituted the proper covering for 
women? Should women be encouraged to pursue higher education? Was polygamy religiously 
permissible in the United States? What relationship should Muslims have to their government? 
Attempts to resolve these and other questions would prove complex, as multiple sources of 
direction arose.  
Saudis, and Muslims of other nationalities, presented themselves to African-American 
Muslims as guides, with separate groups portraying themselves as representing a universal Islam. 
Choosing among the options proved challenging. Islam has long been practiced in diverse ways, 
with the estimated 1.5 billion Muslims around the world broadly divided into Sunni (85 percent) 
and Shi’i (15 percent). That main breakdown obscures myriad other important distinctions, either 
self-identified or imposed; among Sunnis there are Sufi Muslims, Salafi Muslims, and Tablighi 
Muslims, for example. In addition, Sunni groups are often associated with one of four distinct 
“madhhabs,” or schools of thought;
23
 adherents of each school tend to view their own as the best 
one. In time, claims of authority by Saudi religious leaders would face increasing challenges 
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within the United States, from immigrant-run organizations such as the Fiqh Council of North 
America, Zaytuna College, and the AlMaghrib Institute, which tasked themselves with building a 
domestic Islamic educational infrastructure to serve Muslims in the United States.  
Scholarly studies evaluating Muslim populations around the world bolster the case that 
cultural norms in host countries help shape the development of Islam in a given region. The 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, in his well-known work contrasting Islam’s development in 
Morocco and Indonesia during the sixteenth century, observed the effects of culture on religious 
practices. In Morocco, which lacked a strong unifying religion prior to the onset of Islam, an 
“aggressive fundamentalism” would prosper. In Indonesia, where the dominant culture in the 
Javanese state had been Hindu-Buddhist, the main versions of Islam that developed tended to be 
pluralist and syncretistic.
24
 In Morocco, the development of Islam led to “cultural 
homogenization,” while in Indonesia it resulted in “cultural diversification.”
25
 It is not a stretch 
to extrapolate Geertz’s assertions internationally, to surmise that the development of world 
religions in a specific host country is at least partially reliant on cultural factors unrelated to 
theology. In the United States in the mid-20th century, the growth of Sunnism among African-
Americans was affected by a cultural landscape with historic discrimination against black 
Americans. And the flow of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries led to increased 
interactions between these new arrivals and African-American Muslims at NOI mosques and 
other Muslim communal events.
26
 These interactions often led African Americans to question the 
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NOI’s racialist theology and helped introduce many of them to the more conventional variant of 
Sunni Islam that Wallace Mohammed would advocate. In addition, Black Nationalist groups – 
the NOI had been the quintessential example – were in political decline by the time Elijah 
Muhammad died in 1975. By that time, the racialist ideology that had powered the NOI’s growth 
faced increased competition from more orthodox religious appeals such as that voiced by 
Wallace Mohammed.
27
   
Attempts to measure a “Saudi” influence on regional Muslim groups, then, are fraught 
with obstacles. Distinguishing between the Islamic traditions viewed as universal, on one hand, 
and cultural norms stemming from religious practices, on the other, can be a struggle for 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike; Islamic teachings and national religious cultures are often 
easily confused. As Edward Said observed in 1997, “Islam defines a relatively small proportion 
of what actually takes place in the Islamic world, which numbers a billion people, and includes 




Underlying the relationship between the universal and the particular, for African 
American Muslims, is the relationship between the Muslim-majority world and “Muslim-
minority lands” such as the United States, where Muslims generally live as a minority and are 
governed by non-Muslim rulers. Islamic jurists have for centuries asked whether Muslim-
minority populations should migrate to Muslim-majority regions or stay and attempt to convert 
non-Muslims. Where Islam is dominant, many have professed a responsibility to aid Muslim 
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communities where Islam is not the majority religion. For African-Americans, as we shall see, 
being on the receiving end of this largesse has often caused anxiety and conflict.  
 
The Saudis and ‘Soft Power’ 
The Saudis, of course, had motives in projecting themselves as the conveyors of a 
universal Islam. In the 1950s and 1960s, as mentioned above, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had 
been enmeshed in what political scientist Malcolm Kerr has called the “Arab Cold War,” in 
which Egypt and Saudi Arabia were the main competitors for influence among Arab states.
29
 
After Nasser nationalized al-Azhar University in Cairo, the Islamic world’s most prestigious 
university, and sent troops to Yemen, the House of Saud created its own Islamic university and a 
pan-Islamic institution called the Muslim World League. Though the main focus of the Arab 
Cold War was regional, the Saudi kingdom also sought to build and influence elsewhere. In 
seeking to maintain power, it acted “to bolster its legitimacy in the West and among Muslim 
states and persons.”
30
 Promoting itself as the global leader of Sunni Islam, the kingdom 
promoted a chastened form of Sunnism that favored literalist approaches to scripture and oral 
traditions, as well as dim views of Western thought and culture.  
The location of Islamic holy sites within the kingdom’s borders contributed greatly to the 
kingdom’s prestige across the Muslim world.
31
 The official promotion of the monarch as 
“Custodian of the Two Holy Sites,” and the spending of massive sums to proselytize other 
Muslims, constituted assertions of what Joseph Nye famously called “soft power,” that is, the 
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effort and ability to shape preferences of others without coercion.
32
 The kingdom’s fortuitous 




A caveat is in order here, about my use of the term “Saudi influence.” The ideas about 
Islam that were conveyed through Saudi-financed proselytization cannot be traced to Saudi 
Arabia exclusively; key contributors to the Salafi and Islamist worldviews who spent time in 
Saudi Arabia actually came from other Muslim-majority countries such as Syria, Pakistan, Egypt 
and Albania. The same is true for many of the people who I portray as conveyors of Saudi-
financed influence in the United States; key officials in the Saudi-funded Muslim World 
League’s North American offices were of Palestinian, Egyptian or Pakistani descent, and while 
they viewed themselves as practicing Muslims who were well-versed in Sunni Islamic teachings 
and scripture, they would not have identified themselves (or been identified by others) with 
Salafism or Wahhabism, the literalist forms of Islam often associated with Saudi religious 
leaders. And while shaykhs sent by the Muslim World League to teach at African-African 
mosques had often studied at Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, their native countries 
were elsewhere, including Nigeria, the Sudan and Syria. Furthermore, the curricula at 
the Islamic University of Medina, where many of these shaykhs did receive their 
training, was developed and taught by non-Saudis including Abu A’la Mawdudi of British India 
and Egyptian members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s. Any understanding of a “Saudi” 
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influence on Islam around the world, then, must account for these transnational influences 
and exchanges.  
Why, then, my focus on Saudi Arabia? While certainly true that other countries including 
Pakistan, Iran, Libya, and Egypt also sought to influence the practice of Islam among Muslim-
Americans, none of these national efforts rivaled the Saudis’ in scope, depth or resources. In 
attempting to influence the practice of Islam in the region and around the world, so that religious 
practices would more closely align with Salafi practices prevalent in Saudi Arabia, and so Saudi 
influence would be felt around the world, the Saudis used “soft power” by providing grants for 
mosques around the world;
34
 financing salaries for imams and for Saudi-trained Islamic Studies 
specialists to work at American mosques; donating millions of Saudi-published Qur’ans and 
pieces of other Islamic literature; and providing full years-long scholarships to Islamic 
universities in the kingdom.  
These efforts have affected how many Muslims around the world, including African-
Americans, relate to Saudi Arabia.
35
 And they have spurred the development, in many countries, 
of Salafi movements that are led by graduates of Saudi universities who have returned home. 
Clearly, since the 1960s, Saudi Arabia has held a distinctive place in Islamic proselytization 
around the world. Missionary efforts from other Muslim countries to the United States tended to 
be more scattered, consisting of occasional donations and scholarships to study abroad. But for 
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Saudi Arabia, proselytization is a full-time, ongoing concern that has produced formidable 
institutions known to Muslims around the world, including the Muslim World League, World 
Assembly of Muslim Youth, and Islamic University of Medina. 
 
Issues of Masculinity, Femininity and Marriage 
The relationship between African-American Muslims and Saudis involved power 
struggles inextricably linked to notions of masculinity. To emerge victorious in battles over 
religious authority was to win a crucial power struggle over the ability to interpret ancient 
Islamic texts and traditions for Muslim-Americans in the late 20th century. These battles were 
closely tied to perceptions of masculinity, given the history of the Nation of Islam, and, more 
broadly, of black people in the United States from slavery onward. Slavery had robbed black 
men of traditional male roles that are common in patriarchal societies – among them, earning 
income for a family, protecting one’s wife and children from harm, and defending oneself and 
one’s property. To those who joined the NOI in the mid-20th century, the organization’s explicit 
calls to manliness, with the associated ideals of self-sufficiency and autonomy, had been major 
appeals.
36
 The NOI taught that black people should work apart from white Americans, own their 
own businesses, and publish their own newspapers; in other words, they should live as much of 
their lives as possible among other black people. So Wallace Mohammed’s movement from 
Black Nationalism and toward more conventional Sunni Islamic norms posed a potential threat 
to his father’s loyalists, who worried he would hand the leadership reins to Muslims from abroad. 
Wallace Mohammed clearly recognized this perception, as is demonstrated by his shifting 
discourse on religious authority over the decades.  
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 The relationship with Saudi religious leaders and the broader Sunni world also affected 
African-American discourse over the ideal roles for women in Muslim society, family life, and 
marriage. Elijah Muhammad’s NOI had stressed the role of women as loyal, obedient wives, and 
as mothers whose main priorities were at home. Wallace Mohammed, without disavowing his 
father’s emphases on women’s responsibilities to families and obedience to husbands, also 
encouraged women to pursue college and graduate degrees and was known within the movement 
for his sensitivity to women’s issues – likely due to a strong relationship with his mother, with 
whom he had sided after his father had children with other women.
37
  
Elijah Muhammad had publicly banned polygamy in the NOI. But in 1975, after he died, 
at least some ministers viewed Wallace Mohammed’s new Qur’anic emphasis as license to have 
more than one wife at a time. The new leader chastised them and generally discouraged 
polygamy, saying it was acceptable only if all wives were treated equally, and if each marriage 
was legalized.
38
 Polygamy was less rare among African-American Salafis; it is hard to link this 
development directly to Saudis, because polygamy had been present in some earlier African-
American-Muslim communities such as the Sunni Dar al-Islam movement, which was not 
directly associated with the kingdom.  Communal discourse on family issues, especially in Salafi 
communities, would often center on marriage and the movement of women, that is, whether a 
wife should leave home alone without her husband’s permission.  
Scholarly debate persists over the roles and status of African-American women in Islamic 
organizations. The patterns of this dialogue have echoed broader debates within Western 
discourse on the degrees of restrictions faced by Muslim women. Contemporary comparisons pit 
                                                          
37
 Dawn-Marie Gibson and Jamillah Karim, Women of the Nation: Between Black Protest and Sunni Islam (New 
York and London: New York University Press, 2014), 89. 
38
 Ibid., and Debra Majeed, Polygyny: What It Means When African American Muslim Women Share Their 
Husbands (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 2015). 
19 
 
Western feminist ideals against the perceptions of sexism in Muslim-majority countries, but also 
posit the seventh-century arrival of Islam as a benefit to women’s rights, a positive contrast to 
what existed before. In the 1960s, the first major scholarly works on the NOI, by C. Eric Lincoln 
and E.U. Essien-Udom, portrayed the NOI as a male-centered organization, its women associated 
mostly with domestic life and activities. In the 1990s, Claude Andrew Clegg, in his biography of 
Elijah Muhammad, provided a similar impression with a few alterations. He wrote that the ideals 
of female purity, domesticity and piety played significant roles in the discourse surrounding the 
NOI, and that women exercised real power in certain “progressive locales.” Edward Curtis, in 
2002, turned scholarship in a new direction, highlighting the importance that the NOI placed on 
girls’ education – not just on home economics and dress making, but also on science. None of 




Since 9/11, multiple monographs have specifically focused on the lived experiences of 
African-American Muslim women. In 2004, Carolyn Rouse published a study of African 
American Muslim women in Los Angeles arguing that their experiences defied common 
stereotypes of Muslim women as oppressed and passive.
40
 In 2014 and 2015, three books were 
published specifically on the topic of NOI women. Bayyinah Jeffries, focusing on 1950 to 1975, 
celebrated the role of Elijah Muhammad’s wife, Clara Muhammad, in establishing the NOI’s 
education system (which her son Wallace named in her honor upon becoming leader), while 
exploring, through oral histories and newspaper clippings, what attracted women to the NOI.
41
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Meanwhile, Dawn-Marie Gibson and Jamillah Karim argued, through analyses of oral histories 
they conducted, that women’s experiences in the NOI improved considerably after Wallace 
Mohammed became leader. While they observed that women in the NOI’s early period were 
excluded from leadership positions, they criticized common Western feminist critiques of the 
social status of Muslim women. In 2015, Debra Majeed published the first scholarly monograph 
on polygamy among African-American Muslims. She presented a complex profile that, without 
prejudging polygamy from her perspective as a Westerner, acknowledged both positive and 




Sources and Methodology  
Initially, this study was geared to join a slew of other projects that focused on a specific 
local Muslim community in the United States.
43
 My experience from 2003 to 2010 as the 
religious-affairs reporter for the Newark Star-Ledger of New Jersey had introduced me to the 
African-American Salafi community in Newark and East Orange, the hub of the national Salafi 
movement during the 1990s. But after enrolling in graduate school with the intent of writing a 
dissertation focused mainly on that community, a multiplicity of archival resources and oral 
histories became known and available to me, and important national figures in various Muslim-
American communities agreed to let me interview them about the historical period I was 
studying. I included Wallace Mohammed’s movement in my research, and the scope of my 
project became more national.  
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Through use of these data, this project constructs and analyzes an historical narrative of 
the interaction of African American Muslims with Saudi-financed missionary work between 
1975 and 2000. This is an important segment of African-American-Muslim history that has been 
largely neglected by scholars, the void in scholarship owing to its relatively recent vintage, on 
one hand, and also to topics of great intrigue adjacent to either side of the timeline. The decades 
preceding 1975 included the Nation of Islam’s heyday, which has spurred dozens of studies on 
the NOI, Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X.
44
 On the other side of 2000, scholars have 
examined dynamics of post-9/11 Muslim-American communities, as well as anti-Muslim 
sentiment in the United States. Yet the years between 1975 and 2000, the subject of my 
dissertation, include critical developments in both African-American Muslim communities and 
Muslim-American communities as a whole. For African-American Muslims, these years 
witnessed dramatic movement away from the NOI’s form of Islam toward more conventional 
forms of Sunni Islam and, for sizable minorities of African-American Muslims, toward 
Salafism.
45
 For the Muslim-American community overall, these were years of dramatically 
increasing immigration from Muslim-majority countries, a result of the U.S. Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965 that substantively increased immigration from Muslim-majority 
countries.  
Some of my sources are used here for the first time in a scholarly study. Wallace 
Mohammed’s directives to his ministers in 1975, during his first nine months as leader, helped 
me elucidate in Chapter Two the discourse of the transition’s first year, providing newfound 
details and speeches that demonstrate immediate concerns about relationships with Muslims 
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from abroad. These directives were assembled into packets called “Ministers’ Kits” and 
distributed every four to six weeks between March 1975 and January 1976. Usually consisting of 
one hundred to two hundred pages apiece, they were meant for the ministers’ eyes only. Chapter 
Three benefits from archived newspapers of Wallace Mohammed’s organization and transcripts 
of his speeches, which helped me chart and explain the history of his organization’s interactions 
with other Muslim groups.
46
 Chapter Four benefits from internal reports of the Muslim World 
League’s North American office during the early 1980s, which helped me document that 
organization’s proselytizing efforts to African-American Muslims, as well as to other Muslim-
Americans. Oral histories of Muslim-Americans – leaders and non-leaders alike -- also helped 
me provide context and fill gaps in information unaddressed by the documents.
47
  
Using this data has required great care. Oral histories, reliant as they are on flawed and 
subjective memories of past events – usually twenty to fifty years old, for my interviewees -- are 
inherently suspect as records of facts and feelings. Anyone can be fooled by a source’s deliberate 
or unwitting agendas. My interviewees, while discussing their spiritual and religious trajectories, 
were revealing their memories of important, emotional events in their lives from decades ago. In 
addition, many of them probably knew or suspected that their accounts, if published, might have 
ramifications for how Muslim-Americans are publicly viewed in a post-9/11 environment that 
subjects Muslim-American activities and perceived loyalties to high levels of scrutiny by non-
Muslims and Muslims alike. I was almost always able to corroborate the basic facts of oral 
histories from broader historical accounts in books and periodicals, other documentary evidence, 
or other interviews. 
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In choosing people to interview, I was aware of two general categories: leaders in 
Muslim communities, and non-leaders. In chapters two through four, which cover areas for 
which documentary evidence was readily available, the oral histories tended to serve the purpose 
of providing context and filling historical gaps. It seemed more important in these chapters to 
rely on interviews of Muslim-American leaders, or people who were close to them, who recalled 
important details of contemporary communal life and controversies. In chapter five, the oral 
histories played a more significant role in constructing the historical narrative, as there existed 
few other sources.  
Like oral histories, documentary sources also require scrutiny and cannot be taken at face 
value. The most widely cited periodical in this dissertation, the Muslim Journal, was a house 
organ for Wallace Mohammed’s movement, and the Journal of the Muslim World League 
fulfilled a similar role for that Saudi-based organization. Each had the type of self-professed, 
organizational agenda that spurs a researcher to extra caution when evaluating matters other than 
names, dates and details of events.  
The sheer volume of available recordings of Wallace Mohammed and other African-
American Muslims, especially Salafis, presented another issue. Literally thousands of them were 
available, with most lasting between one and three hours. It simply would have impractical to 
listen to more than samplings. Over his thirty-three years of leadership, Wallace Mohammed had 
virtually every one of his sermons recorded; one loyal follower plausibly estimated the number 
of recordings at two thousand. It was necessary for me to choose which ones to listen to in their 
entirety. I accepted guidance in this choice by the lectures’ titles, their dates, and the advice of 
members of his community who were extremely familiar with his speaking history. 
24 
 
This study has three main limitations. One is a gender imbalance in sourcing. In creating 
and analyzing various narratives of power, transition and cultural diplomacy, I utilized archives 
and data that tended to rely on male-centered discourse. That said, the experiences of African 
American Muslim women among Wallace Mohammed’s followers and within the Salafi 
movement are discussed in three of the five chapters of this dissertation. And I interviewed 
women and incorporated their oral histories into my broader narratives. Yet the central narratives 
on the relationships between African American Muslims and Saudi religious leaders tend to be 
driven by archival resources and other data that were more concerned with men’s views and 
statements than women’s.  
A second limitation of this study is that by focusing on Wallace Mohammed’s 
organization and the Salafi movement, I neglect the careful study of several other known groups 
in African American communities, among them the Addeyne Allahe-Universal Arabic 
Association, the Dar al-Islam movement, Sufi movements, the Islamic Mission of America, and 
the Reconstituted Nation of Islam led by Minister Louis Farrakhan. My neglect of these groups is 
not meant to suggest that they have not played notable roles within the history of Islam among 
African Americans.
 48
 My focus on Wallace Mohammed’s organization and the Salafi movement 
owes to these specific groups’ long-term relationships with Saudi and Saudi-financed institutions.   
A third limitation of this study is uncertainty over the size of the studied African 
American Muslim populations. To develop a sound estimate, I would have needed not only the 
size of the Muslim-American population as a whole, but also of African American Muslims as a 
single group within that population, and further breakdowns for different African American 
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Muslim groups. Yet estimating any U.S. religious population is difficult, as the census bureau 
does not inquire about religion. Estimates for Wallace Mohammed’s group range from the tens 
of thousands to hundreds of thousands; for African American Salafis, from the thousands to tens 
of thousands. There exist no scientific estimates of the sizes of the Nation of Islam, Wallace 
Mohammed’s organization, or of the African-American Salafi population.
49
  
This study consists of five chapters. Chapter One, New Transnationalisms for African 
American Muslims, elucidates the meanings of old and new Islamic transnationalisms within the 
narratives of African American history. The structure of this chapter is as follows: First, it 
explores the history of transnationalism as a loosely defined field of scholarship, broadly and 
then with particular resonance for African American history. Second, it relates transnationalism 
to notions of counter-citizenship that were significant to the political and religious consciousness 
of African American Muslims in the early 20th century, both in how these groups envisioned 
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themselves and how they interacted with the Muslim International. The following section 
demonstrates how Wallace Mohammed’s approach dramatically altered this worldview through 
his quest to incorporate African American Muslims into the American mainstream. The section 
after that explores the history of the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. government and 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The final section explores the transnational elements of the Salafi 
movement among African Americans, which was more closely associated with Saudi religious 
leaders than any previous American Muslim movement.  
Chapter Two, The Transition of 1975, situates the Nation of Islam’s major transition 
within a decades-long trajectory leading to 1975, the year Elijah Muhammad died and his 
successor (and son) Wallace Mohammed embraced more conventional Sunni norms for the 
organization. It analyzes the discourse surrounding these theological changes, especially 
regarding relationships with Muslims from abroad. The first main section explores shifts in NOI 
religious teachings during the decades and years approaching 1975, demonstrating how they 
hinted at changes from the NOI’s racialist teachings. Elijah Muhammad’s teachings were not as 
forcefully expressed in his later decades as in his earlier ones, and Wallace Mohammed’s new 
direction, while significant, did not appear to have emerged from nowhere. The chapter’s next 
section uses oral histories and recordings of sermons to recast the narrative of the NOI’s change 
of leadership in 1975, while also focusing on the organization’s relationships with Muslims from 
abroad. The rest of the chapter uses a previously untapped source – thick packets called 
“Ministers Kits” that included confidential directives from Wallace Mohammed to his ministers 
and minutes of private meetings. I use these kits for a systematic examination of NOI discourse 
on the broader Sunni Islamic world; on Wallace Mohammed’s instructions to his ministers about 
the transition; and on changing gender norms that affected Muslims in the organization. The 
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chapter’s final section then examines the NOI’s internal discourse regarding its tense relationship 
with, and feelings toward, Muslims from around the world.  
Chapter Three, Wallace Mohammed’s Organization and the Saudis, 1975-1995, analyzes 
the often-tumultuous relationship between the largest African-American Muslim organization 
and Saudi religious leaders and institutions during the first two decades of Wallace Mohammed’s 
leadership. The first section examines the nature and extent of financial assistance and religious 
education that Wallace Mohammed’s organization received from Saudi Arabia and other 
selected parts of the Muslim world, exploring why it was not more substantive. The next section 
explores the political dilemmas facing this African American Muslim organization as it 
attempted to set foreign-policy positions in the 1970s that would alienate neither other Muslims 
nor the U.S. government. The chapter then explores critical interactions between Saudi-financed 
missionaries and African Americans in Wallace Mohammed’s organization as the former 
positioned themselves to guide the latter on Islamic beliefs, practices and rituals. Next, the 
chapter explores how Wallace Mohammed’s organization altered gender norms governing its 
members during this period. The two sections after that explore Wallace Mohammed’s 
contentious relationships with his own ministers and with immigrant Muslims, showing how 
both sets of relationships related to the overarching relationship with the Saudis. The final parts 
of this chapter focus on a new era of the relationship, when Wallace Mohammed and delegations 
of ministers traveled four times to Saudi Arabia in 1990 and 1991. These visits had multiple 
purposes: showing support for the royal family during the Persian Gulf War; seeking Saudi 
money for the movement’s school system; and providing support to the U.S. war effort.   
 Chapter Four, The Muslim World League in a “Muslim-Minority Land,” 1975 to 1985, 
contextualizes African American Muslims’ interactions with Saudi Arabia as one part of the 
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kingdom’s broad international proselytizing campaign. Focusing on the intercontinental efforts 
of one Saudi-funded agency, the Muslim World League, the chapter examines the historic and 
contemporary relationships between the Muslim-majority world and places where Muslims live 
as religious minorities. The chapter’s first main section analyzes the early history and growth of 
the Muslim World League from its 1962 creation, showing how its first priorities lay in countries 
with larger, more established Muslim populations than those found in the United States. Its next 
section analyzes the MWL’s method of employing non-Saudi locals in its target countries, a 
strategy that helps ensure its workers will understand the cultures of the Muslim communities 
they work with. The chapter then links Saudi missionary work to the historic relationship 
between Muslim-majority regions and Muslim-minority ones, broadly reviewing opinions of 
Islamic jurists on the needs and responsibilities of Muslims who live under non-Muslim rule. 
The following section explores the growth in Muslim-American populations and organizations 
through five stages of immigration from the 1870s to the present, as identified by the researchers 
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Adair T. Lummis in their 1987 study.
50
 The chapter then contrasts 
the Muslim World League’s approach to missionary work in Muslim-majority countries to its 
approach in the West, with special attention to a MWL-sponsored event, the “First Islamic 
Conference of North America,” held in 1977 in Newark, New Jersey.  
Chapter Five, A Salafi Movement among African-Americans, analyzes the self-identified 
Salafi movement among African Americans, contrasting it not only with the old Islamic 
transnationalism of the NOI but also with the newer Islamic transnationalism of Wallace 
Mohammed’s movement in its willingness to broadly accept religious guidance from Saudi 
Arabia. The chapter’s first main section historicizes the African-American Salafi movement and 
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clarifies common usage of the term Salafi not only to distinguish this group of Muslims from 
others, but also to distinguish different types of Salafis from one another. The chapter then 
analyzes the role of Saudi universities, which provided scholarships to people who would 
become key African-American Salafi leaders. It then profiles the Salafi community of East 
Orange, New Jersey, which in the 1990s was the hub of a burgeoning national movement. The 
next section uses a series of communal conflicts in East Orange involving prominent Saudi 
shaykhs to explore how religious authority was contested among African-American Salafis. It 
than explores marriage and gender issues among African American Salafis. Finally, it explores 
the question of “Saudi-ization,” the degree to which the dynamics of Muslim communities – 
Salafi ones in particular – are influenced by Saudi missionary efforts. 
 
Conclusion 
The importance of these transnational religious issues transcends African-American-
Muslim history to include the collective experience of Muslim-Americans as a larger group. 
Better understandings of these issues can illuminate dilemmas of identity faced by Muslim-
Americans born in or descended from other countries, who are constantly negotiating their 
American and Muslim identities in at least three separate sites: within the broader Muslim-
American community, within American society as a whole, and within the worldwide Muslim 
community. (The Muslim-American experience mirrors that of other American ethnic and 
religious groups in this regard.) And while this study focuses on the quarter-century prior to 9/11, 
it nonetheless informs post-9/11 scholarship on Islam in America by shedding light on essential 



























In her wide-ranging, illuminating monograph Islam is a Foreign Country, the historical 
anthropologist Zareena Grewal explores how Islamic authority is imagined by different groups of 
American Muslims, and the degree to which they locate it overseas rather than in the West. As 
part of her quest she examines where the United States falls within the “moral geographies” of 
Muslim-Americans; in the case of African American Muslims, in particular, the United States 
has played a dystopic role, in contrast to the “Muslim World” overseas, which has served as a 
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The main subjects of Grewal’s inquiries are young American Muslim “student travelers” 
of diverse ethnicities who leave the United States for weeks, months or years to study Islamic 
theology, jurisprudence, proselytization, and the Arabic language, to reside in countries with 
historic Muslim populations and scholarly traditions.
53
 They partake in the historic Islamic 
tradition of the rihla, a journey taken for the sake of Islamic knowledge. Their main goal, she 
writes after having interviewed dozens of them, is to “retrieve bodies of traditional knowledge 
and make them accessible to American Muslims in US mosques on their return.” They can then, 
they believe, help to raise the level of Islamic discourse in the United States.
54
 Grewal asks, 
What led these student travelers to seek this knowledge from scholars abroad rather than from 
Muslim authorities in the United States? What perceptions of the “Muslim World,” and the 
American role in in it, did they ascribe to? She posits that these Muslim travelers, in seeking 




Their imaginations of, and engagements with, an Islamic world that exists as a distinct 
territorial entity outside the United States, are relevant to a core matter of the present study: how 
and why a subset of African American Muslims has aligned itself with Islamic worldviews of 
Sunni Muslim leaders in Saudi Arabia. The Muslim world overseas, as an imagined whole, has 
long occupied important space in the political imaginaries of African-Americans. From the 
1950s through the early 1970s, African American Muslims played notable roles in transnational 
political alliances, siding with Arab nationalists and non-Muslim leftists in opposition to the 
Western dominance of world politics. The film and media studies professor Sohail Daulatzai 
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refers to this ideological alliance as the “Muslim International,” an entity consisting of “those 
who struggle for dignity by other means after being left at the margins by the violence of 
neoliberalism.”
56
 The Nation of Islam figures Malcolm X and Elijah Muhammad served 
especially significant roles in this regard until their deaths in 1965 and 1975, respectively.  
And yet after 1975, I argue, the role of African American Muslims within this imagined 
political alliance would change dramatically, due to the practices and loyalties of the two 
significant groups discussed in the present study. These two groups were Wallace Mohammed’s 
organization and a movement of self-identifying Salafi Muslims that arrived on the scene later. 
These groups had little to no interaction with one another, yet in their distinct manners they 
nurtured connections with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a crucial ally of the U.S. government. 
While the kingdom governed the areas including the two holiest sites in Islam, a distinction 
bestowing authenticity in Muslim imaginations around the world, the royal family was a rival of 
the Egyptian government, whose former president Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, an advocate of Arab 
nationalism, had been a hero to the Nation of Islam and the rest of the Muslim International for 
his defiant stances against Great Britain, France and the United States. After 1975, the dominant 
relationships between African American Muslims and Saudi Arabia would favor pan-Islamic 
imaginaries, while complicating African-American Muslims’ conceptions of religious 
authenticity and authority. 
This chapter situates these transnational components within the contexts of the Cold War, 
post-colonialism, Islamic revivalism, the U.S. government’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, and 
the Nation of Islam’s history. The NOI’s racial views and religious heterodoxies would play 
significant roles in the communal consciousness of Wallace Mohammed’s organization and the 
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Salafi movement, both of which purposefully avoided political engagement that might brand 
them overly concerned with secular politics. This entailed placing less emphasis on racial issues 
and global politics than had the Nation of Islam, and instead stressing their connections to the 
global Islamic world. (As noted, the NOI and other, earlier groups of African American Muslims 
had also linked themselves to the Islamic world abroad.)  
The main purpose of the chapter is to elucidate the distinct meanings of old and new 
Islamic transnationalisms within the narratives of African American history. The chapter’s 
structure is as follows: First, it explores the history of transnationalism as a field of scholarship, 
broadly and then with particular resonance for African American history. Second, it relates 
transnationalism to notions of counter-citizenship that were significant to the political and 
religious consciousness of African American Muslims in the early- and mid-20th century, The 
next section demonstrates how Wallace Mohammed’s approach dramatically altered this 
worldview through his quest to incorporate African American Muslims into the American 
mainstream. The section after that explores the history of the diplomatic relationship between the 
U.S. government and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The final section explores the transnational 
elements of the Salafi movement among African Americans, which was more closely associated 
with Saudi religious leaders than any previous American Muslim movement.  
 
Transcending National Borders  
In analyzing how American student-travelers conceptualized the Muslim World and 
Islamic knowledge, Grewal’s aforementioned monograph stands as a worthy entry to a body of 
scholarship, transnational in focus, which has grown since the 1980s. A loosely defined 
interdisciplinary field, transnational studies has explored the movement and circulation of ideas 
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across national boundaries, benefiting from an increased awareness that theses stemming from 
the experiences of just a single country can produce overly narrow perspectives and conclusions. 
It is well suited to the present study on African-American Muslims’ interactions with Saudi 
Arabia -- not just due to the transnational spread of Islam, but also because of African American 
Muslims’ perceived attachments to the worldwide Muslim community that have provided them 
with “imagined communities that are global and inclusive in ways their experience as U.S. 
citizens fails to be.”
57
  
Many historians, when discussing scholarly treatment of nationalism and its limits, cite 
the publication of Imagined Communities in 1983 by Benedict Anderson.
58
 Anderson, an 
historian and political scientist, argued that all notions of national unity are only imagined; every 
nation is, instead, essentially an “imagined community” of people who conjure connections to 
their compatriots, most of whom they have never met. He observed that national boundaries are 
artificially and socially constructed, rather than natural or logical delineations for the world.
59
 It 
could follow, then, that people’s national loyalties could be less significant than commonly 
assumed, prioritized below “transnational” connections with citizens of other countries who are 
of the same race, ethnicity or religion. In 2004, Shelly Fischer Fishkin cited a recent 
“transnational turn” in scholarship that had increased historians’ emphases on the 
“multidirectional flows of peoples, ideas, and goods, and thrown into question the naturalness of 
political, geographical and epistemological boundaries.”
60
 Much of the scholarship focuses on 
“global networks of religious activists,” who meet, communicate ideas, transfer money to each 
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other, and come to identify more with religious dogma than with ideologies as nationalism, 
community or liberal democracy.
61
 The political scientist Jeff Haynes identified the global 
Muslim community and the Roman Catholic Church as examples of “transnational civil 
societ[ies]… which have important ramifications for the development of local and interstate 
religious political cultures.”
62
   
In 1999, the Journal of American History devoted a special issue to transnational 
approaches in the discipline. David Thelan, the editor, succinctly articulated the project’s 
importance: “Nation-states look fragile, constructed, imagined,” he observed, “even as they 
possess the very real capacities to collect taxes, recruit and deploy armed forces, manage legal 
systems, and allocate resources.”
63
 The discipline has regarded transnational studies as an 
explicit focus only since 1990, lagging behind the disciplines of law, anthropology and political 
science, which took up the transnational decades ago.
64
 And no agreement exists on a definition 
that would clearly differentiate transnational history from other modes of international history, 
such as comparative or global. What does exist is a negative definition -- transnational histories 
are alternatives to histories that are strictly national in scope.
65
 
While the explicit idea of “transnational history” is recent, it is clear that the roots of 
transnational foci in Western scholarship run deep. The term itself dates to the World War I era, 
to Randolph Bourne’s 1916 essay “Trans-National America” in the Atlantic Monthly.
66
 Bourne 
used it while rejecting the theory of the American “melting pot.” His article noted that 
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immigrants in the United States, once they assimilated, became established and accumulated 
wealth, increasingly cultivated the traditions of their homelands. He said, 
Assimilation, in other words, instead of washing out the memories of Europe,  
made them more and more intensely real. Just as these clusters became more  
and more objectively American, did they become more and more German or 
Scandinavian or Bohemian or Polish… America is coming to be, not a nationality  
but a trans-nationality, a weaving back and forth, with the other lands, of many  




If the Melting Pot theory was insufficient to explain the assimilation narratives of 
immigrants in the United States, then what replaced it was inherently transnational; newcomers 
to the United States, during various stages of assimilation, continued to value their imagined ties 
to home countries. This is one reason that scholars of American religion, Islam in the Middle 
East, and African-American history – the fields explored in this study -- have increasingly 
observed that the best research practices encompass data from more than just one country. 
“[R]eligion is increasingly viewed as a transnational phenomenon,” wrote the sociologists Robert 
Wuthnow and Stephen Offutt in 2008. “Although it exists in local communities and is 
distinctively influenced by a national cultural and political context, it has connections with the 
wider world and is influenced by these relations.”
68
 They expressed wonder that scholarship has 
focused on the religious diasporas of so-called “micro-communities” -- Haitians in Harlem, 
Christians in China, and Central Americans in Houston – rather than on larger, more popular 
Christian denominations in the United States such as Roman Catholics, whose transnational 
interests are obvious.
69
 And while transnational ties of religionists to their holy lands are not new, 
they have become more “pronounced” in recent decades due to “e-mail, the Internet, faster 
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aviation, and cheaper shipping making it easier to communicate and travel.”
70
 Increased 
migration in recent decades has also supported the trend.
71
  
Within the American academy, African-American history has always been studied on a 
transnational level, across disciplinary boundaries, due to the nature of the transatlantic slave 
trade as well as the indignities faced by African-Americans that, in threatening their sense of U.S. 
citizenship, ultimately oriented their moral geographies toward Africa or Asia.
72
 Robin D.G. 
Kelley, writing for a 1999 special issue on transnational history for the Journal of American 
History, found that African-American scholars and journalists had been immersed in 
transnational topics, without using the word, in the late nineteenth century. Among them was 
W.E.B. Du Bois, who famously wrote of the “double-consciousness” faced by black Americans 
who, to put it one way, had to constantly negotiate between their American and African 
identities.
73
 Later, Hubert Harrison, a journalist/activist, in his book When Africa Awakes, titled 
one of his chapters “Our International Consciousness,” in which he called on African-Americans 
to support decolonization struggles in India, Africa, Ireland, and Egypt.
74
 Carter Woodson, in 
1921, wrote, “The citizenship of the Negro in this country is a fiction,”
75
 effectively asking: To 
what country did he or she belong?  
Paul Gilroy, in Black Atlantic, used the image of a ship crossing the Atlantic Ocean to 
posit the merits of transnational approaches to African-American history. Routes were just as 
important as roots; the ships, he wrote, “immediately focus attention on the middle passage, on 
the various projects for redemptive return to an African homeland, on the circulation of ideas and 
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activists as well as the movement of key cultural and political artefacts [sic]: tracts, books, 
gramophone records, and choirs.”
76
 Scholars needed to re-think the significance of nation-states 
as political, economic and cultural units, Gilroy wrote, given that “neither political nor economic 
structures are still simply co-extensive with national borders.”
77
  
By definition, the study of diasporas – whether ethnic or religious – is inherently 
transnational in nature, involving peoples who conceive of themselves in relation to their 
perceived, distant and collective homeland. The nineteenth century African American journalist 
and abolitionist Martin Delany observed the social problems faced by various diaspora 
communities – Poles in Russia, Hungarians in Austria, and Jews in Europe. These groups lived 
in homelands assimilated into empires, rather than as a people moved from one region to another, 
but their members endured less political equality than their compatriots and held “peculiar 
positions” in their societies. Jews, the religious group he referred to, were “maintaining their 
national characteristics, and looking forward in high hopes of seeing the day when they may 
return to their former national position of self-government and independence let that be in 
whatever part of the habitable world that it may.”
78
  
The alienation of these groups from their countries’ majority populations spurred a sense 
that they belonged in a different geographic space, similar to the predicament of African 
Americans. In the mid-nineteenth century, thousands of black Americans moved to Liberia for 
the chance to live free and unharassed by American racism. The analogy should not be taken too 
far; imagined connections to Africa, powerful as they were, did not lead to large migrations. The 
vast majority of freed black Americans stayed put, and most black opinion leaders opposed this 
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so-called colonization of black Westerners, pressing instead for full rights in the United States, 
where the vast majority of them had been born. 
 
African-American Muslims, Counter-citizenship and Geopolitics 
The small yet influential minority of African Americans who accepted Islam in the early-
to-mid-20th century learned from their religious leaders to look to the Muslim world, rather than 
to the United States or the African continent in and of itself, for their roots and true identities. In 
the process they collectively formed what Sohail Daulatzai has termed a “symbolic counter-
citizenship,” defined as “an identity that challenged black incorporation into the dominant 
discourse of Judeo-Christian Americanness.”
79
 Their embrace of Islam so profoundly upset the 
dominant societal narrative that they did not speak of themselves as “converts” to Islam; rather, 
they were “reverts,” gravitating back to the Islam that they posited as their origin. In time, limits 
to this ideological alliance would present themselves when African Americans learned of, and 
experienced, the legacies of racism in Arab countries, including slavery in parts of the Muslim-
majority world.
80
 Still, in the first half of the 20th century at least tens of thousands of African 
Americans joined Islamic or “proto-Islamic” groups such as the Ahmadiyya Movement, the 
Moorish Science Temple of America, and the Nation of Islam, remapping their religious and 
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national identities in the process.
81
 I will consider each of these three groups briefly here, with a 
special emphasis on the NOI. 
In the 1920s, the India-based Ahmadiyya movement taught its converts – many of whom 
were African American – that their Islamic identities transcended their American ones, due to the 
internationality of Islam. The Ahmadiyya movement, headed in the United States by an Indian 
immigrant known as Mufti Muhammad Sadiq, posited connections between Christianity and the 
racist realities plaguing African Americans, holding that Islam, by contrast, “does away with all 
distinctions of race, color, and creed.”
82
 Sadiq and his successor, Mohammed Yusuf Khan, 
attempted to internationalize his followers’ experience of being Muslim, placing advertisements 
that invited them to services so they could learn the religion of their “forefathers.”  
The Moorish Science Temple of America, established in 1925, posited a more territorial 
Islamic identity, one explicitly located outside the United States. Its founder, Noble Drew Ali, 
taught his African American members that they were “not Negroes. Rather, their true nationality 
is ‘Moorish Americans.’” Followers carried membership cards with the following language: 
“This is your Nationality and Identification Card for the Moorish Science Temple of America 
and Birthrights for the Moorish Americans… I do hereby declare that you are a Moslem under 
the Divine Laws of the Holy Koran of Mecca.” It said, at the end, in quotation marks, “I am a 
citizen of the U.S.A.”
83
 This served for Drew Ali what religious studies professor Kambiz 
GhaneaBassiri called a “de-negrofying’ process that was designed to ascribe to his followers a 
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 Like Ahmadis, MSTA members wore turbans, robes and fezzes at 
their leaders’ direction, another way of separating themselves figuratively from American society 
and associating themselves with cultural norms in the Muslim-majority world. This clothing, 
Grewal posits, also “symbolized a historical and divine recovery of knowledge lost in the tragic 
upheaval of American slavery that had wrenched Islam from African slaves, akin to the 
quotidian objects that archeologists use to provisionally reconstruct history.”
85
 
The Nation of Islam, the most historically significant of these groups, also emphasized 
international connections, classifying followers with terms such as “Asiatic” and “Moorish.” 
Histories have linked the NOI’s development to the Moorish Science Temple, with one 
contending that longtime NOI leader Elijah Muhammad had been a member.
86
  
All three of the organizations just mentioned contained significant heterodoxies that drew 
criticism from the Muslim world overseas and from Muslim immigrants in the United States.
87
 
Yet it was the NOI, founded after the other two, which would achieve the largest following of 
these groups and therefore encounter the most resistance from Muslims from abroad. The NOI 
taught that God had appeared in human form in the 20th century, in the form of Master Farad 
Muhammad. It taught that Elijah Muhammad was a prophet, that black people were “the original 
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man,” and that a black scientist named Yakub had created the white race. It taught there was no 
afterlife. These teachings, while criticized as lacking Qur’anic grounding, contributed to an 
historical narrative that elevated the social status of African Americans forced to deal with the 
degradations of racist realities in the United States. After 1975, Wallace Mohammed would 
eliminate the NOI’s usage of the term Asiatic, encouraging his followers to embrace their 
American identities. And African-American Salafis would strive to eliminate regional Islamic 
traditions in favor of purportedly universal conceptions of the practices of the earliest Muslims. 
But for the early- and mid-twentieth-century African American Muslims, faced with Jim Crow 
segregation and northern racism in a Christian-majority country, Islam served as a connector to 
an international religion-based culture seemingly devoid of racism, as well as a communal 
identity predating the United States and thus challenging U.S. authority over African Americans’ 
personhood.  
 
African-Americans and Post-colonialism 
Wallace Mohammed became leader of the NOI in 1975. By that time, the NOI had for 
decades produced rhetoric imagining and seeking connections with the Muslim world abroad, 
much of which was emerging from European colonial rule. In 1957, Elijah Muhammad sent 
congratulations to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Sudan. (Signs around Khartoum, 
the host city, that welcomed foreign leaders read, “Down with U.S. Imperialism and its Puppet 
Israel.”). Nasser returned the favor the following year, extending greetings to the NOI on its 
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annual “Savior’s Day” celebration.
88
 And in 1959 Elijah Muhammad remarked that the NOI was 
“backed by five hundred million people, who are lifting their voices to Allah five times a day.”
89
 
The NOI’s members were not alone among black Americans in drawing these 
connections and transnational ideological and religious alliances. Black activists and black artists, 
across religious lines, had long challenged the narratives of American exceptionalism, that is, the 
idea that the United States holds a privileged and perhaps providentially approved place in the 
world as a purveyor of democratic ideals. They also opposed the notion of U.S. leadership of the 
“free world,” often voicing solidarity with forces in the Muslim Third World allied against U.S. 
foreign-policy goals and imperialism in general.
90
 In 1887, the writer and diplomat Edward 
Wilmot Blyden portrayed Christianity, the religion of the West, in a negative light, arguing that 
Islam was better for black people in that it had historically treated new converts as equals, while 
black converts to Christianity remained in their previous social state.
91
 In the 1910s and 1920s, 
Marcus Garvey would call for racial pride and solidarity among black people around the world, 
encouraging them to “stand… together as one man.” Endorsing a pan-Africanism that the 
sociologist E. David Cronon would call “a massive dose of adrenalin” to future Black Nationalist 
movements, Garvey urged black people to move to Africa and live under “a government of our 
own, strong enough to lend protection to the members of our race scattered all over the world.”
92
 
In 1920, the journalist and activist Hubert Harrison called on African-Americans to support 
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decolonization struggles in India, Africa, Ireland, and Egypt, writing in When Africa Awakes, in 
a chapter notably titled “Our International Consciousness.”
93
 In 1946, W.E.B. Du Bois appealed 
to the United Nations for protection of African Americans, asserting that the “color caste system” 
in the United States has “repeatedly led the greatest modern attempt at democratic government to 
deny its political ideals, to falsify its philanthropic assertions, and to make its religion a vast 
hypocrisy.”
94
 These connections to the Muslim International strengthened with the Bandung 
Conference of 1955, in which representatives of twenty-nine non-aligned Asian and African 
countries denounced Soviet and Western imperialist designs on them, as well as the Suez Canal 
Crisis of 1956, in which Britain, France and Israel invaded Egypt.  
Bandung and the Suez crisis, in particular, marked what Melani McAlister called “the 
beginning of a larger transformation, which by the late 1960s would bring black Islam, Arab 
nationalism, and African American radicalism into an ideological alliance.”
95
 Among the 
prominent figures of this so-called Muslim International was Egypt’s Nasser, a rival of the Saudi 
regime in a positioning for leadership in the Arab Muslim world.
96
 Of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it 
was the former that seemed the natural preference for African-Americans; not only had Nasser 
stood his ground with the West in 1956, but he had exchanged supportive letters with Elijah 
Muhammad and visited Harlem (along with Fidel Castro) while in New York attending the 
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United Nations General Assembly in 1960.
97
 The House of Saud, while a nominal ally to African 
American Muslims, was also a strong ally of the U.S. government. 
The most prominent, influential American spokesman for these positions would be the 
NOI’s Malcolm X, who in the 1950s and 1960s urged African-Americans to “unite” with 
Muslims in Asia and Africa. “You know you’ve got to unite with them,” he said, “because there 
are seven hundred million Muslims and we sure need to stop being the minority and become part 
of the majority.” They faced a common enemy, he said -- “the white man,” who had colonized 
and otherwise oppressed Asian and African people in Kenya, the Congo, South Africa, Southern 
Rhodesia, Burma, India, and Pakistan.
98
 
Malcolm X and his ideological allies also rejected the broader notion of American 
exceptionalism. During the Cold War, strains of American exceptionalism had bolstered public 
support in the United States for proactive military or CIA interventions in less powerful countries 
such as Iran, Guatemala, Korea and Vietnam, as long as they could be included into the fight 
against communism to bring about a perceived greater good of humankind. Opposition to 
American exceptionalism had aligned many African-American activists with dark-skinned 
peoples in countries overseas that were battling or emerging from colonialism, often in places 
where communism was preferred to capitalism, or where no widespread preference existed. In 
addition, the Nation of Islam’s alignment with Black Nationalist ideals challenged the goals not 
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just of unrepentant racists but of the liberal integrationists of the Civil Rights Movement, which 
was viewed as deficient in protecting rights of African Americans.
99
 
Inside the United States, Malcolm X in 1964 urged African-Americans not to vote even 
for Democrats, on the grounds that white Democratic politicians who had solicited their votes 
had regularly ignored their needs once in office. Given that Democrats had won large majorities 
of black votes in the most recent presidential elections, and were poised to pass Civil Rights 
legislation over filibustering Republicans, this stance represented a bold rejection of the entire 
American political process. Indeed, Malcolm X would ridicule the notion that African Americans 
could ever view the U.S. government as their own and urged Muslims not to serve in the military. 
His rhetoric against American exceptionalism took no starker a turn than his call in 1965, a week 
before he was assassinated, for a United Nations investigation of the domestic abuses of African-
Americans’ human rights. This of course echoed Du Bois’s attempt of two decades earlier. The 
United States, said Malcolm X, was incapable of resolving its own race problem, which he said 
was “no longer a Negro problem or an American problem but a human problem, 
a problem that was so complex that it was impossible for Uncle Sam  
to solve it himself and therefore we want to get into a body or conference  
with people who are in such positions that they can help us get some kind  





His ideological alignment with Nasser did not prevent Malcolm X – who by this time 
operated independently after having left the NOI – from nurturing a relationship with Saudi 
Arabia. Malcolm needed financial support, and the Saudis hoped to influence the Islamic 
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practices of Muslims around the world, including African-American Muslims.
101
 The kingdom, 
through the Muslim World League that it created and financed, provided his organization with 
fifteen scholarships for the Islamic University of Medina,
102
 and the MWL’s Secretary General, 
Surur al-Sabban, named Malcolm as an official representative for the MWL in the United States, 
with authority to open a religious center in New York.
103
 It also supplied him with an imam, 
Shaykh Ahmed Hassoun, for his Muslim organization, the Muslim Mosque, Inc. Malcolm 
viewed connections abroad as essential to the success of Black Nationalism and Islam alike; the 




The strength of these transnational ties notwithstanding, this counter-citizenship came 
with a price, at least when voiced publicly. The NOI had first gained widespread attention in 
1959 after broadcast of a TV series titled “The Hate that Hate Produced,” which garnered 
negative publicity for the organization due to teachings that all white people were evil, as well as 
for ties of some black Americans to Arab nationalist groups abroad. More public figures, such as 
athletes, would face withering public criticism for voicing transnational solidarities that appeared 
to eclipse their U.S. citizenship.  The heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali – an 
African-American Muslim – faced intense public criticism after publicly explaining, the day he 
won the championship, that his racial and religious identities mattered more to him than his 
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national one. “I’m not an American; I’m a black man,” he told reporters.
105
 Two years later, upon 
refusing to enlist in the U.S. Army, he said, “I’m a member of the Nation of Islam, and we don’t 
have any wars unless they’re called by Allah himself.”
106
 Some athletes have faced death threats 
for not standing during the U.S. national anthem or the singing of “God Bless America” during 
sports events. The best known protest of this sort occurred during the medal ceremonies of the 
1968 Olympics, when sprinters Tommie Smith and John Carlos raised their fists in what was 
viewed as a Black Power salute during the playing of the U.S. national anthem; medal 
ceremonies are usually associated with national pride. The chairman of the International 
Olympic Committee ordered that Smith and Carlos be suspended from future Olympic events.  
 
Wallace Mohammed and U.S. Society  
Wallace Mohammed’s broad alliance with the Saudi kingdom -- a staunch ally of the 
United States and a regional rival to Egypt -- seemed a departure from the spirit of most black 
activism of the period. The Saudis, after all, were a monarchy, standing in opposition to the more 
populist Arab nationalism represented by Nasser that many black intellectuals had embraced. It 
is revealing, then, to examine and historicize Wallace Mohammed’s views about the United 
States and American democracy, as well as the basic contrasts between the rhetoric of Wallace 
Mohammed and that of Malcolm X. The men had been close allies during the latter’s tumultuous 
final years in and out of the Nation of Islam. Both men had increasingly aligned themselves with 
Sunni Islamic beliefs on divinity, prophets, race and the afterlife that contradicted the NOI’s 
theology, and had expressed disgust to one another that Elijah Muhammad had fathered children 
with women other than his wife, Clara Muhammad. Yet while Malcolm X frequently disparaged 
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the authenticity of U.S. citizenship for African-Americans, Wallace Mohammed in 1975 urged 
members of his group to proudly identify as Americans and to participate as fully as possible in 
American public life.  
Under Wallace Mohammed, then, the largest African-American Muslim organization was 
no longer instinctively positioned against U.S. government positions; rather, it would often 
broadly align its positions with U.S. foreign policy and urge members to self-identify as 
American, rather than, say, Asiatic or Moorish. Wallace Mohammed would encourage African-
American Muslims to vote in elections and even to enlist in the military, saying that children 
“should not be discouraged from going into the [military] service,” where they could gain skills 
and education to help them in the domestic job market afterward.
107
  
Wallace Mohammed’s most striking early action in this regard came on July 3, 1977, 
before a crowd of hundreds for what he called “New World Patriotism Day.” At that event, he 
waved the American flag and praised the United States in the starkest terms. “Let me tell you 
something,” he said. “You might not like it, you might not like to hear it from me, you might say 
it sounds Uncle Tomish but America is the greatest land on the face of the Earth.”  In the same 
speech he called for “genuine patriotism,” and after waving the flag at members he asked that 
they “not hav[e] any old emotional hang-ups with the American flag or the American 
government.”
108
 Anticipating criticism for this, he defined the terms of this patriotism so it 
wouldn’t be wrongly regarded as love for all things American.  
[S]ome of our people get the wrong idea and think that we are just  
emotional, sentimental lovers of America. Our emotions are deeper  
than that. You can’t come out of the Nation of Islam and fall into  
any sentimental romance or shallow involvement. You are looking for  
something solid if you’ve got your Muslim senses. Our patriotism is  
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not what some people think. Our patriotism is an acceptance of that  
which supports human existence. We see in the U.S. constitution  
something compatible with our religion and with the concept of man  
in our Holy Book. So we identify with the human spirit in the Constitution.  
We cherish it. We think that beautiful concept is responsible for the  




This was an unforgettable moment for the attendees and one that, when publicized, 
resulted in greater distance between Wallace Mohammed’s organization and potential foreign 
benefactors. “When he picked that flag up, you could feel people’s breath intake, trying to learn 
how to deal with it,” recalled Agieb Bilal, assistant national secretary of the NOI from 1972 
through the end of 1975 and a salaried consultant for Wallace Mohammed from 1978 to 1982. 
“…The Arab governments, the Muslim governments, they couldn’t deal with it, they said, 
‘Why’d you pick up the flag? America is a kufar country, American hates Muslims, and you 
gonna raise the flag?’ They started calling him W.D., Wrong Direction Mohammed.”
110
 
A picture of him waving the flag adorned the cover of the newspaper, which Wallace 
Mohammed knew would be seen by government officials. Not long afterward he received a 
complimentary letter from President Jimmy Carter referring to the gesture, recalled Agieb Bilal. 
And, as this chapter will demonstrate, he was aware his gesture would draw unfavorable notice 
from immigrant Muslim leaders and Muslims overseas, who had wanted him to more strenuously 
oppose U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, most notably American support for Israel. But the 
flag-waving seemed to telegraph that such opposition would not be forthcoming. “He knew,” 
recalled Agieb Bilal, “in so doing [waving the flag], he was sending signals, not just to those 
who thought we should be their tools in America, but also sending signals of reconciliation to 
people in power in America; they didn’t know where Wallace was going when he took over the 
Nation of Islam.” 
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Indeed, far from critiquing the idea of American exceptionalism, as many other black 
intellectual leaders had forcefully done, Wallace Mohammed used its rhetoric in his public 
statements, invoking a “divine hand” that had guided the country’s fate and progress from the 
end of slavery to the successes of civil rights legislation. 
If you can’t see the divine hand on this young nation – and this is a young  
nation, only 201 years old tomorrow – and all of a sudden now everything  
has come out in the open. This is the beauty. This is what makes America  
so great now that America has survived the days that it existed as the pit of  




 Without denying the existence of socio-economic and political struggles facing African 
American communities, Wallace Mohammed expressed as his overarching goal the 
reconciliation of African American Muslims with American society, in contrast to the Nation of 
Islam’s previous promotion of racial separation. “He was able,” said Agieb Bilal, “to explain 
Qur’anically how being black, being American, and being Muslims were not at odds with each 
other.” 
 A telling example of this approach appeared in a series of bicentennial speeches given by 
Wallace Mohammed in 1976, entitled The Birth of the American Spirit. Historically, most public 
discourse on Independence Day in the United States is oriented toward praise of American 
conceptions of freedom and democracy, complete with references to the Declaration of 
Independence and U.S. Constitution. For many black Americans, though, the spirit of these 
celebrations has long been steeped in hypocrisy. In 1852, in the most famous public denunciation 
of July Fourth celebrations, the former slave and abolitionist Frederick Douglass remarked that 
for slaves, July Fourth revealed “more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and 
cruelty to which he is the constant victim.” But one hundred twenty-four years later, in 1976, 
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Wallace Mohammed stated that African-Americans should indeed celebrate the Fourth of July – 
not in a spirit of thanksgiving, but “in the spirit of hope.”  
We are not ready to celebrate in the spirit of thanksgiving because we have  
not received enough from America to say, ‘Thank you.’ We will celebrate  
but we will celebrate in the spirit of hope. We congratulate the leaders of  
the nation for having recognized the signs of the time and for having responded  
well enough to survive. We have the hope that they will continue to recognize  
the signs of the time until they have given us a reason to celebrate the birth  




The thrust of this message to his followers invoked a narrative of progress toward racial 
equality in the United States, and urged African Americans to view themselves as stakeholders in 
the country. “America has become for me like a wife and a mother that leaves me with some bad 
memories,” he said on July 4, 1979. “But they have been too good to me, too long, to separate. 
We’ve invested too much in America.”
113
 His followers should vote, he said, and choose among 
candidates based on questions including: “How does this man treat Muslims in America? What is 
this man saying about Palestinian rights? What is the candidate’s ability to function with even 
hands in the Middle East? Does he appreciate the Arabs in Saudi Arabia and in the Emirates who 
are good friends of the country?”
114
 
During the hostage crisis with Iran, he directly addressed the identity crisis felt by many 
Muslim-Americans, contending that their dual loyalties included strong feelings for both their 
Muslim and their American identities. “We are Muslims,” he said on April 27, 1980, “and 
Muslims feel that hurt of their fellow Muslims. We are Americans and Americans feel the hurt of 
their fellow Americans.” He even suggested a Cold War alliance between the United States and 
Muslim countries: “The American leadership knows that there is no room, no chance that 
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Communism and al-Islam can live together and court each other. So it would seem that the 
leadership of the American people, the Western people, including Europe, would be trying to 
promote a coming together of the so-called Free World and many hundreds of millions of 
Muslims all over the world.”
115
 
The FBI had long noted Wallace Mohammed’s views in favorable terms. The U.S. 
government and white public remained concerned in the mid-1970s about the rhetoric of Black 
Power movements, from which Wallace Mohammed’s statements and overall direction seemed 
to offer relief. Sunni Muslims had been portrayed in media as “good Muslims,” practitioners of 
an egalitarian race-neutral Islam, in contrast to the NOI.
116
 In 1968, the FBI had expressed in 
internal correspondence the desire to either alter the radical philosophy of the NOI upon Elijah 
Muhammad’s death or to destroy the organization. Wallace Mohammed, the only possible 
successor to Elijah Muhammad about whom the bureau was enthusiastic due to his rejection of 
the NOI’s racial theories, was believed by agents to be “the only son of Elijah Muhammad who 




While Wallace Mohammed remained a critic of various U.S. government policies, 
especially its past treatment of African-Americans, he contended that he and other African-
American Muslims should view themselves as full participants in American society. While his 
organization did not instinctively support U.S. government policies, neither did it instinctively 
oppose them, even when those policies ran counter to widespread opinions in the Muslim world. 
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In 1978, he supported the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, despite opposition to 
it by various Muslim groups and governments that it circumvented Palestinian concerns.
118
 In 
1979, he volunteered to help secure the release of American hostages in Iran, and a company 
partly owned by his organization signed a $22 million contract with the U.S. Department of 
Defense to provide prepared meals to the Army. (At the time, it was the largest contract for 
services between the U.S. government and a minority-owned business).
119
 In 1980, when the 
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, he declared it sensible for Western democracies and the 
Islamic world to join together politically against communism due to its opposition to religion. 
The Muslim Journal even ran a classified advertisement in 1990 seeking applicants for 
“Intelligence jobs: CIA, US Customs, DEA, etc.” And in 1991, Wallace Mohammed would 
support both the U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf War and the decision by the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia to let American forces operate from a military base on the Arabian Peninsula, 
despite criticism within the Muslim world on both issues. He would even travel to Saudi Arabia 
intending to speak with U.S. troops who had converted to Islam while in the kingdom.
120
 
In addition, he professed concern for the United States’ image in the Muslim world and 
its relationship with overseas Muslims. In 1979, he lamented that no Muslim-Americans were 
present for the state dinner honoring the King of Morocco on his visit to Washington. He said,  
We are a large Islamic community here and we feel that when Islamic  
                                                          
118
 While sympathizing with the plight of Palestinians, Wallace Mohammed also spoke of Jewish loss during the 
Holocaust. Imam W. Deen Muhammad, “The Middle East Situation is Confused,” Muslim Journal, August 9, 1985. 
And he would say that Egypt and Palestine were ill-equipped to war against countries with better armies. “WCIW 
President Wallace Deen Muhammad: Special Report on Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference,” Bilalian News, June 
15, 1979, 16-17. 
119
 The company, “America Pouch Foods,” was co-owned by Wallace Mohammed’s organization and American 
Pouch Foods International. “Minority Firm Wins Big Order,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, February 1, 1979, 10, 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19790201&id=OlMaAAAAIBAJ&sjid=nikEAAAAIBAJ&pg
=4683,327626&hl=en (accessed June 23, 2016). C. Eric Lincoln, “The Muslim Mission in the Context of American 
Social History,” in ed. Gayraud S. Wilmore, African-American Religious Studies: An Interdisciplinary Anthology, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 352.  
120
 “Muslim-American delegates meet with Saudi Leaders,” Muslim Journal, February 15, 1991, 7. 
56 
 
dignitaries come into this country, to Chicago, or wherever we are, our  
community should at least be invited. I think it’s the desire of several of  
the people in government, but it’s something that I think we ourselves  
haven’t pressed enough. When King Hassan or any other figure from  
the Islamic world comes, I would think the government would want to  
give them the best reception. The best reception would include a person  
or representative from a dignified American-Muslim community, and  




Wallace Mohammed also issued religious rulings that accommodated the assimilation of 
Muslim-Americans into American society, hoping to distance himself from his father’s call for 
separation. In previous decades, NOI members were disciplined for even minor infractions of 
NOI rules. But Wallace Mohammed tended toward leniency when faced with members’ 
questions about the religious permissibility of various practices, such as displaying photographs 
of people at home, and eating non-halal food at friends’ houses. To both of these questions he 
responded in ways that permitted increased participation in American society. He approved the 
display of photographs in houses, saying it was a widespread practice in the Muslim world, and 
contended that even though it was technically forbidden by Islamic teachings, “there are many 
more serious things that we should be talking about.”
122
 As for non-halal food at friends’ houses, 
he said that while it is forbidden by Islam, “we have to understand that we live in a society where 
we are a very small minority, and we have relatives and friends. We can’t isolate ourselves to the 
extent that we don’t visit the homes of relatives and friends and don’t eat with them. We can’t do 
that.” He advised them to weigh the effect of rejecting non-halal food on friendships and that 
whenever they did eat it, they should remember to ask God for forgiveness.
123
 
Decades earlier, his father and Fard Muhammad had given African-Americans their “X” 
names, to distinguish from so-called “slave names” given to their ancestors by Christian slave 
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owners. Wallace Mohammed eliminated “X” names in favor of more identifiably Muslim names 
for his followers, wary of too much separation from mainstream American society. Strategically, 
in 1982 he announced in the pages of his newspaper that he would henceforth be referred to as 
“W. Deen Mohammed,” rather than the name he had been using, Warithudeen Mohammed, 
“because of the difficulty experienced by some non-Muslims in pronouncing his first name.”
 124
  
This was a significant moment; here was the leader of the successor organization of the Nation of 
Islam, an organization that had placed the highest value on signification and identity, deciding to 
alter an essential aspect of his African-American-Muslim identity – his own name – so that non-
Muslims in the United States would feel more comfortable addressing him. Indeed, the Muslim-
American identity that he promoted placed a heavy emphasis on American culture, rather than on 
Arab cultural norms that many African-American Muslims sought to emulate. He criticized that 
tendency in some of his followers, arguing that, historically, Islam “didn’t seek to eradicate the 
cultural life of the people it came to.” And yet, he continued, “[s]ome of us have a tendency to go 
to extremes and try to emulate Arab personality or Pakistani personality.”
125
  
The departure over time was so striking that William L. Van Deburg, in New Day in 
Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975, cited Wallace 
Mohammed’s post-1975 activity at the start of his conclusion as the quintessential example of 
the apparent end of the Black Power Movement. “The messenger’s spirit lived on in the Nation’s 
new leader, Wallace Muhammad,” Van Deburg wrote. “But it was impossible to exorcise the 
feeling that some great change was imminent. The Black Power torch ignited at the time of 
Malcolm X’s assassination seemed to be flickering as Elijah breathed his last.”
126
 Deburg and 
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others, including political scientist Dean Robinson, would note that cultural aspects of the Black 
Power Movement would survive the mid-1970s in a quite robust form. Still, from a political 
standpoint, Wallace Mohammed’s direction – as well as various post-1970 paths taken by top 
leaders of the Black Panther Party -- marked a departure.
127
 
Wallace Mohammed maintained a stated interest in improving the relationship between 
his organization and American society for a full ten years after ascending to leadership. In May 
1985, when announcing the name change of his newspaper from the A.M. Journal to the Muslim 
Journal, he wrote that “the purpose of the newspaper will be to serve the best interests of 
Muslims in the United States and throughout the world, but mainly in the United States, with the 
understanding that the paper’s position is one that allows us to win friends and make progress in 
the United States.” He added that he was not referring to the United States “as a government 
body, but we are talking about the peace-loving, freedom-loving people of these United States.” 
The newspaper would “advocate participatory government and democracy.”
128
 
The NOI rhetoric of his father’s day was not left behind completely in the mid-1970s. 
Louis Farrakhan, who became so dissatisfied with Wallace Mohammed’s approach as leader that 
he left the organization and re-created the Nation of Islam, maintained the leftist critique of the 
U.S. government and American exceptionalism over the ensuing decades. The following 
exchange, from an episode of Sixty Minutes on CBS, illustrates this well. In the segment, the 
famed interviewer Mike Wallace is critical of Farrakhan for visiting with leaders of Nigeria, 
which Wallace asserted was perhaps “the most corrupt nation in the world.” Farrakhan noted 
Nigeria’s relative youth as a nation compared to the United States, which he said was far worse 
and much worthier of moral condemnation.  
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Louis Farrakhan: “Thirty-five years old, that’s what that nation is. Now here’s America, 
two hundred twenty-six years old. You love democracy? But there in Africa, you’re 
trying to force people into a system of government that you just have accepted 30 years 
ago (when) black folk got the right to vote. You’re not in any moral position to tell 
anybody how corrupt they are… Yes there’s corruption there, yes there’s 
mismanagement of resources. Yes, there’s abuse. There’s abuse in every nation on earth, 
including this one. So let’s not play holy to moralize on them. Let’s help them.” 
Mike Wallace: “I’m not moralizing, I asked you a quesiotn and I got an answer.” 
Louis Farrakhan: “Why would you put it as the most corrupt regime in the world? That 
doesn’t make sense.” 
Mike Wallace: “Can you think of one more corrupt?”  
Louis Farrakhan: “Yeah, I’m living in one. I’m living in one. Yeah, you’ve done a hell of 
a thing on this earth so you should to be the one to talk. You should be quiet when it 




U.S. and Saudi Arabia: A Cold War Alliance  
      At least through the early 1980s, U.S-Saudi diplomacy was hardly concerned with 
Muslim-Americans’ religious preferences or habits.
130
 The alliance between the United States 
and the kingdom, dating to the 1930s, had first involved American oil companies operating in the 
Arabian Peninsula with the permission of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. Later it would revolve around U.S. 
access to Saudi oil in return for American support for the ruling House of Saud. Indeed, Wallace 
Mohammed and other African-Americans generally operated independently of the U.S. 
government when interacting with Saudi religious leaders and institutions. For most of the 20th 
century, the two countries’ diplomats occupied themselves with issues of American access to 
petroleum and Cold War concerns; security for the House of Saud, which was engaged in the 
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aforementioned “Arab Cold War”; disputes between Arab nations and Israel, and among Arab 
governments; and the development of infrastructure and technology inside the kingdom.
131
 
 Scholarly treatments of the relationship’s history merit review here. In 1933, just one 
year after King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz finished consolidating the bulk of the Arabian Peninsula under his 
rule, he granted a “concession” to Standard Oil of California (SOCAL), which transferred it to its 
branch, California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC).
132
 The concession allowed the 
company to explore the eastern part of the peninsula for oil and brought to the region a small 
number of American geologists and engineers, who throughout the decade would advise the 
Saudis to widen their borders to incorporate more oil reserves, and who impressed upon the new 
royals the long-term severity of their water problem. Later, the Americans would conduct 
extensive surveys through the desert to provide the new rulers with knowledge of their 
environmental resources and potential concerns in selected regions. Toby Jones observed that 
this scientific expertise had political ramifications, in that the timing of this American guidance 
came when Saudi sovereignty of the peninsula remained uncertain. The scientific nature of their 
work did not shield the Americans from charges that they effectively aided a king in the 
solidification of his realm.
133
 And after 1942, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz would receive U.S. government 
advice that reinforced the idea of a national model in which power flowed from the center to the 
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periphery, and in which peninsula’s periphery – especially its natural resources -- needed to be 
controlled by the center.
134
  
 Looming over SOCAL’s early commercial efforts was British government interest in 
Saudi Arabia. In 1938, the private American company struck oil in the peninsula, and London 
was wary of losing influence to the Americans. It was the British who in previous decades had 
been ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s main financial backers, providing crucial if limited supplies of weapons 
and money during the king’s rise to power. Now, as Washington and London increasingly 
recognized the importance of access to the peninsula’s oil reserves, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz would play the 
countries’ aspirations off of each other, confident that each desired a stake in his future. 
The Americans emerged the victors. After the king sought $6 million from CASOC, on 
top of $3.5 million it already had just provided, the oil company’s executives requested help 
from the U.S. government.
135
 President Roosevelt refused to directly subsidize CASOC, but the 
administration wanted to retain access to Saudi oil, and in 1942, at the height of the Second 
World War, he let Britain channel $10 million in U.S. aid (from the Lend-Lease act) to the king. 
The following year, worried that British use of this American money would solidify London’s 
own position with the king, Roosevelt declared the security of the kingdom an essential war 
interest, making Saudi Arabia itself directly eligible for Lend-Lease aid and eliminating 
confusion as to the funds’ origin.
136
 
A wartime meeting aboard the U.S.S. Quincy on February 14, 1945, between Roosevelt 
and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, improved the relationship further, and when President Harry Truman 
cancelled Lend-Lease aid for Great Britain shortly after the war ended in 1945, he allowed Saudi 
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Arabia to receive it for an entire extra year.
137
 The king preferred the softer American touch, 
proffered largely through U.S. private interests, to the British one, which came straight from the 
London government and which had manifested itself across the British Empire.
138
 Throughout 
the Cold War, successive American administrations sided with the anti-communist monarchy in 
return for secure access to oil.  
The alliance was less steadfast than often portrayed. During the 1950s, each side would 
flirt with the other’s geopolitical opponents. The U.S. administration chafed over the Saudi 
award of a contract to the Greek shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis to transport its oil, while the 
kingdom worried that the United States might ultimately side with Britain against Saudi claims 
over the Buraimi oases, in a disputed border territory in the eastern Arabian Peninsula.
139
 Later, 
the United States courted Nasser of Egypt, the chief proponent of Arab nationalism and regional 
opponent of the Saudis, while the kingdom courted the Soviet Union’s support and threatened to 
evict the United States from its airbase that the Saudis had allowed in Dhahran. Yet these 
difficult moments ran their respective courses and the U.S.-Saudi alliance was maintained, 
gaining strength in 1957 with the announcement of what became known as the “Eisenhower 
Doctrine,” which assured U.S. economic or military support to Middle Eastern countries 
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Its oil-for-security alliance with a monarchy seemed problematic for the U.S. 
government’s Cold War attempts to influence non-aligned countries. U.S. policymakers 
attempted to pressure the House of Saud to accept democratic reforms, but the results were 
lackluster at best. Historians have deemphasized the importance of Crown Prince Faisal’s “Ten 
Point Program” of 1962, which promised significant political reform and stressed the 
propagation of Islam, while officially ending slavery in the kingdom.
141
 Some speculation exists, 
without proof, that it was President John F. Kennedy who urged Faisal to include the anti-slavery 
provision. In either event, Alexei Vassiliev argued in 2002 that the kingdom’s willingness to 
propose reforms, even if barely imposed, reflected its desire to eradicate internal opposition and 
appear in line with “the spirit of the age.”
142
 
 As Robert Vitalis has demonstrated, unsavory aspects abounded in the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship, even leaving aside the American bargain to support a monarchy in return for access 
to oil. CASOC, renamed the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) in 1944, built 
company housing in eastern Saudi Arabia for thousands of employees in a manner that, Vitalis 
argued, echoed the Jim Crow segregation practices then present in the American South. 
American employees of ARAMCO lived in luxurious homes in Dhahran and used top-quality 
facilities while the company’s Arab workers resided in unstable huts, earned meager wages that 
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The late 1960s and 1970s witnessed increased strain in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The 
kingdom and other Arab exporters of petroleum began an embargo of countries that aided Israel 
in the war of June 1967, though the kingdom ended the embargo in September.
144
 Six years later, 
President Nixon’s decision to help Israel during the October 1973 war inflamed existing tensions 
between the kingdom and the United States, leading the Saudis to participate in an embargo of 
oil exports. The embargo lasted until the following spring, leading to the quadrupling of prices to 
twelve dollars a barrel. Yet the U.S.-Saudi relationship recovered quickly. The two countries in 
1974 formed a Joint Economic Commission that met annually to improve the kingdom’s 
infrastructure, and American experts traveled to the kingdom for projects involving water 
desalination, electrical power, agricultural development, transportation planning, and 
government administration.
145
 Weapons sales from the United States to Saudi Arabia figured into 
the relationship as well; having totaled $1.2 billion from fiscal years 1950 to 1973, in fiscal year 
1974 alone they totaled $950 million and included fourteen C-130 military transport aircraft, 
among other materials to expand Saudi Arabia’s Royal Navy and National Guard.
146
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The countries became even more intertwined economically throughout the 1970s with the 
increase in U.S. petroleum imports and the transfer of control of ARAMCO to the kingdom. In 
1976, Saudi Arabia surpassed Canada and Venezuela as the largest exporter of oil to the United 
States; two years earlier the United States had imported 461,000 barrels of oil a day from Saudi 
Arabia, but in 1976 the daily figure was 1.2 million barrels; it has remained between 1 million 
and 1.78 million barrels a day in most of the ensuing years.
147
 The relationship with the Saudis 
was deemed so precious that in 1975, when King Khaled visited the United States at the 
Cleveland Clinic in Ohio, for a medical checkup, and the Saudi ambassador requested a visit for 
him with President Gerald Ford, officials of the U.S. State Department and National Security 
Council allowed it. The reasoning was put forth in a National Security Council memo: “Given 
fact of King’s presence in US and importance of US-Saudi relations, Secretary and White House 
agree that King should be received in fitting manner…”
148
  
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 would lead to a test of the legacy of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, leading to a U.S. response not against a Soviet threat, but an Iraqi one. The United 
States, with its obvious interest in Saudi oil, accepted the kingdom’s carefully arranged invitation 
to open an airbase in the eastern portion of the Arabian Peninsula. This issue, unlike previous 
matters of diplomacy between the two countries, would directly affect American Muslims. The 
U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, while roundly criticized in much of the Muslim world, 
was given religious sanction within the kingdom by the royal family’s favored shaykhs, chief 
among them ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Bin Baz, the future grand mufti. These shaykhs were revered by 
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quietist Salafis -- a large subset of Salafis that included African Americans -- around the world. 
In addition, Wallace Mohammed publicly supported the Saudi decision, even as other American 
Muslim groups voiced opposition. African American Salafis, still fledgling as a group when this 
occurred, did not issue pronouncements but have regarded the decision favorably; this is not 
surprising given their support for the Saudi royal family and their suspicion of nationalism, 
which they associated with Saddam Hussein of Iraq.  
African American Salafis 
The American-Muslim student-travelers who are profiled in Zareena Grewal’s book had 
determined that the Muslim world overseas held the best opportunities for religious education.
149
The rest of this chapter examines the transnational component of a select group of Muslim 
student-travelers – African American Muslims who won years-long scholarships to study Islam 
in Saudi Arabia. Their experiences in the kingdom and then upon their return to the United States 
in the 1980s and 1990s would result in a self-identifying Salafi movement among African 
Americans, one very closely tied to Islamic intellectual networks largely based in the kingdom. 
Like other Islamic movements among African Americans, the Salafi movement was an 
urban one, formed amid the periods of racial and social conflicts that characterized large portions 
of U.S. history in the 20th century. Yet the Salafi movement would prove less overtly political 
on the types of issues that had motivated the Nation of Islam. Indeed, the rhetoric and spirit of 
the Salafi movement was animated less by the “Muslim International” than by the Islamic 
Revival of the mid-20th century.  
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Islam, like other religions, has witnessed many calls for reform and religious renewal 
during its history. In the 1920s, with many Muslim-majority countries occupied or otherwise 
dominated by European countries, a number of Islamic leaders began calling for religious revival. 
Among the most prominent voices was Hasan al-Banna of Egypt, who in 1928 founded the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood taught that Islam should dictate not just people’s spiritual 
lives but also public life and government policy. These ideas, spread by disciples of al-Banna, 
gained footholds with Muslims in other countries. They also met with fierce resistance from 
governments supportive of Arab nationalism that for numerous reasons opposed the use of 
Islamic law to dictate policy. In particular, the government of Egypt, blaming Brotherhood 
members for assassination plots, prosecuted, imprisoned and on occasion executed Brotherhood 
members. Because of this, many members fled to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a regional rival 
of Nasser, in the late 1950s and 1960s, taking the Brotherhood’s ideas about Islamic government 
with them. The Brotherhood would spread its Islamist ideas to other countries as well, including 
the United States, through members who were immigrants. The African-American Muslim 
leader Talib Dawud, a jazz musician and Philadelphia resident, became associated with an 
Egyptian immigrant named Mahmoud Alwan, who introduced him to the Brotherhood’s ideals. 
Dawud, an immigrant from Antigua who was not a member of the Nation of Islam, engaged in 
Islamic missionary work around the country and was a public opponent of the NOI, which he 
criticized as heretical. Shaykh Daoud Ahmad Faisal, founder of a mosque in New York City 
called the Islamic Mission of America, was another non-NOI African American Muslim leader 
influenced by Muslim Brotherhood ideals. A splinter group, called Dar al-Islam, attempted to 
govern its community according to Islamic law; Dar al-Islam followed the teachings of South 
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Asian Islamist Abul A’la Mawdudi, who called on Muslims and Muslim-majority countries to 
accept governance by Islamic law.
150
  
The aforementioned conflict between Nasser and the House of Saud would in retrospect 
play an essential role in the development of the Salafi movement among African Americans 
during the 1980s and 1990s. In one manifestion of what the political scientist Malcolm Kerr 
called the Arab Cold War, the kingdom, always concerned about Nasser’s growing influence in 
the region, reacted to his nationalization of al-Azhar University in Cairo by bolstering its own 
Islamic university system. In 1961, the royal family created the Islamic University of Medina 
(IUM), which would become a vital component in the growth of the Salafi movement. In ensuing 
decades, thousands of Muslims from around the world would come to study there. Usually given 
Saudi-funded scholarships, they were expected to return to their homelands with the ability to 
lead Salafi communities. 
While officially a Saudi endeavor, the university had transnational components as well. The 
aforementioned revivalist Abul A’la Mawdudi, of Pakistan, held advisory roles designing its 
curricula,
151
 and the faculty included Muslim Brotherhood members exiled from Egypt. In its 
early years the faculty also included the highly esteemed Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d.1999), 
a native of Albania and a staunch quietist who ranked high among the best-respected Salafi 
scholars in the world. After he left the university, he lived in Jordan and Lebanon, inspiring 
Salafi movements there while maintaining his relationship with the Saudi shaykh who had 
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invited him to the university in the first place, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Bin Baz.
152
 During the 1990s, 
African-American Salafis, while facing communal disputes involving local leadership, would 
invoke the words of Shaykh Albani, Shaykh Bin Baz and other Salafi scholars as evidence for 
their respective sides. In the twenty-first century, Internet chat rooms and devoted web sites 
would spread these scholars’ words far and wide, around the globe, while making sacred texts 
easily available to anyone with an internet connection, but during the 1990s it was cassette 





 The relationships between African American Muslim organizations and Saudi Arabia 
from 1975 to 2000 marked a departure from the spirit of the “Muslim International” that had 
animated the political and religious imaginations of previous generations of African American 
Muslims.  After the death of Elijah Muhammad, his son Wallace would lead the largest African-
American Muslim organization toward more conventional Sunni Islamic norms and, in the 
process, withdraw his organization from political alliances that were broadly opposed to U.S. 
government policy. His general alliance with Saudi Islamic leaders, while more religious than 
overtly political in nature, was well suited for this. Meanwhile, a fledgling Salafi movement 
embraced an ostensible apoliticism that was linked to the Saudi royal family via the kingdom’s 
university system. As future chapters demonstrate, Wallace Mohammed’s movement would 
resist the religious direction from Saudi Arabia as it related to theology, rituals, dress and 
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language, while Salafis would broadly embrace their relationships with quietist Saudis. Yet the 
transnational politics of both groups would involve stances toward the U.S. government and 
















Chapter Two: The Transition of 1975 
 
We are not today what we were yesterday, not shall we be  
tomorrow what we are today. This is the success of the Nation  
of Islam. Nobody has been able to write about us without his 
writings becoming stale within a few years. 
 




The ascension of Wallace Mohammed to the leadership of the Nation of Islam (NOI) on 
February 26, 1975, ranks high among the landmarks of twentieth-century Muslim-American 
history. The NOI, both the largest African-American and Muslim-American organization alike, 
had previously adhered to a cosmology that distinguished it from other Muslim groups relating to 
beliefs about God, prophets, race and the afterlife.
2
 Wallace Mohammed, however, would 
quickly move to erase these distinctions. The group’s transition toward more conventional 
Islamic norms has been called the largest mass conversion of Muslims in the United States, 
where, admittedly, the bar was low.
3
  Still, regardless of whether it constituted a “conversion” 
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according to common usage of the term – that is, the change from one religion, belief or 
viewpoint to another -- what happened to this organization of tens of thousands of Muslims, if 
not hundreds of thousands, was unusual in Islamic history.  
This chapter demonstrates the level of concern existing within Wallace Mohammed’s 
organization, from the very start, that Muslims from other countries might impinge on the NOI’s 
autonomy. This concern would never dissipate. The chapter begins by reviewing the religious 
background of the NOI during the years preceding the transition, exploring gradual shifts in its 
language that hinted at the coming theological changes. Next, it describes and interprets events 
on the days of and after Elijah Muhammad’s death. The bulk of the chapter then examines 
internal discourse within the organization, its relationship to Sunni Muslims from other countries, 
and changes implemented by Wallace Mohammed relating to rituals, theology, identity, and 
Muslim family life.  
The story of this transition has been told before, though either without the sources used in 
this chapter or with sparing use of them. Most prior accounts exist in biographies of Elijah 
Muhammad or Louis Farrakhan, other NOI leaders;
4
 in journal articles or book chapters;
5
 in 




 or, in one case, a 
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short monograph specifically on the transition.
8
 This chapter benefits from the existence of these 
works, while drawing on previously unused documents from the Nation of Islam collection at the 
Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture – most notably, eight “Ministers’ Kits” that 
were distributed to NOI ministers around the country from the group’s Chicago headquarters. 
These allow for the most systematic examination yet of the NOI’s internal discourse during the 
year Wallace Mohammed became leader, as it related to Islamic rituals, theology, gender roles, 
and marriage. This chapter also benefits from recordings of important NOI meetings and 
gatherings in 1975, as well as from numerous interviews with people who experienced the 
transition in person as high-ranking NOI officials, notable among them Agieb Bilal, the NOI’s 
Assistant National Secretary at the time. 
Existing accounts of the transition also tend to focus on the differences and tensions 
among Wallace Mohammed’s organization and NOI members such as Louis Farrakhan, who 
bristled at the substance of the changes and found them disrespectful to Elijah Muhammad, who 
was Wallace Mohammed’s father and predecessor as NOI leader.
9
 Yet tensions with Muslims 
from overseas, who claimed they were more authentically Islamic, played significant roles in the 
transition as well, as did Wallace Mohammed’s administrative changes, which upset many of the 
NOI ministers who remained with him. My approach is to examine the transition primarily 
through the NOI’s relationships with Muslims from abroad. I argue this allows for a more 
thorough investigation of the organization after 1975, because questions over acceptance and 
resistance of religious guidance from abroad would linger for decades, while the rift with his 
father’s loyalists was resolved early in his tenure.  
 
                                                          
8
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9
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Changes in the works 
Before further exploration of the transition, it is important to examine the religious nature 
of the organization that was about to be transformed. By 1975, though it had not officially 
changed its beliefs, the NOI had already lessened its emphasis on some of its earliest teachings 
and cosmologies that were first introduced in the 1930s. And even as NOI leaders distanced 
themselves from many “orthodox” Islamic practices, NOI members from 1960 to 1975 actually 
increased their collective awareness of these more mainstream Islamic rituals, beliefs, ethics and 
symbols.
10
 One reason is that other Muslims’ criticisms of the NOI’s cosmology had led NOI 
members to increase their familiarity with the Qur’an.
11
 (Unbowed, Elijah Muhammad 
contended that Muslims abroad could not be expected to understand his interpretations because 




The transition of 1975, then, dramatic as it was, did not introduce ideas that NOI 
members had not heard before. Signs of a slight but definite organizational shift had already been 
evident. Elijah Muhammad, since at least the late 1950s, had hesitated to propagate the 
aforementioned Yakub narrative of the creation of the white race, aware that this and other NOI 
teachings had drawn criticism from Muslims overseas. On a personal level, Elijah Muhammad’s 
faith was probably thinning in the truth of the cosmology that Fard had taught him. In searching 
for early signs of a transition, we may ask when Elijah Muhammad may have begun to doubt the 
truth of what Fard had told him. One answer, from Wallace Mohammed, suggests the late 1950s; 
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it comes from a story about Elijah Muhammad and a new, secret Qur’an supposedly meant for 
the future. Wallace reported that Fard had told Elijah that the Qur’an being used in the 1930s 
would someday be updated. Fard then gave Elijah a copy of this supposedly new Qur’an, which 
had a green cover, telling him to keep it secret. One day, apparently in the late 1950s, Elijah 
Muhammad asked Wallace, his seventh child, and Akbar Muhammad, his eighth child, both of 
whom could read Arabic, to scan this green Qur’an and compare it to a regular one. The two sons 
quickly saw the books were identical. There was no update, despite what Fard had reportedly 




Elijah Muhammad likely became more disillusioned with Fard’s cosmology when he first 
traveled to the Middle East in 1959. Fard had told him in the 1930s that the streets of Mecca 
were paved with gold, and that Muslims there didn’t discriminate against people with darker-
colored skin.
14
 What Elijah Muhammad saw there, however, was terrible poverty, and he learned 
about contemporary slavery in Saudi Arabia, which did not end until 1962. On that trip he was 
confronted by Sunni Muslims about the NOI’s theology, as he had been previously in the United 
States. In the years after his return he allowed his “temples” to be called “mosques.” He let NOI 
Muslims choose to align their Ramadan fasts with the rest of the Muslim world -- that is, 
according to the lunar calendar -- rather than in December of each year according to 
longstanding NOI practice.  
Still, Elijah Muhammad persisted in his controversial core teachings and his defiance of 
Sunni authority. “I will say that neither Jeddah nor Mecca have sent me!” he wrote to his 
                                                          
13
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followers in an open letter. “I am sent from Allah and not from the Secretary General of the 
Muslim (World) League! There is no Muslim in Arabia that has the authority to stop me from 
delivering this message.”
15
 He continued to allow NOI members to view him as a prophet, and 
his newspaper continued printing that God had appeared in the human form of Fard Muhammad 
in the early 20th century. Critically, during the 1960s, Elijah suspended people close to him from 
the NOI, including two of his sons, Wallace and Akbar, and a grandson, Hasan Sharif, after they 
disavowed Fard’s divinity in favor of more conventional Sunni Islamic beliefs.
16
 Wallace 
Mohammed had studied Sunni Islam the previous decade in Chicago, but while in prison for 
draft evasion from 1961 to 1963 he had read the Qur’an and other books about Sunni Islam more 
closely and concluded that Fard had invented the NOI’s cosmology. While he would later call 
the disagreements with his father part of a divine plan to bring more African-Americans to Sunni 
Islam, the disagreement was unmistakably bitter at the time. Wallace Mohammed told the 
Chicago Daily Defender that “officers” in the NOI had threatened to beat and kill him, leading 
him to seek protection from the FBI and police.
17 
Hasan Sharif said someone even threw a brick 
through his apartment window, nearly hitting his sleeping child.
18
 And Elijah Muhammad used 
his newspaper, which was extremely well-read within the NOI, to disparage them. 
It was after leaving prison in 1963 that Wallace Mohammed had broken with his father, 
over his father’s relationships with women other than his wife, and his own refusal to say that he 
believed Fard was God.
19
 Hasan Sharif, one of Elijah Muhammad’s grandsons and Wallace 
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Mohammed’s closest nephews, who was suspended at the same time Wallace was, remembered 
when Wallace first conveyed to him his disbelief in Fard. It was in 1963, shortly after Wallace’s 
release from prison and, in retrospect, shortly before they both were suspended from the NOI.  
We were coming out of the drug store on 79
th
 street, a couple of blocks  
from our clothing store and he said “Hasan,” he said, “If Fard ate food,  
he went to the bathroom just like me and you do. He had to wash his  
body just like you and me do. He wasn’t god. He ain’t god” … He said,  
“Let me tell you something. If Fard was standing in front of me right  
now, Hasan I’d grab that dude in his collar and I’d snatch him out of  
his shoes, God as my witness.” When he said it, I instinctively looked  
up to the sky. I knew a lightning bolt was going to hit Uncle Wallace  




Throughout his time as an NOI minister, when he was not suspended, Wallace 
Mohammed had distinguished himself among other NOI ministers by his extensive usage of the 
Qur’an during sermons, and as a teaching tool. The contrast between his approach and that of 
other NOI ministers was evident during his appearance at the main Newark mosque in 1973. As 
W. Deen Shareef, then the temple’s assistant secretary, remembers it, Wallace Mohammed 
ascended a podium in the temple’s balcony to speak, and asked if anyone there had a Qur’an he 
could use. 
There was no Qur’an on the podium. Now if you know about the temple, most  
of the ministers didn’t teach from the Qur’an. So he says, “Is there a Qur’an?” 
And none of the ministers knew where there was a Qur’an… I said, “I know  
where there’s a Qur’an.” I went downstairs, and of course in the larger podium…  
under all this paperwork, all these papers, was the Qur’an. So I took the Qur’an  
from the podium, and brought it upstairs and handed it to the Imam [Wallace 
Mohammed]. And he began to teach from it. And that was the first time I saw  




Elijah Muhammad did not teach from the Qur’an as frequently as his son did. But in 1974, 
when he was seventy-six years old, two more developments occurred that demonstrated further 
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movement in Elijah Muhammad’s thinking. In late February, at that year’s Saviour’s Day 
ceremony, two Turkish scientists sat on the dais as Elijah Muhammad praised their work, saying 
that they and other accomplished white people deserved respect. Later in 1974, during Ramadan, 
which started in mid-September that year, Elijah Muhammad came perhaps the closest he would 
ever come, even semi-publicly, to authorizing Wallace’s different approach. This occurred at a 
dinner meeting of dozens of high-ranking NOI officials. Wallace had recently regained status as 
an NOI minister after returning from his final suspension, but detractors within the organization 
had caught him, on tape, preaching as he had before. They brought the tape to Elijah 
Muhammad’s Chicago home to play it for him. Wallace was present. There, in Elijah’s massive 
dining room, at a large oval table that sat forty people, the leader oversaw what was in essence a 
court hearing, as he typically did for NOI members accused of violating the organization’s rules. 
But the NOI officials, so confident they had “caught” Wallace on tape, were to be disappointed 
in Elijah’s ruling. As Wallace would recount in multiple speeches over the years, and as 
someone else who was present – one of Elijah Muhammad’s granddaughters, Halimah 
Muhammad, who worked in the home as a food-server to guests – related in an interview, Elijah 
on that day “ruled” in favor of his son’s outlook. Halimah Muhammad recounted that Elijah 
Muhammad was extremely ill at the time, his face extremely pale, but that 
toward the end of the [recorded] lecture [of Wallace], I noticed my  
grandfather’s face began to get color in it. He began to smile…  
You could see life getting back into him. He looked happy. And  
when he was finished, he left his seat and clapped his hands  
repeatedly, and he said, “My son got it! I wish I was the man  
that my son is.’ And then he said, “I see the paradise.” He said,  
‘Son, you can take that truth all over the world.’
22
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After gaining his father’s support for his teachings, Wallace Mohammed made speaking 
appearances at NOI mosques over the next few months – in retrospect, the last months of Elijah 
Muhammad’s life. In these speeches he left no doubt that he would eventually be the national 
leader. He said as much in explicit terms at a Fruit of Islam (FOI) meeting at the Harlem mosque 
on January 19, 1975, warning Minister Louis Farrakhan, who was present as leader of the temple, 
to support him when he eventually became leader or risk losing his job.
23
   
The responsibility is going to fall upon me one of these days, and  
when it does, the Brother (Farrakhan) will have his position for as  
long as he lives up to the requirements and demands. But if falls  
victim I will sit him down and nothing will change my order, nothing  
at all. It’ll be just like the Honorable Elijah Muhammad’s order, and  
in fact it will be his order! Brother Secretary is looking at me, saying,  
‘He’s stepping out here, he never said that before,’ but it’s fine for us 
 to know the truth. It’s bad just to go all wondering what will happen. 




Also at the meeting, Wallace said it was henceforth futile for his opponents in New York 
to complain about him to NOI headquarters in Chicago: “Don’t say, ‘Well, I’m going to act on 
this [by reporting him], I’m gonna see what happens to him when he gets back to Chicago, we 
gonna take this back to Chicago’… You lookin’ at Chicago!”
25
 
Earlier in this January meeting, Wallace had offered a reinterpretation of a core NOI 
teaching about Fard and Elijah. While the NOI had viewed Fard as both savior and as God, 
Wallace Mohammed said it was Elijah who should be viewed as the savior – not Fard -- due to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Brother Secretary?
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Elijah’s successes in bringing black people to Islam.
26
 And Wallace’s use of the word “savior” 
for his father did not carry the same divine connotation present in previous NOI parlance; Fard, 
the honoree of the NOI’s annual Saviour’s Day celebration, was believed to have been God, and 
Wallace Muhammad was not claiming that about his father.
27
 
 Indeed, Wallace seemed to stress that it had been his father’s perception that Fard was 
God, as opposed to historical reality. It is noteworthy that this contention echoed an argument 
Wallace made to his mother in the 1960s, while he was banned from the NOI for refusing to 
acknowledge Fard’s divinity. As he related later when telling the story, his mother was trying to 
persuade him to apologize to his father, who wanted him to attest to Fard’s divinity. But his 
mother conceded during this disagreement that Fard himself had never explicitly said he was 
God in the first place; rather, Elijah Muhammad had discerned Fard’s divinity. Later, in 
discussing this topic, Wallace would present his conversation with his mother as reinforcement 
for his disbelief in Fard during a tense time in his life. Yet at this January 1975 meeting, while 
speaking to the Fruit of Islam at the NOI’s New York mosque, Wallace mentioned Elijah 
Muhammad’s vision of Fard as reason to praise his father: 
We have a man coming [Fard] and another man [Elijah Muhammad]  
seeing in that man the coming of God. We have thousands of people  
who’ve witnessed the physical presence of that man, just like the  
Honorable Elijah Muhammad did. But they didn’t see God coming in  
that man. Go back and read the old writings, the old history of the  
coming of Master WD Farad and his teachings in Detroit, Michigan.  
And listen to what those people say that saw him and met him. They  
say they met a professor. They say they met a prophet. They say they  
met a teacher. The Honorable Elijah Muhammad say, ‘I met God.’  
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 While Wallace Mohammed was eager to eschew old NOI teachings, he did not want to be 
viewed as sacrificing the NOI’s autonomy to the Muslim groups his father had long derided as 
“orthodox.” This was a difficult line to toe. Wallace had realized as early as the 1950s that core 
NOI beliefs about Fard could not be supported in the Qur’an. Yet he knew that to vociferously 
argue against them now, in 1975, as he had during his earlier suspensions, would alienate the 
people he hoped to lead, many of whom believed NOI teachings so fully that they saw visions of 
Fard in their minds while praying. In an attempt to turn orthodox criticism of the NOI on its head, 
Wallace Mohammed echoed his father’s use of a dichotomy of “New Islam” vs. “Old Islam,”
29
 
which claimed that it was the NOI that had the “new” Islam, while “so-called Orthodox” 
Muslims still preferred the “old.”
30
   
We don’t have any strange Islam. We have a new, fresh, up-to-date  
interpretation of old Islam. And this new fresh, up-to-date interpretation  
is called New Islam. When we say new, we don’t mean another one.  
We mean one that’s made so fresh again, so attractive to the present-day  
life, that when we look at it, we see a new garment!  
 
“Old man, you’re wearing a new suit there!” The old man says “No, this  
is the same old suit. What I did was, I broke it down, into threads again,  
and I weaved the suit all over.” “Say man, why did you go through all that  
trouble with that old garment?” “I said I discovered this old garment is  
better than anything they could put out new. And all it needs is just (to  





Louis Farrakhan, for his part, praised Wallace Mohammed in effusive terms at that 
January 1975 meeting, saying he was willing to spend the rest of his life telling others to follow 
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him, “because he has what it will take to bring about that which Messenger (Elijah) Muhammad 
envisioned for us.”
32
 But a few days later, when the Harlem mosque hosted another, smaller 
meeting for Wallace Mohammed, Farrakhan seemed more concerned, recalled Siraj Wahhaj, 
then the NOI’s lead Brooklyn minister. At both meetings, the speaker and audience interacted in 
the “call-and-response” manner familiar to African-American churches. At the first meeting, 
Farrakhan’s interjections were completely positive.
33
 Yet at the second, smaller one, Wahhaj 
recalled that Farrakhan, as if responding to Wallace but also talking to himself out loud, said the 




Day of the Transition 
In the years to come, Siraj Wahhaj would become a national figure in African-American-
Muslim communal life. But on February 26, 1975, he was a twenty-four-year-old soldier in the 
Fruit of Islam, and he was distressed by the news of Elijah Muhammad’s death the previous day. 
From his assigned security post at Chicago’s International Amphitheatre, three rows from the 
rostrum, Wahhaj could survey the scene of mass emotional devastation laid out before him: 
twenty thousand of his fellow African-American Muslims, men and women seated separately, in 
shocked mourning over their leader’s death.
35
 
Yet this was not a funeral gathering, and the mourning was mixed with moments of 
elation. It was Saviour’s Day, the Nation of Islam’s annual and jubilant celebration of the 
group’s founder, Fard Muhammad, who the group taught had appeared as God in human form in 
the 1930s. The death of Elijah Muhammad the day before had imbued the event with grief and 
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uncertainty, but it was not without enthusiasm over the naming of a successor. And for Wahhaj 
and for many others present, anxiety loomed over what might come next for the organization. 
After all, Elijah Muhammad’s successor, his son Wallace Mohammed, seemed cast from a very 
different mold. While the father had taught a unique form of Islam with controversial views on 
God and race – views widely rejected by most Muslims outside the NOI as lacking Qur’anic 
grounding -- the son had long demonstrated affinity for more conventional Sunni Islamic norms 
that were prevalent across the Muslim world. This was an affinity that many of his father’s long-
time believers found troubling. Indeed, since 1964, Wallace Mohammed’s refusal to accept Fard 
Muhammad’s divinity had led to his suspension from the NOI at least three times.
36
  
Several years later, Siraj Wahhaj would break from Wallace Mohammed’s organization 
and eventually gain enough stature to be selected, in 1991, as the first Muslim to lead the U.S. 
House of Representatives in prayer before a Congressional session.
37
 (One year after that, in 
1992, Wallace Mohammed would break the same milestone in the U.S. Senate chamber.
38
) But 
on this day in 1975, as the event’s speechmaking neared its mid-point, Wahhaj was just one of 
many people in the arena who didn’t yet know whether they would stay with Wallace 
Mohammed or leave the NOI. Speaker after speaker had risen to eulogize the deceased leader 
and pledge loyalty to his son, but Wahhaj, as he recalled years later, remained non-committal for 
much of the event, waiting to hear his own regional NOI leader address the audience.
39
 That 
regional leader was Minister Louis Farrakhan, who led the NOI’s main New York mosque, and 
who himself would leave the NOI a few years later. During the previous decade, Minister 
Farrakhan had risen to high ranks within the NOI, spreading its message on speaking tours to 
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college campuses across the country. Farrakhan, unlike Wallace Mohammed, had always stayed 
loyal to Elijah Muhammad’s core teachings. If Farrakhan on this day would pledge his loyalty to 




Farrakhan’s moment on the rostrum was infused with drama for other reasons as well. 
For years, especially during the periods when Wallace Mohammed was suspended from the NOI, 
it was Farrakhan who had been most rumored as the successor to Elijah Muhammad. And so, on 
February 26, 1975, Farrakhan approached the lectern not unlike a political candidate who had 
failed to win the primary and now had to endorse an opponent at the party convention – that is, 
as a man who had not gotten what he had wanted, who had been denied it in the most public 
manner possible, and who was now effectively being called to anoint his old competitor. 
Wahhaj and others watched anxiously, but Farrakhan’s tone left no doubt. He threw his 
full support to Wallace Mohammed. After urging his audience to exude joy that day rather than 
mire themselves in grief over Elijah Muhammad’s passing, he cited Wallace’s appointment as an 
example of divine intervention, perhaps a reference to Fard’s legendary prediction – made before 
Wallace Mohammed was born in 1933 -- that he would succeed his father. Cheering intensified 
throughout the amphitheater as Farrakhan, his words primarily a eulogy for Elijah Muhammad, 
interpreted the deceased leader’s life and death as having been “the will of God.” The crowd’s 
approval then climaxed in a roar when he also cited Wallace as the will of God, in a passage 
replete with dramatic pauses (after the italicized words below), all delivered in Farrakhan’s 
distinctive, deliberate cadence that had contributed to his status as the NOI’s most popular orator 
over the previous decade: “His [Elijah Muhammad’s] life was the will of God, his mission was 









When Wallace Mohammed himself stepped to the lectern minutes later, surrounded by 
FOI guards, his nearly hour-long speech did not stray from conventional NOI theology; indeed, 
he mentioned three separate times that Fard Muhammad had been God in human form.
42
 Still, 
some of what he said could be construed, in retrospect, as hints to the crowd that change was in 
the works. He did not refer to white people as “devils” as his father and NOI ministers had done 
in the past. And he implicitly laid the foundation for a new interpretation of NOI teachings, 
stemmed in the contention that Elijah Muhammad had long intended for Wallace to institute 
major reforms as part of a divine plan to lead African-Americans to Islam. This line of reasoning 
would be critical to his new path. He insinuated that his father had approved his future course, so 
that if he appeared to diverge from his father’s path, it was only because few people besides him 
knew what his father truly wanted for the organization.
43
 He said, “The honorable Elijah 
Muhammad didn’t train but a few here. He kept his head to the many and revealed it only to the 
few… But there was another walking with him, learning how to walk his walk when the time 
demanded it.
44




Most in the arena did not know that during the previous evening, February 25, 1975, on 
the very night that his father died, Wallace Mohammed had firmly asserted his authority as 
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leader to the NOI’s ministers and top officials – almost all of whom were already in town for 
Saviour’s Day – and had informed them of major changes to come.
46
 Assembled in the basement 
of the main Chicago mosque, known as Temple No. 2, the ministers listened that night as 
Wallace Mohammed notified them that, as their leader, he planned to place more emphasis on 
Qur’anic teachings than the NOI had in the past, and that they should not teach anything that 
lacked clear backing in the Qur’an. The significance of this is that several NOI beliefs had lacked 
Qur’anic grounding, and not just the teaching that Fard Muhammad was God; also, for example, 
the teaching that Elijah Muhammad had been the final prophet sent by God; that there was no 
afterlife; that polygyny was not allowed; and that the white race was as a race of devils created 
by an evil black scientist named Yakub six thousand years earlier. In fact, Wallace Mohammed 
told the ministers assembled before him that they themselves needed to learn more about the 
Qur’an.
47
 In his words that night, according to a partial transcript distributed two weeks later to 
NOI ministers around the country, he said that  
We must now begin to teach the Holy Qur’an. We must take it  
now off the wall and put it on the rostrum. But you can’t do this  
at once. You have to be taught how to do this… So now we have  





The new leader clearly realized he was walking a fine line and that he risked alienating 
many of his ministers who believed -- or who at least propagated -- the traditional NOI teachings. 
Indeed, many would view the changes as a slap at his father’s legacy. Wallace Mohammed was 
sensitive to this charge: “We are not making any sudden changes,” he insisted at this meeting. 
“We want to be very clear. We are only coming now into a sudden realization of the gradual 
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change that has been made.”
49
 Yet it was clear that new changes were coming. He explicitly told 
the ministers not to publicly say the white man is the devil, and to not teach the Yakub history 
without his office’s permission, which he indicated he would not give.
50
  
 Significantly, Wallace Mohammed tried to alleviate the ministers’ concerns that he would 
surrender the NOI’s autonomy to foreign Muslims. In previous decades, many in the Arab world 
had bristled at the NOI’s religious teachings, and at its emphases on social and economic issues 
in African-American communities rather than on political issues facing the Muslim world 
overseas. While these differences with Muslims of foreign descent garnered less public attention 
than did his later disagreement with Louis Farrakhan, in essence Wallace Mohammed would 
have to fight difficult battles on two fronts. On one front, Farrakhan and others would contend 
that Wallace Mohammed was changing too much, too fast. On the other, Muslim leaders from 
abroad would insist that his pace of change was too slow. In years to come, his organization’s 
growing relationship with the Arab world would cause considerable internal tension as the new 
leader attempted to walk a fine line – seeking religious guidance (and hoping for money) from 
abroad, while striving to maintain autonomy over his group’s religious and political practices. 
Autonomy and masculinity had been central to the NOI’s mission, and members were loath to 
surrender power to outsiders, whatever their race. At the ministers’ meeting on the night his 
father died, Wallace Mohammed was insistent: “Don’t think any Arab is coming here to tell you 
anything,” he said. “If he comes here, he will have to come by me. I don’t care if he’s been 
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He realized, he said the night his father died, that it might seem tempting for the NOI to 
solicit money from oil-rich Arab nations. Yet he insisted that while “certainly we will accept 
gifts… we are not going out there as beggars.”
52
 Standing firm on principle was the best way to 
attract foreign money, he contended, invoking the memory of a $3 million loan his father had 
secured from Libyan ruler Muammar el-Qaddafi in 1972: “The Honorable Elijah Muhammad 
didn’t get a loan from Libya by obliging or by compromising. He got it by standing firm.”
53
 
Muslims abroad, he predicted, would be so impressed with the NOI’s direction that the 
organization would soon be able to attract gifts “from all corners of the world” without much 
difficulty.
54
   
 It was probably little surprise to Wallace Mohammed that the bulk his message to the 
ministers that night, in the words of a top assistant, “went over like a lead balloon.”
55
 Many 
ministers did not trust him due to his long-held beliefs about Fard and his suspensions. Indeed, in 
years to come, large groups of his own ministers – that is, those who chose to stay with him -- 
would present as much of a challenge to his leadership as did Minister Farrakhan and Muslims 
from other countries. Still, on this night Wallace wielded his authority assertively, saying he 
would tolerate no discord and addressing what he realized was a view among them that he was 
asserting control too quickly: “You say, ‘Where did he get all this power?’ It has been given to 
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me through my father.”
56
 Briefly noting his past suspensions from the NOI, he implied that his 
father had actually intended, all along, for him to institute major reforms, and that, the 
suspensions aside, his father had given him space to be himself because he “knew God was 





New look at the transition 
The main primary source used for the remainder of this chapter, the aforementioned 
Ministers’ Kits, allows for the most systematic examination yet undertaken of the changes to the 
Nation of Islam after the death of Elijah Muhammad. While previous accounts of the 1975 
transition do describe the litany of changes instituted by Wallace Mohammed following his 
father’s death, they neither interpret nor recount in detail the discourse accompanying these 
changes. This discourse, which is contained in the Ministers’ Kits, reveals how the NOI managed 
dilemmas regarding its ethnic and religious identities while reckoning with powerful critiques 
put forth by “orthodox” Muslims both overseas and in the United States.  
The Ministers’ Kits consisted of eight thick packets, most of them between one hundred 
to two hundred pages, which were distributed from the NOI’s national Chicago headquarters 
eight times from March 1975 to January 1976 to ministers around the country. They were not 
meant for anyone else’s eyes. Each packet contained a few selected articles from the Muhammad 
Speaks newspaper and, more importantly, transcripts of Wallace Mohammed’s speeches at 
public gatherings and private meetings. They were designed as resources to help ministers 
defend Wallace Mohammed’s new approach. On June 2, he told his ministers,  
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There’s nobody out there with whom you are unable to talk, brother.  
If you don’t recall the answer right off, tell him, ‘Just a minute, it’s  
in this Ministers Kit.’ Open the Ministers Kit on him and just read any  
page. When you finish, say, ‘Mister, do you know who that was talking?  




Taken together, the packets portray a savvy leader determined to change the NOI’s 
religious language, one attempting to mark new ground for African-American Muslims within 
the international Islamic world. They simultaneously demonstrate his concern with moving 
closer to conventional Sunni Islamic norms and his steadfast refusal to acknowledge superior 
Islamic status for Arabs and other “so-called Orthodox Muslims.” While conceding that his 
ministers needed to learn more about the Qur’an, and that Arab Muslims could help them with 
their knowledge of Arabic, he claimed repeatedly that African Americans should not view 
themselves as religiously inferior to other Muslims who, he said, had serious deficiencies as 
Muslims. As an example of these shortcomings, he said that other Muslims, had they been 
properly inspired by the Qur’an, would have tried to aid enslaved African-Americans during 
previous centuries. And he used early Islamic history to this purpose, contrasting Arab Meccans 
who persecuted the prophet Muhammad and drove him from Mecca, to an Abyssinian ruler – an 
African -- who graciously supported the earliest Muslims.
59
 
The overarching goal of the Ministers’ Kits, and of Wallace Mohammed’s early 
leadership, was to bring NOI beliefs closer to those of conventional Sunni Islamic ones without 
alienating his father’s old followers. This entailed the sometimes-delicate elimination or altering 
of language that in previous decades had become second nature to NOI ministers and members -- 
language about Yakub, white people being devils, the afterlife, and Elijah Muhammad having 
been a prophet. It also entailed urging ministers to use the Qur’an more, and a careful 
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reinterpretation of the NOI’s cosmology as allegory rather than as historical fact. Wallace 
Mohammed argued that Allah had always intended for Muslims to eventually learn what he was 
teaching in 1975. He said that Fard and Elijah Muhammad, far from being frauds, had been 
introducing Islam to African-Americans in ways aligned with Allah’s plan to make Islam 
palatable to them one step at a time, even if their teachings appeared fraudulent with hindsight.  
 
Speaking of Change 
While change seemed ubiquitous within the NOI, it was central to Wallace Mohammad’s 
stance that it was not a human-inspired change. Rather, he argued, it was a divinely inspired 
evolution of African-Americans’ understandings of Islam. On April 5, 1975, just six weeks into 
his leadership, he developed this approach with his followers at a business meeting. 
You are seeing many things and you are hearing many things that may  
 appear  to some of you to be big changes. You see those things as changes 
 because you can’t see the whole thing. If you could see the whole thing,  
 you would see everything that has happened since the Manifestation of  
 Allah in the person of the Great Master W.F. [Fard] Muhammad as a  
continuous event, step by step, to get us where we have to go.” 
 
…You are going to see changes now, but don’t think that   
these changes are my changes. They are not my changes,  




The divine plan was to bring them to Islamic maturity. In previous decades, Wallace 
Elijah Muhammad often said, the NOI had been a “baby nation” whose members were fed the 
only version of Islam they could have handled, one designed for their needs in black America. 
Even in 1975, many members were still “children, mentally,” he averred, but now they were 
ready to become adults – that is, ready for Islam according to his teachings rather than his 
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 On July 15, 1975, in a private speech to his ministers, Wallace Mohammed outlined 
his and their challenge, in the context of his recent hire of a psychologist, Na’im Akbar, who was 
helping him adjust the NOI’s religious language without alienating long-time believers. 
When I use the word ‘child,’ I am not making a chronological reference  
to speaking relative to physical years. I mean a child mentally. Many of  
us still are children mentally, and a man [Na’im Akbar] on a high plane  
of knowledge has to have patience, translate his language and pick up  
your topic in order to reach you. He has to have the patience to say to you  




Among the biggest changes to NOI theology under Wallace Mohammed was the removal of 
Fard’s divine status from the organization’s cosmology. While the new leader would 
occasionally refer to Fard as having been the manifestation of God, as he said three times in his 
1975 Saviour’s Day address, more often he would say God had never appeared as a human, 
instead referring to Fard as an “angel” who helped save African-Americans. On April 1, he told 
the ministers 
Allah is not flesh and blood… Brother Ministers, if we have been in the  
habit of thinking about an Allah that we could weigh on a scale and come  
up with some kind of weight, or one that we could measure and say he’s  
five feet tall or 6 feet tall, let’s get away from that. There’s no such Allah  
in existence. There never was and there never will be. Am I saying that  





Another important change in mindset involved conceptions of an afterlife. Elijah 
Muhammad had taught that heaven and hell were here on earth, and that there was no afterlife to 
aspire to. Wallace Mohammed, on the other hand, taught a version of the afterlife that was 
aligned to more conventional Islamic teachings. Here, in answer to a question in speech to Fruit 
of Islam members on October 4, 1975, he criticized the idea that there is no afterlife in answer to 
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 If you mean will there be any existence after this physical death,  
certainly there will. In saying that physical death is the end, you’re  
making death more powerful than life. You’re making decay more  
powerful than regeneration. If you say that death ends it all, you’re  
saying that the God that came before there was a physical world is  
inferior to the natural law of the creation that he made; [that] man  




Also noteworthy was Wallace Mohammed’s approach to NOI discourse on “devils,” for 
its cautious way around previous NOI teachings. While Fard and Elijah Muhammad had taught 
that the white race was a race of devils, Wallace Mohammed taught that any individual, of any 
race, could be devilish. And while he often singled out white behavior as influenced by the devil, 
he said this was not purely a function of the person’s race. The Qur’an, he said, did not 
categorize any race as superior or inferior. “I would like to say that the devil is no mystery,” he 
told his ministers on July 1, 1975. “Anyone can become a devil if he gives himself to the 
physical body and neglects the cultivation of his higher development.”
65
 He sought validation 
from the Bible, citing the passage in the Book of Mark (8:33) in which Jesus refers to his disciple 
Peter as Satan. “This did not mean that the man himself was a devil,” Wallace Mohammed said, 
“but at that time he was giving himself to the particular forces of the physical body that bring 
about the growth of devil in the person.”
66
 And on April 1, he preached that the devil to be most 
feared is not a physical entity. 
Some have thought that the devil was the spook or something  
that’s standing somewhere behind you waiting to interfere with  
your good thoughts, your good deeds, or your good works. The  
devil that we seek refuge from is that devil that rises up in the  
hearts of people as a germ and then affects the mind and causes  
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One culmination of his new lessons about the devil was a popular teaching that “man means 
mind,” and that “woman means womb of mind.” This teaching tried to sever a person’s core 
identity from their physical traits, a connection the NOI had previously fostered with regard to 
race, and instead to link identity to mental characteristics. In spring of 1975 he told his followers 
that “words make people. People are the product of words. A human being doesn’t start to form 
in the flesh body until words reach the ear or the eye or affect the senses in some way… God 
made nothing outside of you that is superior to what is in your mind.”
68
  
 Shifts in the NOI’s language were only part of the transition. Also necessary to consider 
here are the NOI’s administrative changes during this period, many of which would come to 
influence its growing alignment with the Sunni Islamic world. The old NOI leadership had 
suffered from an often-corrupt administrative culture in which many ministers and other leaders 
accepted startlingly high salaries, made possible through steadily applied pressure on members to 
donate money. These members were often penalized for various infractions through harsh 
suspensions or physical beatings. Wallace Mohammed’s reforms would rein the ministers in, but 
it was not easy. Indeed, his biggest challenge over time may have been dealing with ministers 
who disliked his changes but stayed with him anyway for the benefits of being affiliated with his 
nationally known organization.  
 The poor and increasingly middle-class African-American populations that comprised the 
NOI had given large amounts of money to the organization. In the early-to-mid-1970s, each 
member had to donate $125 on every Saviour’s Day (about $609 in 2016 dollars) and, at major 
mosques, $8.30 a week (about $50 in 2016 dollars), not including money from mandated sales of 
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the newspaper Muhammad Speaks.
69
 As a result, ministers and other leaders at major mosques 
made very high salaries, and their lifestyles reflected this. “As (Imam Mohammed) and his father 
said, they were living deliciously,” said Agieb Bilal, assistant national secretary of the NOI from 
1972 through the end of 1975 and a salaried consultant for Wallace Mohammed from 1978 to 
1982. “There was no accountability. It was, ‘Do what you want to do.’ As long as you the 
messenger’s [Elijah Muhammad’s] ministers, you had carte blanche.”
70
 
 Though his father and his father’s ministers had lived extremely well, on salaries and 
funds derived from contributions of NOI members, Wallace Mohammed would maintain a 
solidly middle-class lifestyle. Elijah Muhammad had contended that his residence in a stately 
mansion and purchases of fancy cars bolstered members’ views of the NOI, but Wallace 
Mohammed preferred surroundings that NOI members could more easily identify with. As he 
related during the spring to NOI “laborers” – ministers, captains, lieutenants and secretaries -- he 
rejected a request by NOI officials that he purchase a luxury car.  
I was invited to get a big, long, fine club car that makes people notice  
you that don’t have any sense. I told them, ‘no.’ I am not used to that  
kind of car and I don’t want to get used to that kind of car. I asked them  
to get me a car in the medium price range.  I want a car that all the  
followers can identify with. If I get one too cheap, the wealthier  
followers won’t be able to identify with me. If I get one in the middle,  




 If his personal example to eschew the finer things wasn’t enough incentive for his 
ministers, on April 1, 1975, he threatened to remove them from their jobs if they didn’t comply 
within ninety days. “Those who commit shameful violations against Islamic moderation, 
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religious morals and principles by showing themselves as Hollywood made super-flies,” he said, 
“will have to conform or they will have to get out of the position in the NOI.” He also summarily 
removed major sources of their funding by forbidding the types of mandatory collections that 
marked temple life in previous years. For example, in the past, the $125-per-person gifts 
showered upon Chicago headquarters for Saviour’s Day would allow ministers of major temples 
to leave the city after the event with gift checks from Elijah Muhammad in the low five figures.
72
 
But Wallace Mohammed quickly eliminated this tradition. Going forward, he told his ministers 
on August 26, 1975, the “Saviour’s Day gift is not to be set. There will be no set amount that a 
believer will have to give. You’re not to push Saviour’s Day as we have in the past.”
73
 And, 
referring to other collections, he said, on June 15, 1975, that “there will be no forced or set 
amount placed on members.”
74
 These changes probably cost his ministers tens of thousands of 
dollars a year in take-home pay that they were used to receiving. 
 That wasn’t the only way Wallace Mohammed changed the NOI’s administrative 
structure. He increased the roles for women in mosques, allowing them to be called ministers 
(but not imams, the term he began using for his male leaders, who were previously called 
ministers). He appointed women to senior administrative positions. He also stopped mandating 
that members sell the Muhammad Speaks newspaper, a long-time source of revenue for temples 
and of weekly angst for many members who struggled to sell their quota. And he cracked down 
on high-ranking temple members who drew salaries without doing much work, saying, “If you’re 
going to get the donations and we’re going to take care of you and your family, then you’re 
going to work so hard that we’re going to see some sweat on your brow…. Playing time is 
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 On August 29, 1975, he informed all paid temple officials that they would undergo 
biannual reviews. He also ordered his ministers to reduce the amount of discipline imposed on 
members and at one point urged rank-and-file members – half-jokingly -- to purchase actual 




Toward Arabic and Sunnism 
 He also directed ministers to learn Arabic, or at least to try. It was okay if all they could 
manage was a few lines. “When you speak to the people,” he said, “I don’t care if you only know 
one line, say that one line with authority.”
77
 His detailed instructions on the Five Pillars of Islam, 
on ablution (washing before prayer) and on prayer itself increased the NOI’s alignment with 
more conventional Sunni norms, while making allowances for his ministers’ lack of abilities in 
Arabic. 
Place your head between the hands, with your forehead and your  
nose touching the floor. In this position, say ‘Subha Allah’ twice  
which means ‘Highly glorified is my Lord, the Most High.’ … For  
the second Rakat, you repeat it just as you did the first. If you know  
other verses to say from the Holy Qur’an, it is good that you repeat  




He told them that in their prayers they should include people of other religions, including 
Buddhists, Christians and Jews, who he said “recognize the Supreme Being and are trying to live 
righteously.” As “righteous servants of Allah,” they deserved to be included in prayers, he said.
79
 
Another directive was they read one-thirtieth of the Qur’an each day of the holy month of 
Ramadan. While this was a common Ramadan practice across the Muslim world, it was new to 
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the NOI. The ministers’ top priority in learning the Qur’an, he instructed, should be the opening 
chapter, known as al-Fatiha, which they could listen to on tapes from his national radio 
broadcasts. 
All the ministers are to learn the opening prayer, Al-Fatiha, in both  
English and Arabic. All ministers should be regular readers of the  





At various points in these first months he taught and explained to them words from other 
important religious Arabic phrases, such as the Basmala, which appears at the start of most 
chapters of the Qur’an and is uttered by Muslims before they pray: “Bismallah al-Rahim al-
Rahmeen…” It is usually translated into English as, “In the name of God, the most beneficent, 
the most merciful...” Wallace Mohammed, however, would contest this common translation, 
declaring it hubris to declare anything “in the name” of Allah. Noting that bih, the first syllable 
of bismillah, can mean “with” in addition to “in,” he chose a different definition. “Bismillah 
means with God, or Allah,” he said, on September 2. “We go with God, keeping him before us 
and on our mind. We proceed ‘with’ the name of Allah...”
81
 
At least some imams viewed Wallace Mohammed’s Qur’anic emphasis as license to 
marry second wives. (Previously, under Elijah Muhammad’s leadership, the NOI had banned 
polygamy.) The Qur’an allows men to have as many as four wives although, as Wallace 
Mohammed would note in chastising these imams, the Qur’anic verses on marriage say a 
husband must treat all wives the same, and that equal treatment ultimately is not possible.
82
  
We have a few misinformed, fat-brained ministers who are trying to  
bring ancient history and social behavior to modern day life. They read  
about Solomon and others and their many wives and concubines and try  
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to impose that on our poor sister. The Holy Qur’an is over 1,400 years old  
and even it says that monogamy is the peaceful way of life and that the  
man who takes more than one wife is taking on added problems and  
headaches. It says that as a Muslim man he should be compelled to deal  





He also deemphasized race in a man’s selection of a woman to marry, saying that what 
mattered most was choosing a good Muslim. He said that while a male African-American should 
ideally seek to marry a female African-American Muslim, that if he could not find one who 
“would make you a decent wife,” he could choose a Muslim woman of a difference race.
84
  
A brother first should look for a good Muslim in a wife, so if a  
Caucasian comes into the temple and turns out to be a good Muslim,  
it’s better to have a good Muslim Caucasian than to have a devil so- 
called Negro… If you are unable to find a black woman but a white  
one with whom you can live, I will not put you out of the temple. I  
couldn’t dare put you out of the temple. It’s none of my business.  




Marriage was not the only topic involving gender relations that Wallace Mohammed 
found the need to address in his first few months as leader. He also told NOI women that as long 
as they dressed “decently,” that they no longer had to wear uniforms to temple meetings, as they 
had previously. (In previous decades, he noted on May 9, 1975, the purpose of the NOI uniform 
had been “to leave the filthy, unclean, indecent dress of the world. We did that but now that the 
purpose has been served, we don’t all have to look like nuns, do we?”
86
) And as part of his 
general loosening of rules and discipline, he told NOI women not to overly concern themselves 
with covering all their hair under head scarves.
87
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Your hair should be covered when you come to the temple. If there  
is a little hair visible, it’s alright. But if you’re trying to show your  
hair, you’re wrong. If it’s not intentional, it’s alright. But if you’re  
just trying to have a little hair showing because you think it makes  
you prettier, you’re wrong. You don’t come to the temple to attract  




Previously, Elijah Muhammad’s NOI had stressed the role of women as loyal, obedient 
wives and as mothers whose main priorities should be at home. Though husbands could be 
beaten by FOI members as punishment for abusing their wives, in general the NOI under Elijah 
Muhammad emphasized obedience to a husband, and men were urged to both “protect” and 
“control” their wives.
89
 Wallace Mohammed, without disavowing the NOI’s strong emphasis on 
women’s responsibilities to families and obedience to husbands, was known among his followers 
for sensitivity to women’s issues – partially due to a strong relationship with his mother, who he 
sided with after his father had children with other women. During his first months as leader he 
frequently dispelled common gender stereotypes in speeches to NOI members;
90
 in the next 
quotation, taken from a speech made June 15, 1975, he says women are capable and intelligent 
as men, and that their ability to bear children is the only thing keeping them from the most 
prominent leadership roles in society.  
Scripture teaches us that the male is superior to the female because he  
has been free and has not been tied at home domestically carrying  
children for nine month periods. Nor has he had to stay with them until  
they reached the level where they could take care of themselves. This  
has been the way or practice of the society for thousands of years so  
because man performed hard work outside of the home this has made  




 Herbert Berg, Elijah Muhammad (London, Oneworld Publications, 2013), 93. Dawn-Marie Gibson and Jamillah 
Karim, Women of the Nation: Between Black Protest and Sunni Islam (New York: New York University Press, 
2014), 56. Another message of Gibson and Karim’s chapter on women in the NOI, though, is that the NOI offered 
many benefits to women, related to personal discipline, kinship networks, and leadership opportunities in NOI 
women’s groups.  
90
 Wallace Mohammed often praised the role of his mother, Clara Muhammad, in introducing Elijah Muhammad to 
Fard in 1930 – an introduction without which Elijah Muhammad presumably would not have come to lead the NOI. 




him more fit physically. It is because he also had the freedom to go out  
and find the wealth in distant land. Still if the woman had been put in  
his place with her same mind and human makeup and man had been  
burdened with the physiological problems of bearing and raising  





None of this is meant to imply that Wallace Mohammed’s views on gender approached 
the frontiers of late-twentieth-century feminist thought. As Dawn-Marie Gibson and Jamillah 
Karim note, Wallace Mohammed’s views were “affected by, but not guided by, ideals of 
women’s liberation in the larger culture.”
92
 True, he would allow women to be ministers and 
“instructresses,” but only after changing the title of the temple’s top leaders to imams, a role that 
remained restricted to men. He favored expanding women’s roles in society beyond his father’s 
preferences, but he also idealized a woman’s role in marriage as supporting her husband and 
carrying out his wishes, rather than the other way around.  In the speech below, for example, he 
discusses different types of women for a man to marry. 
Let’s consider a brother who has been raised in a home wherein the woman  
would say, ‘Honey, get somebody out here to board up the back door and I  
want one put on the side. I don’t want that door on the back anymore.’ The  
man would say, ‘Okay, baby, I’ll take care of it.’ Now, if a brother came up  
in that kind of house, he can get a sister that talks to him all of the time and  
doesn’t listen much and he’ll be happy. 
 
However, if he came from the kind of house as from where I came, he will  
want a sister that says, ‘I think that the house will look better or it might be  
more convenient if we had the back door boarded and another door out on  
the side’ and waits for him to give the answer. If he says, ‘Well, OK we can  
get somebody to do it, she says, ‘Thank you honey,’ and if he says ‘No, I  
don’t think that it will work,’ she says, ‘Okay honey, I just was telling you I  
thought that it would work out better that way.’ Then she goes on with her  
little sad face and comes back the next day just as happy. She has forgotten  
all about it. Why? It is because she recognizes and accepts you as the last  
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word in the house. So when you are looking for women, look for someone  
with whom you can live. 
 
Relationships with Orthodox Muslims 
During his thirty-three years of leadership, Wallace Mohammed would forge and manage 
relationships with Saudi religious authorities and other Muslim religious leaders overseas that 
were alternately productive and tumultuous. In his first months of leadership, however, there 
were few concrete signs that the NOI could expect much help – financial or otherwise – from 
Muslims abroad as it navigated the transition toward more conventional Sunni Islamic norms. 
Wallace Mohammed wasn’t exactly starting from scratch. Under his father’s leadership, 
the NOI had become a known entity in the Muslim world, for its political stances on American 
exceptionalism, post-colonialism, and U.S. superpower status. Elijah Muhammad had cultivated 
relationships with foreign leaders including Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser of Egypt and Muammar el- 
Qaddafi of Libya. When Nasser met with Elijah Muhammad during the latter’s trip in 1959 
across the Muslim world, the Egyptian president reportedly urged the NOI leader to leave the 
United States to help spread Islam in Africa, promising him a palace in Cairo.
93
 Elijah 
Muhammad even secured a coveted letter expressing religious brotherhood from Nasser, at the 
height of Nasser’s popularity, which Elijah Muhammad hoped would bolster his group’s status 
among non-NOI Muslims in the United States. That same year, 1959, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia allowed Elijah Muhammad to enter the holy city of Mecca, an allowance made only to 
people who are viewed as Muslims by the Saudis. And years later, in 1972, Qaddafi lent the NOI 
$3 million to purchase property for a mosque in Chicago.
94
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 Still, the relationship between the NOI and other Muslims remained strained over the 
NOI’s cosmology and racial theories. In the NOI’s early decades, Elijah Muhammad said, Fard 
had instructed him to bar Arabs from NOI meetings “because they didn’t understand what he 
was doing” and would only be confused, Wallace recalled. Yet the increasing petroleum-
enriched wealth of selected Arab countries, along with the specter of their funding the NOI, was 
tantalizing to at least some NOI officials and members in the 1970s.
95
 
 During his first months as leader, Wallace Mohammed voiced mixed feelings about the 
prospects of receiving money from oil-rich Arab countries to help fill NOI coffers. The Saudis in 
particular, in 1962, had made Islamic missionary work an official state goal, and would work to 
affect the contours of Islamic practices around the globe -- with a focus on people and 
communities that already were Muslim. Wallace Mohammed’s early contacts with the Muslim 
world clearly excited him, seeming to offer the prospect of massive financial help to the NOI. On 
September 8, 1975, he told his members that 
The world at large now is very interested in what we are doing. I talk with  
leaders and I’m blessed to have come into the office of the Honorable Elijah  
Muhammad, who labored for so many years to establish what we have today.  
The same dignitaries and men of high office in business and government now  
are seeking me as they formerly sought him. In fact, we are seeing even more  
visitors today and they are more anxious now than they were before to get with  
us, lend us their hand, and help us with their knowledge, resources and their  
dollars… We have not millions but billions that we can get if we show the  
world that we realize what we already have in our hands. These are not just  
words, brothers and sisters. I’m telling you what has been told to me by those  
who have billions so it’s up to you. There is no job more honorable or more  




Other times, he presciently voiced caution over the burdens associated with such gifts, 
surmising that foreign Muslim associations and governments might want the NOI to alter its 
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religious practices and political agendas in return for their money. On August 1, 1975, he warned 
of a quid pro quo. 
The Honorable Elijah Muhammad and his staff were able … to get loans for  
the Nation, such as the 3 million dollars from Libya. Now although the loan  
was interest free, you should realize that this is no problem-free thing. Don’t  
think that you are without problems because people give you big money  
without writing out a commitment. When people make such a loan to you,  




Another motive for Wallace Mohammed’s wariness, Bilal said, was a state of disorder 
that characterized the NOI’s finances at the time. Indeed, after Elijah Muhammad’s death the 
Internal Revenue Service informed the group it was preparing an investigation. The problem was, 
the NOI had been underpaying taxes on profits from its numerous businesses.
 98
 “We have… 
Muslims abroad who want to give us money,” he told his ministers on Aug. 1, 1975, “but I don’t 
feel right accepting money to put into something where it goes right down the drain. Until we 
can keep this from happening, I’m not going to sign anything, accepting any money.”
99
 
Indeed, the perceived motives and merits of potential funders would become near-
constant sources of tension and friction. On June 22, 1975, Wallace Mohammed noted that the 
“Orthodox Islamic world” had financially supported the NOI more generously during his father’s 
reign than in the first months of his leadership. The lack of fresh donation was unexpected, given 
Wallace Mohammed’s stated intent to align with more conventional Sunni norms. “That showed 
you that a lot of support which they gave him was hypocrisy,” Wallace Mohammed said. “If they 
meant well for him, they would increase their support to me many times over but we don’t hear 
from them now and they are as quiet as church mice.”
100
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The question of whether to solicit and accept foreign money touched on broader issues of 
identity that dominated the NOI’s group consciousness after February 25, 1975. The NOI was in 
the process of shedding the Black Nationalist identity that marked it in prior years, in favor of a 
religious philosophy that was far more acceptable to non-NOI Muslims in the United States and 
abroad. Still, Wallace Mohammed did not want to surrender autonomy to foreign Muslim 
religious leaders, some of whom had been trying to influence the NOI’s political and religious 
agendas. And he did not want to critique U.S. policy with his father’s severity; in fact, he 
encouraged his members to join the military. Nor did he want African-American Muslims to 
adapt to cultural practices, often associated with Islam, that were prevalent in Muslim-majority 
countries. “We in the Nation of Islam shouldn’t want to be integrated with orthodox Muslims,” 
he said. “We would like to associate with them and have some interchange, but we do not want 
to become them. We want to serve them as the sun serves the earth.”
101
 
True, NOI members knew relatively little Arabic and had limited experience studying the 
Qur’an. But Wallace Mohammed steadfastly maintained during these months that it was African-
American Muslims, and not “so-called orthodox Muslims,” who laid claim to the best Islamic 
practices. “Our Islam is better than that of other Muslims,” he said on May 25, 1975. “We have 
heard the preaching of [other Muslims]. We have heard what they learn, we have weighed theirs 
with ours, and we say that we have the best.”
102
 Proof of this superiority, he said, lay in African-
American Muslims’ abilities to gain substantial numbers of converts in the United States, which 
Muslims of foreign descent had failed to do, he said. While “so-called orthodox Muslims” had 
better facility with Arabic and more knowledge of the Qur’an, he claimed that “no matter how 
much they know, they’re only verbalizing. There is no real feeling in what they saw because it’s 
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not really in their heart and soul.”
103
 While he said it was acceptable to spend time around 
Orthodox Muslims to improve one’s Arabic, for the purposes of reading the Qur’an, he stressed 
that African-American Muslims should not seek their advice on interpreting the Qur’an. “Each 




In addition, he urged NOI members to ignore “orthodox” Muslims -- whether individuals, 
representatives of national immigrant groups, or visiting members of foreign delegations -- who 
continued to criticize NOI beliefs and practices. “It’s pitiful,” Wallace Mohammed said. “I 
received something in the mail the other day from a so-called Orthodox Muslim. The man was 
trying to tell the public, ‘Don’t let the [NOI] Muslims or temple deceive you, they are just using 
a trick.’ If you run into some of them, just ignore them and don’t even waste your breath on them. 
We don’t help ourselves by arguing with them.”
105
 
A common criticism heard by Wallace Mohammed, from Muslims of foreign descent, 
was that he should use the Bible far less often in his sermons. His predecessor, Elijah 
Muhammad, would very often analyze biblical passages,
106
 and while Wallace Mohammed used 
the Bible less than his father had, he still referred to biblical passages regularly. For this he was 
unapologetic, saying that most NOI members had grown up viewing the Bible as sacred scripture 
and that he used it as a conversion tool. Given that the Qur’an represents a corrected form of the 
Bible, he said, echoing a basic Islamic teaching, “it should be my duty to put my book beside the 
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uncorrected one and convince those that are not corrected that I have the corrected. How can I do 
this if I don’t compare the two?”
107
 He also stated, 
There are some Orthodox Muslims who don’t understand the Holy Qur’an  
and they say that I should avoid using the Bible because it is a book that  
has been destroyed or cancelled out by the Holy Qur’an. In the Holy Qur’an,  
there is an appeal to the people of the Bible, for they are told to look in their  
book…It says ‘Ask the people of the book,’ meaning that you are being told  





Attacking prevalent notions of Arab superiority in religious matters was a repeated goal. 
Arabs, as a group, were overly nationalistic and out to advance “Arabism,” he said. The prophet 
Muhammad, he said, “wasn’t an Arab in the sense that Arabs are” in that he did not care about a 
person’s race or nationality; instead, he cared if “you [were] a good, decent person in Islam.”
109
 
He grouped rich Arabs with white people – a significant slight in an organization with the NOI’s 
history – in saying that “light-skinned, Caucasian rich Arabs”
110
 were upset that the prophet 
Muhammad favored black slaves over themselves. As for modern Arabs, he said, “Those 
quarreling, fighting Arabs don’t have enough universalism to get rid of tribalism among [them], 
and because of that they have been unable to establish leadership. Prophet Muhammad was the 
only Arab who rose above tribalism to universalism.”
111
 
For those who still believed that contemporary Arabs were descended from the first 
Muslims, Wallace Mohammed briefly contended, in 1975, that the original Arabs had been 
Africans. Contemporary Arabs, on the other hand, had Caucasian blood from the migration of 
white people into the Middle East, a development that he said led Africans to move away, he 
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 Wallace Mohammed does not seem to have made this historical case often. Justification 
for it bore similarities to the more elaborate cosmology laid out by his father and Fard, which had 
attacked the ideas behind white supremacy. (Given Wallace Mohammed’s long-term disbelief in 
previous NOI racial teachings, it is unlikely that he believed this race-mythology.) Now, Wallace 
Mohammed was attacking Arab supremacy in the Muslim world. He said, on October 4, 1975, 
You may feel that the Holy Qur’an is a book filled with Arab prophets, and  
you may consider Arabs to be non-black or Caucasian- or Jew-like people,  
but this is not correct. The original Arabs were black people and the Caucasians  
came in and mixed up their blood with them just as they mixed blood with  
many other black people. Now there are mixed people in Arabia and most  
of them are very light-skinned. Our ancestors, the dark complexion, wooly- 
haired people, retreated or pulled back as the Caucasian people from Europe  
came into Arabia. These dark-skinned people went further away from the  




Decades earlier, Fard and Elijah Muhammad had pronounced a special historical status 
for African-Americans – that of “original man” (known as the “Asiatic Black Man). Now, 
Wallace Mohammed was giving vaunted status to the race specifically within the annals of a 
more widely accepted Islamic history, saying Allah had “manifested the black Americans great 
worth in his plans” and that it was unsurprising that Allah would bless them “with a superior 
understanding.”
114
    
He’s able to take the least and bless them with a superior understanding… It  
was men such as Bilal, a black Ethiopian who was the first minister of Prophet 
Muhammad of Arabia, and slaves, who accepted the great truth that  
he [Muhammad] taught. When Prophet Muhammad started teaching,  
he was not accepted by the rich Arab leaders or the desert Arabs. It was  
the blacks and the slaves that accepted him as it always is these kinds of  
people who turn to the word of Almighty God because they have nobody  
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His contention that “so-called Orthodox Muslims” deserved no special reverence from 
African-Americans, and that his own group consisted of better Muslims, was multi-faceted. One 
contention was that African-Americans had shown greater loyalty, earlier, to the prophet 
Muhammad than Arabs had. Not only was the first muezzin
116
 for the prophet Muhammad 
believed to have been the former Ethiopian slave (Bilal), but the Meccans who in 620 CE 
rejected the prophet Muhammad and chased him from their city had been Arabs. It was the 
Abyssinian king, operating within the boundaries of present-day Ethiopia, who had supported the 
prophet Muhammad during his period of distress.
117
  
They [Arab Muslims] say they are the original owner and the ones  
who received Islam from the prophet Muhammad. They say that they  
have had it from the very beginning, but their history tells us that the Arabs  
were second to be converted; that black men and the poor slave were the  





Not only did large groups of Arabs not accept the earliest Islamic teachings, Wallace 
Mohammed noted, but later generations of Arabs had not been able to maintain Islam’s position 
of strength across the centuries. 
Don’t think… the Arabs were ‘the end’ in religion, because the Arabs  
received divine truth but they were too small to handle it. After it was  
put into their hands, the Caliph fell. They went into war and lost their  
glory and went down to almost nothing again. They still have their  
religion but they don’t have the power. 
 
Another criticism of Arab and other “so-called Orthodox Muslims” put forth by Wallace 
Mohammed was a perceived overreliance on hadith to resolve religious issues, as opposed to the 
Qur’an. Hadith, reputed to be oral traditions of the prophet Muhammad, are widely used to help 
Muslims resolve specific religious issues on which the Qur’an – believed to be the actual word of 
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God as relayed to the prophet Muhammad -- might lack detailed guidelines. But the Qur’an is 
generally viewed as carrying more weight. Wallace Mohammed’s mosques did not emphasize 
the teaching of hadiths. “If you notice,” Wallace Mohammed said, “so-called Orthodox Muslims, 
they use the word ‘hadith’ more than they use the Holy Qur’an, but in their own hadith it is 





The first ten months of Wallace Mohammed’s leadership witnessed significant, tactical 
movements away from old NOI teachings and toward more conventional Sunni Islamic norms, 
but with few if any rhetorical concessions toward Muslims from overseas. This represented a 
middle ground of sorts and was surely a difficult line to toe; the effort was doubtlessly eased by 
Wallace Mohammed’s membership in the NOI’s “royal family” and the belief within the NOI 
that Fard had slated him as the next leader before he was born.  
The rhetoric of 1975 itself demonstrated how Wallace Mohammed attempted to define 
boundaries that were always clearer between his organization and the old NOI, than between his 
organization and Orthodox Muslims. As the sources from this chapter demonstrate, Wallace 
Mohammed was unwilling to grant a higher status to Islam as practiced abroad. In fact, he said in 
the quotation below, it was the NOI that should be spreading its views across the Muslim world 
overseas, rather than the other way around.  
We know we have the best religion because nobody else’s religion has any 
attracting power over us. If they had something better, that superior power  
in their better religion would have enough strength to pull us away from this. 
But they can’t do it. We realize that Allah didn’t make this power we call the 
Nation of Islam grow in this part of the world just to stay to itself. He made  
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it to convince [other Muslims] who think they have the power that they don’t  




There is no evidence that the NOI ever engaged in significant missionary efforts abroad 
to promote its brand of Islam, either before or after Wallace Mohammed’s leadership began. But 
over the ensuing decades, Wallace Mohammed’s organization would continue its tense 
relationship with “so-called Orthodox Muslims,” staying open to financial help from abroad but 
remaining ambivalent about acceding to political and religious requests from Muslim 
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Chapter Three: Wallace Mohammed and the Saudis, 1975-1995 
 
 More than any other country, it was the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that captured the 
imaginations of African-American Muslims in the Nation of Islam and its successor groups run 
by Wallace Mohammed.
1
 Interactions with Saudis from 1975 to 1995 would confront African-
American Muslims with questions about what kind of Muslims they wanted to be, and also about 
what kind they did not want to be. This was a period of transformation and identity conflicts for 
Wallace Mohammed’s organization, which in 1975 had distanced itself from its previous racial 
beliefs and cosmologies, hastening its movement toward more conventional Sunni beliefs on 
divinity, prophets, race and the afterlife. The Saudis offered guidance. The kingdom-financed 
Muslim World League organized training sessions for Wallace Mohammed’s imams on Islamic 
theology and jurisprudence, and paid for Saudi-educated shaykhs to work as Islamic Studies 
specialists in Wallace Mohammed’s mosques. In addition, it funded land accommodations for 
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hajj trips for hundreds of African-American Muslims and donated massive amounts of religious 
literature. 
Wallace Mohammed’s organization, I argue, resisted much of the guidance associated 
with these Saudi-financed efforts. This contention of mine complicates the existing dominant 
narrative of Wallace Mohammed’s organization, which posits years of acceptance followed by 
resistance. I argue instead that tensions with Saudis and Sunni Muslims from other countries 
existed from the start and never let up. Through the decades, the leader managed his relationship 
with Saudi leaders within the scope of his organization’s religious and political agendas. The 
main guidance he did accept lay in MWL-sponsored education of his imams and ordinary 
followers, an acknowledgement of deficiencies in the organization’s capacity to teach the 
religion. While pushing his followers to immerse themselves in Sunni religious practices more 
than they had done previously, he pursued acceptance from Muslims overseas who had doubted 
his group’s Islamic authenticity due to its previous heterodox beliefs and practices. Yet he also 
strove to guard African-American autonomy as interpreters of Islamic law, displaying reluctance 
to sacrifice this to Muslims from overseas when they contested his decisions and spoke about 
non-Muslims in language his followers found offensive. And he encouraged his followers to be 
active in American society, stressing that he was not instinctively opposed to U.S. governmental 
activity as his father had been. While concerns of the Black Freedom movement never 
disappeared from his rhetoric, Wallace Mohammed broadly aligned his organization with U.S. 
geopolitical stances. Saudi Arabia, a petroleum-enriched monarchy, was a staunch ally of the 
United States.  
An important geopolitical backdrop to Wallace Mohammed’s relationship with the 
Saudis was the broad change occurring in global Muslim politics -- both during and after the 
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Cold War. Muslim political entities in Asia and Africa had begun organizing in the name of 
Islam to oppose outside political domination, whether of the U.S., Soviet or European varieties. 
The establishment and existence of Israel, in a period of general decolonization, unified the Arab 
world in opposition, at least until Egypt signed the Camp David Accords in 1978. The 1979 
Islamic revolution in Shi’i Iran would influence and inspire political resistance to U.S. 
domination of the Middle East. After the Soviet Union inviaded Afghanistan in 1979, the United 
States allied with Muslims resisting the invasion. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the 
ensuing Desert Storm led Muslim Americans to take sides in disputes over the control of 
territory in Muslim-majority lands. By allying with the Saudis, Wallace Mohammed abandoned 
the traditional African-American and leftist critiques of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world. 
This chapter argues that the twenty-year relationship between Wallace Mohammed’s 
organization and Saudi religious leaders was marked by tension throughout, slightly 
complicating the existing narrative that suggests two separate periods: of acceptance, at first, and 
resistance, afterward, to Saudi guidance. This chapter begins with an analysis of the relationship 
between foreign donors – actual and potential – to Wallace Mohammed’s movement, and the 
motives of donors and recipients alike. The next section examines Saudi efforts to influence 
African American understandings of Islam through the kingdom’s financing of training sessions 
for imams and of religious-studies specialists at Wallace Mohammed’s mosques. The section 
after that examines broad conflicts with immigrant Muslim groups. The following part charts and 
analyzes tensions between Wallace Mohammed and the imams in his own movement, showing 
that the Saudi embassy to the United States played a controversial role in their communal lives. 
Finally, I analyze four trips that Wallace Mohammed and his organization made to Saudi Arabia 
in 1990 and 1991, the latter two during the Persian Gulf War. I argue that tensions existed 
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throughout the relationship that preclude a neat historical narrative of acceptance and resistance 
of foreign guidance on religious matters and political matters.  
 
Money and Foreign-Policy Agendas 
The foreign courtship of African-American Muslims was not restricted to religious 
authorities and institutions from Saudi Arabia. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, who had met 
Elijah Muhammad when the latter traveled to Egypt in 1959, met with Wallace Mohammed in 
1975 while in the United States for a United Nations meeting and presented him with twelve 
scholarships for followers to study at al-Azhar University in Cairo.
2
 And Sharjah, one of the 
United Arab Emirates, was the source of a $1.25 million gift, the largest single donation given to 
Wallace Mohammed’s group during his thirty-three years of leadership.
3
 Sharjah’s ruler, Shaykh 
Sultan bin Mohamed al-Qasimi, apparently looked favorably on Wallace Mohammed’s changes 
and arrived at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport in May 1976 to the greetings of hundreds 
of Muslims from Wallace Mohammed’s mosques, including heavyweight boxer and 
international celebrity Muhammad Ali. Later, while visiting the NOI’s main mosque in Chicago, 
Shaykh Qasimi pledged significant financial assistance to the movement, remarking on its 
movement away from old NOI beliefs. “We have seen your growth and institutions and it is 
indeed a pleasure to see this growth,” he said. “The news about you was great, but when I came 
here and saw your institutions we know that what you have is greater than what we heard.”
4
 He 
would pledge $250,000 for the NOI’s school system and, separately, one million dollars for a 
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new mosque to be named after Bilal, the African companion of the prophet Muhammad, which 
was expected to cost $16 million. 
Hasan Sharif, Wallace Mohammed’s nephew and the NOI’s public relations specialist in 
1976, recalled traveling with his uncle to the United Arab Emirates embassy in Washington, 
D.C., to pick up the one-million-dollar check, and then to a bank in Chicago to deposit it. “It was 
really kind of cool,” Sharif said, “because as he was filling out the form to deposit the money, he 
kind of looked at me and winked, like, ‘This is really cool, we’re getting ready to put a million 
dollars into the bank.’”
5
 
This was a massive amount of money for a once-flush national organization that had been 
receiving less money from its branch mosques since Wallace Mohammed decentralized it upon 
becoming leader. Yet Wallace Mohammed did not want the prospect of cash to alter his 
movement’s priorities. In the months after the Sharjian shaykh’s visit, it became apparent that 
raising the additional $15 million needed to build the mosque was not feasible. A new mosque 
ranked low as an NOI priority; the organization’s schools were its top financial concern, and just 
three years earlier it had purchased a massive building in Chicago which itself had seemed too 
large for its mosque needs. So Wallace Mohammed contacted Shaykh Sultan and offered to 
return the $1 million, as it seemed unlikely it would be used for its original purpose. The shaykh 
said Wallace Mohammed could use the money for the movement’s school system.
6
 
Such visits and praise by prominent Muslims abroad offered Wallace Mohammed’s 
organization a sense of Islamic legitimacy it had previously lacked, in the view of other Muslim 
groups, due to Elijah Muhammad’s teachings. The movement’s collective pride in these 
meetings with Muslims from abroad is evident from coverage in Wallace Mohammed’s 
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newspapers, which portrayed Saudis and Muslim World League officials not only as financially 
generous to the African-American Muslim community, but also as enthusiastic about Wallace 
Mohammed’s transition to Sunnism, away from the NOI’s original theology.  
In October 1977, prominent Saudis from the Islamic University of Medina stopped at one 
of Wallace Mohammed’s mosques, in Washington D.C. There, the Saudi shaykh heading the 
delegation, Abd al-Rahman al-Rawi, praised the religious practices of the African-American 
Muslims assembled there. He specifically lauded Wallace Mohammed’s efforts and hinted that 
the kingdom would provide financial assistance. “What we have seen,” al-Rawi said, “and what 
we have heard from [I]mam W.D.  Muhammad and others is a very good thing, and has given us 
hope in a great future for al-Islam in the West.… He put upon us the responsibility of teaching 
the real teachings of Islam here, so it’s our duty to help.”
7
 Financial assistance, Shaykh Rawi 
said, might include scholarships for African American Muslims to study at the University. 
“Those who graduate,” he said, referring to the university’s students from around the world, “go 
to their countries and others to promote Al-Islam.”
8
  
As leader, Wallace Muhammad began visiting Muslim leaders in Arab countries in 1976, 
making ostensibly positive impressions with his movement away from his father’s teachings and 
toward more conventional Sunni Islamic norms. “Real cooperation” between African American 
Muslims and Arab countries, Shaykh Rawi said on that October 1977 day, “started with the visit 
of (I)mam W.D. Muhammad to these countries, and they are making very good cooperation (on) 
the propagation of Islam.”
9
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 The newspaper often printed effusive praise for Wallace Mohammed by officials of the 
Muslim World League, a purported demonstration of his group’s Islamic authenticity. One 
article from 1977 included these compliments from the MWL’s Secretary-General:  
The teachings of the Honorable Wallace Muhammad leave me with  
a very good feeling in my heart,” declared the head of the largest order for  
the propagation of Islam in the world.  “The Honorable Wallace Muhammad  
is teaching the true teachings of Islam,” said Shaykh Muhammad Ali Al-Harakhan,  





The publication and tone of these and other articles seemed at least partially intended to 
nurture the budding international relationship. Indeed, the newspaper’s coverage often treated 
Saudi dignitaries as valued members of an extended family. It published flattering pictures of 
Khalil al-Khalil, an official in the Saudi embassy in the United States, at Muslim events across 
the United States in the early 1980s, and it covered the 1985 appearance of the Saudi 
Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, in Dallas, Texas, where he was 
meeting imams from the region at a museum exhibit on Saudi Arabia.
11
 An extremely wealthy 
Saudi named Mohammed al-Fassi, who had married into the royal family, also received coverage 
for a trip to Evanston, Illinois, where he donated $15,000 – a tiny portion, to be sure, of his vast 
fortune -- to a youth program. The A.M. Journal quoted a spokesman for al-Fassi who said the 
shaykh’s visit reflected Saudi concern for Americans: “[S]ince Shaykh Al-Fassi is a member of 
the Saudi Royal Family and a multi-billionaire, he believes that he has a responsibility to learn 
about the United States personally and at the same time give concrete evidence of the concern 
which the Government of Saudi Arabia has for the general welfare of the people of America.”
12
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The newspaper often published, in its entirety, official correspondence addressed to the 
movement from Saudi Arabia and the Muslim World League. One letter reprinted in full was 
directed toward a group of Wallace Mohammed’s followers who had recently traveled to the 
kingdom with their leader; written by Saudi prince (and future king) Salman ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 
then governor of Riyadh, it read,  
I was very happy to receive your correspondence of February 8, 1991 in which  
you mentioned your recent visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.... Your good  
feelings toward the Kingdom and your support we appreciate. I would like to  





 The official praise notwithstanding, donations originating in Saudi Arabia for Wallace 
Mohammed’s organization totaled just a tiny portion of the many millions of dollars donated by 
Saudi-funded institutions and donors to Muslim-American groups during this period. To Wallace 
Mohammed, the disparity was easily explainable. It owed to his refusal to bend his 
organization’s foreign-policy stances to accommodate the political interests of Saudis or other 
Sunni groups regarding Palestinians, the Camp David Accords, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, 
and other issues relating to the Muslim world overseas. “I know,” he told an interviewer for 
Playboy magazine in 1980, “that if I campaigned more vocally for the Palestinians, there’d be 
more substantial gifts. As a Moslem, I identify with their problems, but you don’t sacrifice your 
independence and the integrity of your movement for money.”
14
 
Actually, Wallace Mohammed publicly addressed the plight of Palestinians often, both in 
his speeches and in his newspaper. But his discourse tended to be less strident and more mindful 
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of Israeli concerns than immigrant and foreign Muslim leaders wanted to hear from the leader of 
the largest African-American-Muslim organization. For example, in 1985, under the headline 
“The Middle East Situation is Confused,” he wrote of Palestinian loss and condemned Zionism 
but also acknowledged Jewish losses in the Holocaust: 
The Middle East situation is a very confused situation, and the biggest  
trouble is coming from, I would say, hurt and bitterness in the Jews, and  
hurt and bitterness in the displaced Palestinians – the Arabs who have  
been uprooted and moved from their homes and put in camps or left at  
the mercy of the world society, without a home, without a nation. 
 
The Jews who were persecuted under Hitler, under the Nazis, and who  
lost many millions of lives in a very horrible way carry that hurt. So we  
have two very sensitive people, and they are carrying a great hurt and  
great bitterness – both of them are carrying it. 
 
I believe that what is happening is that there is a great blindness on both  
sides. There is a blindness in the Jewish people, who are Zionist, strongly  
Zionist, and strongly for occupying and dominating that territory [Palestine.] 
 
Now, there is that same kind of blindness in the Palestinians, who respond  




In 1979, upon returning to Chicago from the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Fez, 
Morocco -- a gathering at which he held “observer” status -- he told his newspaper’s reporter that 
he disagreed with many of the Muslim leaders at the international meeting, who he characterized 
as favoring “fiery Jihad.” Egyptians and Palestinians were ill-equipped for war against countries 
with better armies, he said. He continued,  
I don’t feel like a lot of the Muslims I met, who feel the situation is so  
desperate, so urgent that all Muslims ought to jump up with one rallying  
cry, in the spirit of jihad – I meant fiery Jihad. I don’t feel like that. I’m  
inclined to approach this very serious situation in the spirit expressed by  
the King of Morocco, King Hasan II. He prefers a peaceful approach rather  
than an attempt to liberate oppressed Muslim communities with material  
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 Another instance in which Wallace Mohammed irritated immigrant and foreign Muslim 
leaders was his support for the Camp David Accords, implicitly acknowledging Israel’s right to 
exist. And he upset Saudi leaders in refusing to publicly oppose the Iranian Revolution, which 
installed a Shi’i Islamic government viewed as regional rivals to the Saudi royals, who are 
Sunnis. Indeed, while Wallace Mohammed criticized the taking of American hostages in 1979, in 
general he spoke in positive terms about Shi’ism and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Given the 
history of racism against African-Americans, he was reluctant to join forces to persecute another 
group – in this case, Shi’i.
17
 
His father, of course, had critiqued virtually every U.S. government stance and policy, 
and representatives of Muslim countries originally expected Wallace Mohammed to do the same 
as the group moved toward more conventional Sunni norms. “When Imam [Mohammed] first 
came into office,” Agieb Bilal said, “our political posture was viewed as anti-American… The 
Saudis, their political people saw us as a fifth column in America that could be utilized for their 
political purposes, primarily vis-à-vis what they wanted to do over there. They thought we could 
be used to do that. Then they found out that Wallace Mohammed was an independent thinker.”
18
 
The end result was, Wallace Mohammed in his thirty-three years as leader received less money 
from foreign governments than the $3 million that his father received in a single donation from 
Moammar Qaddafi in 1972.  
To Wallace Mohammed and his followers, the declining assistance clearly demonstrated 
that the Saudis and others were less interested in helping African American Muslims develop as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16
 “WCIW President Wallace Deen Muhammad: Special Report on Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference,” Bilalian 
News, June 15, 1979, 16-17. 
17





an autonomous religious community than in using them as a “fifth column” of sorts, a tool to 
build political support in the United States for their own countries’ foreign-policy preferences. 
When my Honorable father… was alive with us, you saw more open support  
coming from the Orthodox Islamic World. That shows you that a lot of the  
support which they gave Him was only hypocrisy. If they meant well for him,  
they would increase their support to me many times over but we don’t hear  




Nevertheless, during the late 1970s, several oil-rich rich Persian Gulf nations including 
Saudi Arabia named Wallace Mohammed their “sole consultant and trustee” for the distribution 
of money to Muslim movements in the United States. Yet he does not appear to have distributed 
significant amounts of funds. The people who I interviewed had different recollections of what 
this meant; none of his relatives or close associates recall Muslims from overseas allowing him 
actual authority over foreign money.
20
 Muhammad Sadeeqi, an imam in Indiana, said Wallace 
Mohammed received annual payments of $100,000 for serving in this role but that the 
arrangement was discontinued when it was revealed that he donated portions of it to non-Muslim 
causes such as the Salvation Army.
21
 Wallace Mohammed, in an interview, said the annual 





Saudi-Funded Trainings and Imams 
 Actual cash donations from Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, then, were relatively few, and 
had little effect on African-American-Muslim religious practices. More consequential was Saudi-
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financed religious education for Wallace Mohammed’s imams and followers. Wallace 
Mohammed’s aforementioned reluctance to alter his political agenda on other countries’ behalf, 
and the resulting unwillingness of foreign governments to shower cash on his movement had set 
a relatively low ceiling on donations. Yet while he remained intent on maintaining religious 
autonomy for African-American Muslims, Wallace Mohammed continued voicing hope that 
more foreign money – especially Saudi money – might reach his organization. 
 What he received, instead, was Saudi-financed mosque staffing, training programs for 
imams, and religious education for his followers. The Muslim World League paid for multiple 
efforts designed to alter African-American Muslims’ religious practices. (African-American 
Muslims were hardly the only such target for the MWL, which worked to influence Islamic 
religious practices on every inhabitable continent, as is discussed in Chapter Four.) The MWL 
hosted special training sessions in the United States for Wallace Mohammed’s imams on Islamic 
studies and funded salaries of Saudi-trained shaykhs to work at many of his movement’s 
mosques, where they taught Islamic Studies to regular believers. In addition, the MWL helped 
fund hajj trips for hundreds of African-American Muslims in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It 
also, as is discussed in Chapter Five, provided multi-year scholarships that allowed African-
American Muslims – mostly from outside Wallace Mohammed’s movement -- to study at 
religious universities in Saudi Arabia. 
 All of these activities and opportunities confronted African-American Muslims with 
vital questions about their religious practices and identity. Were they comfortable with Islam as 
taught by their own leader, Wallace Mohammed, and his imams? Had they instead developed 
more faith in Islam as taught by the Saudi-funded MWL? And how much, if at all, should racial 
identity and awareness count in their religious consciousness? The issue can be framed through 
125 
 
the general boundaries of what Edward E. Curtis IV has referred to as “universalistic and 
particularistic impulses” that have marked Islamic practices among African-Americans.
23
 “The 
tension exists,” Curtis writes, “between the idea, on the one hand, that a religious tradition is 
universally applicable to the experience of all human beings and the idea, on the other hand, that 
a religious tradition is applicable to the experience of one particular group of human beings” – in 
this case African-Americans.
24
 Prior to 1975, when Elijah Muhammad led the NOI, the 
organization can be said to have demonstrated particularistic impulses. Wallace Mohammed, 
though, would demonstrate that he highly valued both universalistic and particularistic 
approaches to Islam and would attempt to transcend the dichotomy. 
 In retrospect, the path was bound to be contentious. The NOI’s history had left many if 
not most of the group’s members with beliefs that were out of step with Sunni Islamic norms on 
race, prophethood, divinity and the afterlife, and even in the mid-to-late 1970s the group’s 
religious leaders, aside from Wallace Mohammed himself, possessed little knowledge of Arabic 
and minimal grounding in Qur’anic studies. Yet while Wallace Mohammed remained loath to 
sacrifice autonomy as a leader and as an interpreter of Islamic law in the United States, he 
actively sought help from Muslim leaders abroad – in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere -- to educate 
his followers. On April 22, 1977, at a MWL-sponsored “First Islamic Conference of North 
America” held in Newark, New Jersey, Wallace Mohammed, during his turn to speak, assured 
his three hundred listeners that his organization had left behind its heterodox ideas and was “now 
on... the Sunni path.” He expressed thanks in advance for foreign assistance: “We are blessed,” 
he said, “to have our brothers, our distinguished brothers of great repute and excellence come to 
the United States, from the holy city of Mecca from Arabia, to encourage us, to give us support, 
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to encourage us to unite, to encourage us to move forward in Islam and they are not people with 
weak support. They have the knowledge and they have the money. We are fortunate…”
25
 
 Yet allowing Saudi-selected shaykhs to educate his followers, and even train his imams, 
represented a significant concession, an acknowledgement that his organization required 
assistance on a basic level. It constituted a reliance on outsiders to teach its own followers about 
the faith. In September of 1978, short house advertisements appeared several times in the 
Bilalian News noting that an “Imam Training Program for the World Community of al-Islam in 
the West is being sponsored by the Muslim World League, Rabita,” for interested imams.
26
 The 
main six-week training session would be held outside Chicago in Naperville, Illinois. Topics 
included “the basics of Islam, Islamic beliefs, prayers, rituals of Islam, something about Islamic 
history,” and basic Arabic.
27
 Approximately one hundred people attended, about half of them 
from Wallace Mohammed’s organization.
28
  
 Wallace Mohammed’s apparent desire to remain in the good graces of the kingdom led 
him to make statements at odds with what he typically told his own followers and ministers in 
private. At the graduation ceremony for the MWL training, he addressed the “graduates” and 
referred to the training sessions as “the beginning of your learning Islam.”
29
 This was more than 
two years after he became leader of the organization and had himself led NOI imams in month-
long training sessions with the Ministers Kits discussed in Chapter Two. Now he was letting the 
MWL train his teachers. 
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 He even allowed those words – “the beginning of your learning Islam” -- to be 
published in his newspaper, which he knew was read closely by his followers. By submitting his 
imams to this training, he was demonstrating to the Muslim world overseas a willingness to take 
its lead on religious issues, with a hope that some combination of money and legitimacy among 
fellow Muslims-Americans would follow. 
 Siraj Wahhaj was among the imams from Wallace Mohammed’s organization who 
attended the MWL training session.
30
 In an interview in 2014, he recalled being deeply 
impressed with the teachings and the quality of the instructors at the MWL training sessions – 
men with well-known pedigrees from institutions for classical Islamic studies, including Shaykh 
Hussein Hamid Hassan of Egypt, Shaykh Jaafar Idris of Sudan, and Shaykh Muhammad Qutb, 
the brother of Sayyid Qutb and a consultant for the curriculum at the Islamic University of 
Medina in the 1960s. Wahhaj valued their lessons, but some other African-American imams 
there expressed frustration with the instructors. Wahhaj recalled, “I could see these members of 
the Nation of Islam were fighting the teachers: ‘Imam Mohammed says this!’ ‘Imam Mohammed 
says that!’ I said to myself,… ‘These are scholars. Listen to them. Learn something.’”
31
  
 Wahhaj impressed MWL officials enough to be selected as one among five of the 100 
assembled imams selected after the course to participate in further studies in Saudi Arabia for 
another two months. Accepting this invitation was difficult politically within Wallace 
Mohammed’s organization, which just three years into his leadership remained immersed in the 
transition.  Wahhaj was an important leader, overseeing the main Brooklyn mosque. “I said, 
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‘Imam, I would love to go’... But I’m his imam, over one of his biggest mosques, and I said [to 
myself], it will be a test to me if he says no, but I’ll respect it. He gave me permission to go.”
32
 
 Studying at King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz University in Mecca, Wahhaj took the long view: “I 
remember going with a sense of purpose that I’m coming back to the U.S. and I want to help 
establish this deen, this religion.” The tensions that followed his return to Wallace Mohammed’s 
movement in the United States, however, were reflective of the long-term conflict permeating 
the relationship between the largest African-American-Muslim organization and Saudi-financed 
religious institutions. Studying under the MWL officials in Naperville and then at King ‘Abd al-
‘Aziz University had bolstered Wahhaj’s sentiment that Wallace Mohammed’s teachings were at 
odds with particular tenets of Sunni Islam, and he began to consider leaving the organization.
33
 
In addition, he recalled, some immigrant Muslims in the United States were pressuring him to 
leave, trapping him during his sermons with questions they knew would cause him problems. A 
particular source of tension was a position taken by Wallace Mohammed during the transition 
period that Jesus had a father; the Qur’an says he did not. As Wahhaj recalled, 
Sunni Muslims… kind of trapped me. I’d be in a public speech. They’d ask me  
a question that they knew would contradict Wallace Mohammed. They said,  
‘Imam Siraj, about Jesus, did Jesus have a father?’ Now I know what Wallace 
Mohammed was teaching, that Jesus had a father. I’d say no, he didn’t have a  
father. So now followers of WD Mohammed, I’m the imam, and they were  
looking, ‘Huh?’… That was disturbing to them. But it was truthful to myself. 
 
Finally I told Imam Muhammad that, I wrote him, and told him that his community  
is now divided and I said I’m the cause of the division and that’s when I offered my 
resignation, sent to see him in Chicago. He said, ‘Imam, we can still have this  
difference.’ I said, ‘No, Imam, I can’t with full conviction, I can’t.’ And that’s  
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 Wahhaj was not the only imam to leave Wallace Mohammed’s organization on the 
belief it had not transitioned far enough toward Sunni Islamic norms. But his impact dwarfed that 
of others. A tape of Wahhaj criticizing Wallace Mohammed over his position on Jesus’s father 
and other issues circulated widely among Muslim leaders in the Middle East who had 
relationships with African-American Muslims, adding fuel to the belief of many foreign and 
immigrant Muslims that Wallace Mohammed, even in the late 1970s, remained overly beholden 
to his father’s views. Wahhaj’s words upset Wallace Mohammed’s followers. “It was putting 
doubt in people’s minds,” Agieb Bilal recalled. He continued,  
Because the Saudis have… religious authority, unless you were hard-core followers  
of Imam [Wallace Mohammed], you were going to act like you were in a tennis match, 
and many people still do that today. They listen to imam, then they listen to somebody 
else, then they listen to imam and then they listen to someone else. And of course it 





 In ensuing decades, Siraj Wahhaj and Wallace Mohammed would rebuild their 
relationship and make positive statements about each other in public. But in the years 
surrounding his departure, Wahhaj was suspected within Wallace Mohammed’s community of 
having received Saudi money to undercut Wallace Mohammed. Wahhaj said he never received 
money from the Saudis.
36
 For the purpose of this study, it’s unimportant whether he did or not; 
what’s relevant here is that his departure from Wallace Mohammed’s organization aligned with 
preconceived notions held by many that Islamic religious authority ultimately lay overseas.  
 In retrospect, Wallace Mohammed’s alliance with the Saudi-financed MWL seems a 
calculated risk. In moving the largest African-American Muslim organization toward Sunni 
Islam and seeking to gain acceptance by Muslims around the world, the relationship with foreign 
Islamic religious authorities and institutions would not have seemed problematic, given the 
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possibility of donations. Yet his organization’s interaction with people better-versed in classical 
Islamic studies, and with political agendas in the Muslim world, presented myriad risks to his 
legitimacy as a religious authority in the United States. 
 
Foreign Imams in Residence 
 The question of authority arose in another controversial manner during this period, 
through a second agreement between Wallace Mohammed and the MWL. The MWL in late 
1977 sent six foreign shaykhs with training in classical Islamic studies to serve as specialists in 
Arabic and Islamic Studies at Wallace Mohammed’s mosques. These six shaykhs were sent to 
teach Wallace Mohammed’s followers, in contrast to the aforementioned training sessions that 
were designed for imams only. The new arrangement, like the previous one, risked tacitly 
acknowledging a need for outside help. The shaykhs’ main daily duties were to help teach Arabic 
and Islamic studies.  
 One of the first shaykhs, Muhammad Nur Abdallah, of Sudan, “did good work,” 
recalled Agieb Bilal. “He… was in the mosque every day, whenever you wanted him. He would 
answer questions, had classes, and was freely available.” His Islamic Studies classes at the 
mosque on Saturdays proved very popular, providing Muslims at Wallace Mohammed’s main 
Chicago mosque the opportunity to learn about the Qur’an and hadiths in more detail than they 
had before. “They came in droves,” Bilal said. “… He was a very patient teacher.”
37
 
 The movement’s journal publicized the presence of these shaykhs, publishing a profile 
of Tajuddin bin Shuaib, then a 24-year-old native of Ghana who had studied at the Islamic 
University of Medina before being sent to Wallace Mohammed’s mosque. Besides teaching 
about the Qur’an and Islamic Studies, the article said he “frequently leads Islamic prayer services 
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and recently has been delivering a five-part lecture series on the Five Principles of Islam, belief 
in Allah, prayer, charity, fasting and Hajj.”
38
  
 In many ways, then, these teachers were well-received. Not only did they provide 
valued instruction to the mosques, but their presence allowed Wallace Mohammed to devote 
more time to his national organization and less to religious teachings at the mosque. “People 
were happy,” Agieb Bilal said, “because they felt that it liberated the imam [Wallace Mohammed] 
and gave him more mobility, rather than having to sit up in Chicago worrying about teaching 
Islam day and night.”
39
 
 Yet so many conflicts would arise between the MWL-funded shaykhs and Wallace 
Mohammed that the arrangements typically lasted either just months or a few years, at most. 
“There were problems with a lot of them because they thought they knew more than the Imam 
[Wallace Mohammed],” Bilal said.
40
 In 1983, Wallace Mohammed and the “Council of Imams” 
he had appointed to help him lead the organization announced they would no longer accept the 
MWL’s offers to fund foreign imams at Wallace Mohammed’s mosques, citing continued 
language and cultural barriers. An increase in the number of Wallace Mohammed’s followers 
who had studied the Qur’an and Arabic rendered the foreign help unnecessary, he said.
41
   
 The foreign shaykhs clashed with Wallace Mohammed on a wide range of topics, from 
Ramadan observance to international politics to the religious language used to describe non-
believers. Typical of the frictions was a disagreement in 1978 over the sighting of the crescent of 
the new moon to start the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. The timing of Ramadan moon-
sightings is important because observant Muslims are supposed to begin fasting the morning 
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after the moon is seen in the sky; Muslims in North America have long debated whether to base 
the start of their Ramadan fasting on moon sightings in the Middle East or in North America, 
given that Middle East sightings are usually announced earlier, in authoritative fashion by 
leaders of individual Muslim-majority countries including Saudi Arabia. Wallace Mohammed 
preferred to wait for a sighting over North America, but in 1978 Muhammad Nur, working in the 
Chicago mosque, announced that Ramadan had begun after a sighting over Saudi Arabia. “He 
was going to start the people on the Ramadan prayer,” Bilal recalled. “…Imam [Wallace 
Mohammed] had to come and stop it. Imam overrode him.”
42
 The question of whether the 
Muslim world or North America should hold sway over the practice of Islam in North America 
had arisen again, and not for the last time.  
While the MWL-funded shaykhs remained popular among Wallace Mohammed’s 
followers for their instruction on Arabic, the Qur’an and hadith, conflict surfaced over questions 
of politics, culture, and religious authority. The shaykhs wanted women to dress “Arab-style.” 
They spoke of Christians and Jews as “kufar” (unbelievers) in ways that many of the African-
American Muslims found discomfiting; as Agieb Bilal put it, the shaykhs “didn’t understand our 
relationship with them [Christians and Jews]. You’re sitting there listening to these guys saying 
your mommy and daddy are unbelievers.”
43
  
In addition, the shaykhs devoted significant amounts of time to political problems 
affecting the Muslim world. “That wasn’t new to us,” Bilal said. “We knew [about world affairs] 
from the Muhammad Speaks newspaper. But we want to know how to pronounce the Arabic 
letters and you’re telling us about the PLO! We want to know how to pronounce the Arabic 
letters and you tell us how bad the Iranian Revolution is and trying to pump us up with anti-Shi’a 
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 Another MWL-funded shaykh, Muhammad Alwan from Syria, would often 
attempt to correct Wallace Mohammed in public, recalled Plemon el-Amin, longtime imam of 
the Atlanta Masjid of Al-Islam and a close adviser to Wallace Mohammed in the 1980s and 
1990s. While on hajj in 1977 with a large contingent from Wallace Mohammed’s mosques, 
Alwan at one point urged the attendees to donate money, only to be chastised by Wallace 
Mohammed that their people were poor and didn’t have money to give.
45
 Still, Wallace 
Mohammed appointed several of these shaykhs to leadership positions at his mosques in major 
cities, though the arrangements tended to be short-lived, either a few months or a few years.
46
 
 Assistance from the MWL to help African-American Muslims make hajj also colored 
the relationship. Starting in 1977 the MWL offered to provide hajj accommodations in Saudi 
Arabia -- hotel rooms, food, transportation, and general guidance -- for hundreds of African-
American Muslims a year. In 1977 alone, three hundred followers of Wallace Mohammed made 
hajj this way. The organization’s newspaper covered these trips in detail, likening the NOI’s 
treatment by the MWL to “the return of the Prodigal Son and the finding of the Lost Sheep in the 
Bible... Almost everything possible was done to make them have a successful hajj.”
47
 
 The MWL on these hajj trips also arranged for Wallace Mohammed’s followers to meet 
with prominent political voices in the Muslim world, including Yasser Arafat of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization; General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, president of Pakistan; and Necmettin 
Erbakan, leader of the National Salvation Party in Turkey. “It was an attempt by the Saudis to 
indoctrinate us with Saudi-friendly leaders,” recalled Alfred Muhammad, imam of the Baltimore 
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mosque at the time and a member of the Council of Imams that managed the movement, who 
was on the trip. “… We had the insurgent leaders from all over the Muslim world give lectures to 
us… They were trying to impress us.”
48
An incident on the plane ride to Saudi Arabia offered another example of the 
longstanding tensions over authority. As the flight approached the airport in Jeddah, one of the 
Saudi-financed shaykhs, Ahmed Rifai of Nigeria, who taught at the movement’s New York 
mosque, approached Wallace Mohammed and said he wanted to instruct his followers over the 
plane’s speaker intercom about what would happen in the ensuing days. “Imam Mohammed 
wouldn’t let him do it,” recalled Imam Abdul Karim Hasan, who has led the organization’s main 
Los Angeles mosque since 1971. “He told him to get me… He said, ‘Whatever you want to say 
to the believers on the plane, you say to Imam Hasan. Imam Hasan will talk to the believers.’ 
The shaykh didn’t like that. What the Imam was doing was establishing among them the fact that 
we were going to be our own leader.”
49
In 1983, when the movement barred foreign imams from leading its mosques, it also 
stopped accepting the offers of land accommodations for hajj, reasoning that after multiple years 
of help, “our community now is at the point where all arrangements for the Hajj journey should 
be made by our community. Although we appreciate what has been done in the past, we now 
want to assume the responsibility for doing these things ourselves.”
50
48
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Marriage, Dress and Family 
 As stated above, Wallace Mohammed resisted entreaties from Muslims abroad to more 
strictly regulate how women dressed. He told his female followers that as long as they dressed 
“decently,” they no longer had to wear uniforms to temple meetings as they had under Elijah 
Muhammad. He worried less about whether strands of women’s hair were showing. What was 
important, he said, was intent; as long as they were not trying to attract men at the mosque, 
displaying some hair was not a concern.
51
 His broader instruction was that women need not 
devote themselves entirely to domestic roles; unlike his father, he encouraged women’s pursuit 
of higher education, including graduate school. Elijah Muhammad had taught that women should 
devote themselves entirely to their husbands and children, and generally emphasized 
wifely obedience to a husband.
52
 Wallace Mohammed, without explicitly disavowing the NOI’s 
strong emphasis on women’s domestic responsibilities and obedience, had developed a 
reputation within the movement for having more sensitivity to women’s issues than his father 
had. This was believed partially due to a strong relationship with his mother, with whom Wallace 
Mohammed had sided after his father had children with other women.
53
  
 His speeches often challenged stereotypical gender roles. He would urge husbands to 
help with housework, and he tended to encourage women to view themselves as intellectual 
beings. He changed the name of the organization’s women’s group from “Muslim Girls Training” 
to “Muslim Women’s Development Class.” He instituted rule changes that favored the 
independence of women in the organization, discontinuing NOI requirements that women needed 
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male escorts when traveling at night, and that they stay home while pregnant.
54
 In the late 1970s
he would establish a Committee to Enhance the Role of Women In Society, known as CERWIS; 
in 1980, he named a woman to the Council of Imams, which managed his organization. A 
study of the experiences of women in his organization, published in 2014, concluded that women 
“readily describe the period of Imam Mohammed’s leadership favorably, evoking terms of 
liberation.” It quoted a woman named Shafeeqah Abdullah saying, “To use our own minds, to 
make decisions. It was true freedom.”
55
As noted, his views would not have met with approval of mainstream Western 
feminists. In 1990, he praised gender norms in Saudi Arabia with more enthusiasm than one 
might have expected. A Muslim Journal about his recent trip to the kingdom included praise – by 
him and the reporter -- for Saudi rules restricting women’s mobility.  
We were happy to learn that the women of this Muslim nation lived in an honorable 
manner. No woman has to fight traffic jams and the many inconveniences of driving in 
the Kingdom (a luxury that is reserved only for the rich and famous women in America). 
Women also have their own banks, shopping centers and hospitals that are completely 
staffed and run by women. And most important, no women are seen immodestly dressed 
in public.  
Imam Mohammed, commenting on the honorable state of women in Saudi Arabia, said, 
“This is the way it should be. Our women shouldn’t have to meet strange men out in 
public. We shouldn’t even have our women answer the door at our homes to strange men. 
If the man isn’t there, the person should come back later. But I think we’re doing alright 
with the treatment of women in our community. We even have a sister [Ayesha Mustafaa] 
as the Editor of our [Muslim Journal] newspaper.”
56
Against his record of more progressive statements, these ruminations seemed out of place, 
appearing to praise Saudi prohibitions on women driving and walking in public alone, and 
restrictions on gender-mixing. These laws are widely viewed as Saudi cultural traditions rather 
than purely Islamic ones, the type of traditions Wallace Mohammed would never seek for 
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Muslim-Americans. But, as we shall see later, on this trip he was trying to engineer a Saudi 
donation for his school system, and he was probably attempting to flatter his hosts. 
Conflict with Immigrant Muslims 
During this period, the MWL was also offering scholarships to African-Americans – 
both inside and outside Wallace Mohammed’s organization – who wanted to pursue degree 
programs at Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, including the Islamic University of Medina 
(IUM) and King Saud University in Riyadh. The Saudis had founded the IUM in 1961 to teach 
Islamic Studies to foreigners, and in fact had offered twelve scholarships to Malcolm X’s 
organizations – the Muslim Mosque, Inc., and the Organization for Afro-American Unity -- after 
he left the Nation of Islam in 1964. (It is worth noting that African American Muslims also 
studied at Islamic universities in other countries; for example, in 1977 the MWL included a 
member of Wallace Mohammed’s organization among five recipients of scholarships to 
University Umm Dumran in Sudan.
57
 And, as noted, Anwar Sadat of Egypt had previously
offered scholarships to a dozen WCIW members, to al-Azhar University in Cairo, when he met 
with Wallace Mohammed in 1975.
58
)
In years and decades to come, the hundreds of Saudi scholarships that were given to 
African-Americans – most of them from outside Wallace Mohammed’s organization -- would 
help alter the practice of Islam by segments of African-American Muslims, especially a small but 
influential segment of African-American Muslims known as Salafis, who are discussed at length 
in Chapter Five. Yet even during the late 1970s and 1980s, the specter of African-Americans 
leaving the United States to study Islam overseas spurred efforts by Wallace Mohammed to 
57
 “Five American Muslims to Study in Sudan,” Bilalian News, November 25, 1977, 7. 
58
 Marsh, From Black Muslims to, 96-97. 
138 
 
create institutions of Islamic learning in the United States. He wanted his organization to 
spearhead a domestic, intellectual Islamic movement that would prevent American Muslims 
from believing the best options for Islamic education were abroad. In 1977, an advertisement in 
the Bilalian News asked for volunteers for a proposed new Journal of Bilalian Scholarship, 
which would strive to “re-define the knowledge base of the society.”
59
 Wallace Mohammed in 
the early 1980s spoke of plans to formulate a madhhab, or Islamic school of thought, in the 
United States that would hold its own among the more established historic ones in the Muslim-
majority world.
60
 And he worked to found a college whose primary goal would be training 
Muslim teachers for the movement’s “Clara Mohammed” school system. The “American 
Muslim Teacher’s College,” as it would be called, would also ground potential imams in 
religious education. In 1979, the Illinois Board of Higher Education approved the movement’s 
request to operate the college, planned for Chicago. The new college would “allow our schools 
to continue to thrive and to deliver an understanding of Islam that we felt was healthy,” recalled 
Clyde el-Amin, the movement’s Director of Education in the late 1970s.
61
 The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia had already donated money to build a library for the school, and Wallace 
Mohammed’s movement assumed more foreign money would help with the rest.  
 This effort to establish religious authority would not end well for the movement. A 
small organization of immigrant Muslims, backed by foreign money, submitted its own plan to 
the Illinois Board of Higher Education for the same kind of school, called the “American Islamic 
College.” Major donors included a Mecca-based group, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, which consisted of foreign ministers of more than fifty Muslim countries, giving 
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this venture more foreign support than Wallace Mohammed’s organization could gather. Plans 
for Wallace Mohammed’s teachers’ college stalled, while the immigrant-run American Islamic 




 This was just one way that, from Wallace Mohammed’s perspective, immigrant 
Muslims were constantly challenging his authority as a Muslim leader in the United States. In the 
late 1970s and the 1980s, officials in Wallace Mohammed’s movement were taken aback by 
several criticisms. Foreign and immigrant Muslims had challenged his use of his title “chief 
imam” and the organization’s use of the term “Bilalians” to describe members. (The term 
referred to Bilal, a valued companion of the prophet Muhammad who had been an African slave.) 
The tone of this “guidance” clearly upset Wallace Mohammed and his followers, who found it 
condescending, though they agreed to stop using the terms. In the following quotation, from 
1982, Wallace Mohammed likened Muslims from abroad – “so-called Muslims,” he called them 
– to aspiring slave masters. He included Jews and Christians in his criticism, but clearly it was 
directed mostly at immigrant Muslims: 
Open your eyes, brothers and sisters, and see that we got people on this  
earth today that greet us like they’re holy holies, in the church, in the  
synagogue, in the mosque, … and their only intention is to keep you ig- 
norant, keep you from coming into the knowledge that Allah gave for all  
of us. That’s their only intention… Let me repeat. They are Jews, they are 
Christians, and they are so-called Muslims. When they come among us,  
they don’t want to do nothing but give us the impressionable stuff that  
will give us an emotional attachment to faith. Just an emotional attachment  
to faith. They never want us to have the rational attachment. They never  
want us to see the real knowledge, because they fear that if we see that, we  
won’t have any use for them! That wasn’t the way of prophet Muhammad!  
What do they want, a camp of slaves? A society of new children? That they  
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can lord over as fathers and mothers? Is that what they want out of us? Get  
the hell out our society if that’s what you want of us! (cheering) You’ll never  
get that. You’ll never get that. Slave masters are finished for us.  
 
…We gonna string some of you shaykhs upside down and chop them up  
in a billion pieces one of these days. I’m talking about those who come up  
among us hypocritically pretending to be good Muslims. And they have no 
intention but to charm us into following them blindly. And once we do that,  




 Underlying much of the concern over autonomy was the sense by many African-
American Muslims that Saudis and other Arabs respected them neither intellectually nor as 
religious equals, and that race played a factor in this condescension. Several of the African-
American Muslims who I interviewed spoke of a “last straw” in the relationship, each of them 
citing a different incident that supposedly led Wallace Mohammed in the mid-to-late-1980s or 
early 1990s to distance the movement from the Saudis and the Muslim World League. Wallace 
Mohammed Jr., the leader’s son, and Alfred Muhammad, a member of the Council of Imams in 
the late 1970s, both cited an incident in which Saudi officials referred to Wallace Mohammed 
and his imams as “our little brothers.”
64
 Muhammad Siddeeq, an Indianapolis imam and an 
adviser to Wallace Mohammed, cited a different incident when a Saudi official, while chiding 
Wallace Mohammed for something, referred to him as “one of our sons.”
65
 And Plemon el-Amin, 
an Atlanta imam and adviser to Wallace Mohammed, recalled an evening in the 1980s when 
several of the movement’s imams were invited to a banquet at the Saudi embassy and were told 
to dress formally. They rented tuxedos and were the only attendees so clad. To their dismay, 
other attendees mistook them for servers and asked them for drinks!
66
 Imam Abdul Karim Hasan, 
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the longtime Los Angeles imam, recalled an incident in the early 1990s in the Saudi embassy 
after Saudi officials learned that Wallace Mohammed secured an upcoming meeting with 
President Bill Clinton. The Saudis invited Wallace Mohammed to their embassy in Washington 
D.C. and proceeded to instruct him on what to tell the president. Every time Wallace Mohammed 
interjected, he was cut off. Hasan recounted, from Wallace Mohammed’s retelling of the event: 
“When they finished, he asked them, he said, ‘Are you finished?’ They said ‘Yes, we’re through.’ 
And he got up and walked out… He was an American. So why should he sit there and listen to 
someone try to tell him, who was not an American, what he should say to his president?”
67
 
 It is difficult to know which, if any, of these incidents proved most pivotal toward the 
souring of a relationship that had never lacked for tension. They probably had cumulative effects. 
Collectively, the anecdotes suggest that the relationship suffered from what is charitably called a 
blindness toward African-American sensitivities regarding language, and interactions that were 
viewed as disrespectful and emasculating given the history of racism in the United States and, for 
that matter, in the Arab world; slavery was legal in Saudi Arabia until 1962, and when it had 
been more common across the Muslim world, it was slaves from Africa rather than elsewhere 
who tended to live under the worst circumstances.
68
 Most of the African-American Muslims who 
I interviewed from Wallace Mohammed’s movement said they believed that most of the 
immigrant or foreign Muslims with whom they interacted, even after 1975, did not view them as 
religious equals.  
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 One incident that seemed to demonstrate that was a 1978 visit by Saudi King Khaled to 
a Cleveland mosque affiliated with Wallace Mohammed, where he tried to ingratiate himself 
with his hosts by telling them, “I was raised by an African woman.”
69
 King Khaled’s mother was 
not of African descent; she was from the Arab tribe of al-Jiwali in the Arabian Peninsula; the 
king, then, was likely referring to a different woman who was a servant or slave. The comment 
seems to have caused no problems at the time; the newspaper for Wallace Mohammed’s 
movement’s even highlighted it above the headline of a positive article about the visit. Yet in 
retrospect, it can be seen as an illustration of the inferiority with which Saudi leaders imagined 
African-Americans; the Saudi king, in describing his emotional connection with his black hosts, 
is framing his relationship to them through a reference to a loyal servant or slave from his 
childhood. 
Saudi discourse on non-Muslims, perceived to be overly negative, was another recurrent 
issue among African-American Muslims, many of whose relatives were Christian. One instance 
of this involved the Saudis’ distribution of free Qur’ans. Sometime in the 1980s, Wallace 
Mohammed and his imams received and rejected Saudi gifts of a controversial English 
translation of Islam’s holiest book. The version, titled the Noble Qur’an in the English Language, 
is the most widely distributed Qur’an in “Islamic bookstores and Sunni mosques in the English-
speaking world,” but it has been criticized by some Westerners, including Muslims, as overtly 
and unnecessarily anti-Christian and anti-Semitic, due to its commentary and method of 
translation.
70
 (More often, the Qur’ans distributed by Saudi-financed entities had lacked that 
controversial language.
71
) As Plemon el-Amin, the Atlanta imam, recalled, “They sent us this 
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huge shipment of Qur’ans that had this terrible translation of the al-Fatiha, the opening chapter 
of the Qur’an, that said, ‘show me the straight way… not of those [on] who your wrath has come 
down – such as the Jews — nor those who go astray – such as the Christians.’ They sent us a 
hundred thousand of those.”
72
  
 A noteworthy moment of public discord occurred in 1988, when Wallace Mohammed 
publicly used the word “heretic” to criticize a spokesman for the Saudi-funded, Mecca-based 
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). Like the Muslim World League, WAMY is 
involved in propagating Islam around the world. In 1988, Wallace Mohammed objected to the 




We are given a cruel WAMY. In a recent publication which attempts to  
highlight today’s concerns for Muslims, a spokesman for the Saudi-based  
“World Association of Muslim Youth” appears to want to alarm both Muslims  
and non-Muslims with his seemingly HERETIC assertion on Allah’s proclamation  
in His Majestic Book, the Qur’an, stating, ‘the religion of Allah is Al-Islam,” and  
further, “should anyone choose a religion other than Al-Islam, it will not be accepted 
from him in the Judgment.” …  
 
This ‘suspect of heresy’ claims to induce and to establish from the Proclamation of  
the Most High Lord a belief which labels non-Muslims as ‘kaafir,’ which is to say 
“rejectors of faith.” With this article, this WAMY spokesman targets Christians and  
Jews for death under Islamic or Quranic authority, unless they – while facing the 
execution in the final moments of their life – the non-Muslim recants or retracts  




The perceived offense was hardly new to the movement; as noted, some of the Saudi-trained 
shaykhs working in Wallace Mohammed’s mosques regularly used the word kufar to refer to 
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followers’ non-Muslim relatives. But WAMY was a widely known international organization, 
and its prominence gave weight to public statements of its officials. “I’ve never seen the imam so 
angry,” Bilal said of Wallace Mohammed. “He was talking about how anybody reading that 
would immediately think, ‘Okay, this is an official Islamic position that all Muslims throughout 
the world including our Negroes here in America take,’ just more cannon fodder for right-
wingers to say we hate Christians.”
75
 It appears to have been the only time Wallace Mohammed 




 Contributing to the tension was Wallace Mohammed’s troubled, tension-filled 
relationship with his own imams, as a group, throughout his thirty-three years of leadership. This 
relationship has never been explored in a scholarly (or non-scholarly) work, perhaps because it is 
unrelated to broad trends in scholarly analysis of Islam among African-Americans and can seem, 
at first glance, inconsequential. But it is at least tangentially related to the movement’s 
relationship with Saudi religious leaders and institutions, as well as with immigrant Muslims 
from other countries. The potential (and reality) of his ministers receiving Saudi money loomed, 
to him, as a threat to his organization’s integrity as a Muslim-American movement. 
 A spate of Muslim Journal articles through the years, and data from my own interviews 
with contemporary leaders in the movement, revealed there were two main, persistent sources of 
conflict between Wallace Mohammed and his imams. Many, if not most, of the imams in the 
movement were unwilling to follow Wallace Mohammed’s religious direction as closely as he 
wanted them to, either from concern he was abandoning his father’s beliefs too quickly or from 
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concern he wasn’t moving toward Sunni Islam quickly or comprehensively enough. Secondly, 
the financial reforms he imposed significantly reduced his ministers’ salaries from their levels 
under his father. This spurred both bitterness and a frequent habit of individual imams to 
personally solicit the Saudi embassy for money.
76
  
 Agieb Bilal, who in 1985 left his job as a top assistant for Wallace Mohamed to accept 
a full-time position in the Saudi embassy, said it was common for individual imams in the 
movement to arrive at the Saudi embassy in Washington D.C. seeking handouts – presumably for 
their own mosques. “They [Saudi embassy officials] would say, ‘Bilal! You know an Imam So-
and-So?’ I’d say, ‘Yeah.’ They’d say, ‘He said Imam Mohammed sent them to get money!’ I’d 
say, ‘All of them were lying, and if you can help him in his individual city, Alhamdulillah, give 
him some help, he might need some money.’”
77
 Alfred Mohammed, an imam in Baltimore for a 
mosque associated with Wallace Mohammed, recalled visiting the Saudi embassy when he 
himself needed $3,000 to pay bills. When he requested that amount, the Saudi official expressed 
surprise the number wasn’t higher, a sign that other imams in the movement were requesting 
more, he said.
78
 This was a common enough practice to merit skeptical notice from the Council 
of Imams, which issued a memorandum on November 13, 1979, seeking to limit such requests. 
In item 1C, titled “Overseas Fund Raising,” the council wrote: “Soliciting funds overseas should 
be done only with the consent of the Council. Accepting funds for the Masjid is okay, however, 
the Council needs to look at [who’s] benefiting from such funds or gifts.”
79
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 Soon thereafter, when interviewer Tony Brown cited an A.M. Journal article on 
Wallace Mohammed’s reluctance to accept foreign money for his organization and mosques, the 
leader expressed concern that ill-advised relationships would form and threaten his 
organization’s integrity. “If we encourage that, we’re gonna have people who look perhaps or 
aspire to that position of imam so they can go overseas and maybe think that they’re gonna get 
rich … when they meet the Arab oil people, their Muslim brothers over there.”
80
 
 He noted that he himself would gladly accept foreign money to invest it in poor 
communities. “Saudi Arabia, for example, donates very, very big sums to relieve misery in the 
world among… poor people, so I have expressed desire to see that kind of help come. But I’ve 
done it openly and I haven’t done it on my own. I’ve also made a point of telling my people that 




 While Wallace Mohammed maintained a large core of devoted followers throughout 
his leadership, his overall relationship with the imams who oversaw the one hundred twenty-five 
mosques associated with the movement never lacked for significant problems. Close readings of 
his newspaper and interviews with movement leaders indicate ongoing concern from the leader 
that too few of his imams supported his religious direction or his community programs. Having 
moved away from his father’s beliefs without falling squarely into the camps of Sunni Muslims 
from abroad, he appears to have landed where few of his imams felt comfortable. This appears to 
be why, over the years, he “resigned” multiple times as leader of his organization, only to retake 
the reins soon thereafter; he was effectively telling his imams to either follow him as he wanted 
to be followed, or leave and build their own audience. During one such break in 1983, in which 
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he “severed his association with local masajid [mosques] and their operations,” as the A.M. 
Journal’s editor wrote, Wallace Mohammed was quoted by the newspaper saying that “Most of 
them (Imams) are embarrassing the image of this community. So what do we need with them? 
Are they helping us carry out our responsibility? No! They’re just looking for an opportunity to 
make some money on my name. That’s all their doing. That’s the truth!”
82
 He even accused 
some imams of refusing to sell the movement’s newspaper at their mosques, “because they don’t 
want the people to hear anything except what comes from their own mouths.” Most devastatingly, 
he said, “I can’t hardly think of one [imam] that I feel comfortable with. It’s hard for me to think 
of a single Imam that I feel comfortable with. That’s a shame! That’s really pitiful! If I think real 
hard and search for about 15 minutes, I might find a few – but it’s hard to find them. Believe me, 
they’re not helping us at all!”
83
 During this period the newspaper often published entire letters 
from imams around the country explicitly pledging their support for Wallace Mohammed’s 
leadership, part of an apparent effort to rally his imams around him. 
 
Visits in the 1990s  
 Despite the wariness toward and frustration with Saudi religious leaders and institutions, 
Wallace Mohammed’s movement did not completely sever ties with them. Even during the 
1980s, the movement’s newspaper published advertisements seeking people to study abroad at 
the University of Medina. “NOTICE TO STUDENTS WHO WISH TO STUDY IN SAUDI 
ARABIA,” read the front-page note – part of the “Inside this issue” sidebar -- in the January 11, 
1985, edition of the weekly Muslim Journal.
84
 It directed readers to page three, where a box in 
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bold type instructed them to “READ. Opportunity has been given to us from Saudi Arabia to 
select a number of students for further education in Islamic studies, and the sciences – General 
courses, Islam and Arabic will also be included.”
85
   
 The advertisement, which ran three times over the course of a month, urged high school 
graduates to send applications to Wallace Mohammad’s office in Chicago. People without high 
school degrees also could apply, as long as they explained their circumstances. “Do it now!!!” 
the advertisement ended. One week later, the advertisement resurfaced in tandem with a short 
article saying that a professor from the Saudi Islamic University of Muhammad bin Saud would 
soon be processing applications with Wallace Mohammed.
86
 The prospect of studying Islam in 
Saudi Arabia had been raised often enough in African American Muslim circles that in May 
1985, Wallace Mohammed’s newspaper published an article about Arabic language classes being 
offered in Chicago that would benefit “those who are interested in studying in Saudi Arabia.”
87
 
 Among the reasons he maintained the relationship with the kingdom was his appointment 
in 1984 to the Supreme Council of Mosques, a prestigious committee of the Muslim World 
League with thirty-five members worldwide. He did not devote much time to the position; from 
1982 to 1989 he apparently never traveled to Saudi Arabia, where the council’s meetings were 
held. But in February 1990, in the first of four trips he would make to the kingdom over a two-
year period, he attended a Supreme Council meeting. In an interview with the Muslim Journal 
after this trip, the leader offered nothing but praise when asked his opinion of Saudi oversight of 
the “holy precincts” of Mecca and Medina. “I do not think we could have any better persons than 
the members of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and of its ruling family there in Saudi Arabia,” he 
said. “Right now, I do not know of any better persons in the international world for that 
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 When asked if he favored stronger links between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia, he responded, “Yes, I do. I encourage Muslims of America to look to Saudi Arabia first. 
We should because the Holy Precincts are there, and we should look there for our Islamic 
contacts.”
89
 While his words seem diplomatic in nature, if taken at face value it would be a 
remarkable statement appearing to counter what Wallace Mohammed had said for the previous 
decade and a half about the location of religious authority for Muslim-Americans. 
Upon his return to the United States, and before his next trip to the kingdom, Wallace 
Mohammed gave a speech in Phoenix to his followers that revealed another element of the 
financial relationship. In discussing how donations of his followers helped him pay his bills, 
Wallace Mohammed mentioned that he had purchased a home with assistance of Saudis from 
whom he had sought a loan.  
The purchase of my home was provided for by good Saudi Arabian friends.  
I went to them and asked for a loan, which I was going to pay back with your  
money, as I received it in my pay. But they (our Saudi Brothers and friends)  
told me, “Brother Imam, you are our Imam also. We are supposed to give  
[you] a home. You cannot pay back this money to us.” So they provided the  
home, and you keep the lights on. The lights, the phone, the gas, the water  
stays on and has never been cut off, because your support is always coming  




The following month, March 1990, he traveled to Saudi Arabia again, this time in hopes 
of receiving donations for his organization’s school system, named after his mother, Clara 
Muhammad. The Saudi embassy to the United States paid for this trip, not just for Wallace 
Mohammed but for a delegation of sixteen of his imams and education specialists. The 
movement’s newspaper publicized how their group was treated with high official honors 
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 “How we are to establish Muslim life in America,” Muslim Journal, March 9, 1990, 25. 
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including an official motorcade, flights on Saudi military planes across the peninsula, and 
meetings with high-ranking members of the royal family and religious leaders.
91
  
Yet in keeping with the long-term rhythms of the organization’s relationship with the 
Saudis, the second trip would end in a frustrating manner. Saudi donors declined to offer 
substantial donations upon learning that the Clara Muhammad schools lacked official  
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Figure 1. The organization’s newspaper published photographs demonstrating the close 
proximity of Wallace Mohammed to Saudi leaders. Photos by Sabir Kasib Muhammad, 
Muslim Journal, April 12, 1990, 7. Source: Research and Reference Division, Schomburg 





accreditation. (This would spur an accreditation effort that became successful in 2000.
92
) The 
only donation made was $50,000 from Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, 
who accompanied the delegation on the trip.  
Coverage in the Muslim Journal, however, portrayed a positive trip during which the 
delegation received “royal treatment,” ignoring the disappointment over donations. The extended, 
detailed coverage merits special attention here because it reflects the nature of the identity crisis 
that clearly continued to affect the organization fifteen years after Wallace Mohammed became 
leader. In the weeks following the trip, the newspaper published a spate of articles with elaborate 
detail about the delegation’s activities, not only on the Saudi motorcades, flights, and fancy 
meals that were provided, but also on public Saudi praise for the movement. It noted that Saudi 
television had cited Wallace Mohammed as “the leader of the Muslims in America.”
93
 Other 
coverage noted he had been awarded “the highest status of any American ever visiting the 
Kingdom,” with full state honors, and that Saudi media ran “daily features on Saudi television, 
radio and newspapers” about him.
94
 One article quoted a Saudi official suggesting the kingdom 
should give Wallace Mohammed more money.
95
 Meanwhile, photo montages portrayed Wallace 
Mohammed in close proximity to Saudis of prominent rank, including future King Abdallah and 
the Shaykh Bin Biz.
96
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The coverage seems to have had three audiences in mind. The most important one 
consisted of Wallace Mohammed’s followers, who took pride in their leader’s acceptance abroad 
as an important dignitary on the Muslim world stage. A second audience consisted of immigrant 
Muslim leaders in the United States, who knew Wallace Mohammed and would be impressed at 
his reception by the royal family. Last but not least, a third audience consisted of officials at the 
Saudi embassy (and other embassies of Muslim-majority countries), who would see Wallace 
Mohammed’s enthusiasm for Saudi leaders and might prove more likely to coordinate larger 
donations.  
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the ensuing Persian Gulf 
War led to two more trips, which received similar coverage in the Muslim Journal. Like other 
Muslim-American groups, Wallace Mohammed’s would face the challenge of deciding whether 
to support Saudi decisions that proved extremely controversial in the Muslim world – the 
decisions to ask for American military assistance and to allow establishment of a new U.S. air 
base in the country. The kingdom, which shares borders with both Iraq and Kuwait, had seen 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait as a direct threat to its own security. Yet many Muslim 
organizations voiced displeasure with a Western military presence in the Arabian Peninsula, 
specifically over the imagined proximity of U.S. troops to Islam’s holiest cities. 
Wallace Mohammed sided with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and against Saddam 
Hussein, a secular Arab socialist with claims against regional monarchies. On September 14, the 
Muslim Journal reprinted a statement condemning the invasion by future grand mufti Shakyh 
‘Abd al-‘Aziz Bin Baz, then the Director General of the important Department of Research, 
Fatwa, Da‘wa and Religious Guidance for the kingdom. The statement carried the loaded 
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headline, “The Islamic standpoint on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait,”
97
 publicly granting “Islamic” 
status to the official Saudi view. On the front page of the same issue, thirteen imams in Wallace 
Mohammed’s community published a statement condemning the Iraqi invasion and backing “the 
decision of the Custodians of the Two Holy Mosques to invite the multinational force for the 
defense of Saudi Arabia and the sovereignty of the countries in that region,” adding that “as 
indigenous American Muslims, we commend our government for honoring the friendship with 
Saudi Arabia and protecting our collective interests with speed, decisiveness, and diplomacy.” 
The headline reflected Wallace Mohammed’s concern with projecting leadership across racial 
and ethnic boundaries: “Taking a Stand, ‘Crisis in the Middle East,’” it read. “Statement of 
Position by Imams of the American Muslim Community Who identify with and support the 
Leadership of Imam W. Deen Mohammed who is regarded as the leader for Muslims in 
America.”
98
 The newspaper also printed, in full, a statement by the Saudi embassy explaining 
and defending its decision to allow Western troops to Saudi Arabia for a “strictly defensive and 




The newspaper also covered a September 1990 trip to Mecca by Wallace Mohammed and 
several of his followers to attend an MWL-sponsored conference related to the war. One article 
printed Wallace Mohammed’s response to critical questions at a press conference in New York, 
before leaving for the trip, on the use of non-Muslims to protect Islam’s holiest sites. “We must 
make decisions,” he said. “Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) used non-Muslims even from among 
the idolaters to protect his emerging community. So there is preceden[t] for the government’s 
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actions.” When asked if the United States had pressured the Saudi government to allow U.S. 
troops there, he defended the arrangement: “U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia is temporary by a pre-
arranged agreement… No, the papers were not signed by the Saudi Government under duress 
from President Bush. The military threat required intelligent decisive action on their part.”
100
  
Once in Saudi Arabia, he said he believed that President Bush had “great respect” for 
Islam and other religions. And in a statement of support to the embattled royal family, he also 
downplayed the widespread concerns of others that the U.S. presence on Arabian soil was 
disrespectful to Islamic concerns, noting that the troop presence was far from the holy sites. 
Also I am told that many Muslims are believing that the military of the United  
States… is occupying the Sacred Places. This not true. We arrived in Jeddah and  
I haven’t seen the military yet. We are now in Mecca. I have not seen the military.  
If I wasn’t informed before, I wouldn’t even know that there was any  
threatening situation or the presence of a massive build-up of ammunition and  
troops to defend Saudi Arabia against any aggression… This build-up is at least  
a thousand miles away from the Haramain (the two holy places). We should be  




Yet all this praise did not result in significant financial support. In an interview printed in the 
November 30, 1990, edition of the Muslim Journal, Wallace Mohammed addressed the matter 
directly to a questioner from Africa.  
Q: How are you financed? For example do you get Saudi aid? 
 
IWMD: Saudi Aid? Yes, I want Saudi aid. You can bring it here. I don’t have it. The 





A fourth trip to Saudi Arabia, with a delegation of sixteen people in January 1991, was 
taken for two stated reasons: to show support for the kingdom and to meet with U.S. troops in 
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Saudi Arabia who had converted to Islam. After U.S. troops had received instruction from the 
military about Islam and on Saudi customs – “so that our soldiers would not inadvertently offend” 
people in the kingdom, recalled Chas Freeman, the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia at the time -
- a higher-than-expected number of troops had converted.
103
 According to Agieb Bilal, the State 
Department had contacted Wallace Mohammed before the trip and requested that he visit with 
these converts, in hope that the encounter could help sway them toward a “moderate” version of 
Islam rather than something more “radical.”
104
 Wallace Mohammed’s delegation never did talk 
with these troops, as the war began on the day they planned to meet with them.
105
 But his 
decision to go for this purpose reflected his willingness to be seen as a moderate Islamic 
alternative. 
Aside from touring the kingdom from January 13, 1991, to January 21, 1991, and 
meeting with Saudi officials to show support for the kingdom’s position on the war, Wallace 
Mohammed publicly praised the Saudis to reporters there. In an interview with CNN in Riyadh, 
in which he was asked whether he was visiting the kingdom “as Muslim or as American or as 
Muslim-American,” he reflected broadly on some of the identity issues faced by Muslim-
Americans, and on perceptions of Islamic law.  
I have wrestled with my soul and my thinking for a long time… I feel very  
comfortable being American and being Muslim and I feel that I am a great  
moral friend of Saudi Arabia. There are hypocrites everywhere, but I have  
come to know members of the Saudi royal family personally and they are  
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His support for U.S. involvement and the related Saudi position on it did not go 
unnoticed by American military brass. On February 5, 1992, about a year after Operation Desert 
Storm and one day before Wallace Mohammed would make history as the first Muslim to pray 
before a session of the U.S. Senate, the imam was honored with a special lunch at the Pentagon. 
The Pentagon’s chief chaplain praised Wallace Mohammed’s “loyal and unswerving religious 
leadership in support of our nation during the difficult times of the Gulf War. That’s no small 
thing. As you know in times of crisis it’s very important to have leadership that understands all 
of the difficulties of those times, and he is one of those leaders…” The Pentagon gave him two 
plaques, one with a drawing of the Pentagon building and one citing “his leadership to the 




Wallace Mohammed called the invitation “a great honor” and said he was “overwhelmed. 
I’m like floating in the air. I never dreamed that we would receive such an invitation.” When he 
completed his short speech about the basic tenets of Islam, a questioner asked him if he had had 
a “crisis of conscience” over his support for the war. “I had no conflict of conscience at all,” he 
responded. “I didn’t rush into any decision. I thought it out very carefully.” He said “all Muslims 
should have denounced [Saddam Hussein], throughout the world” and should have “saluted 
America for helping… people who are Muslim against one who is very strong and perhaps 
would have just walked over everybody there.” Raising the specter of Saddam Hussein 
conquering the Islam’s “holy precincts” of Mecca and Medina, he noted that while he himself 
had refused to be drafted while in the Nation of Islam in the late 1950s, he was now thankful for 
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Sometime around 1997, according to Wallace Mohammed’s telling in a television 
interview five years later, a wealthy Saudi approached him and urged his group to view the 
kingdom’s religious leaders as father figures and to accept their religious guidance. “This person 
came to me,” Wallace Mohammed recalled in 2002, “and impressed me with this idea, that ‘you 




Wallace Mohammed emphasized in the interview – conducted shortly after 9/11 -- that he 
did not view Saudi leadership as “extremist,” but that, had he accepted the proposed relationship, 
his followers “would have gotten a man for their leader [himself] who would not have been their 
leader. Their leader would’ve been whoever was dictating thoughts, opinions, thinking and 
policy to me, to them through me.” His fear of being a “conduit” for Wahhabism was not that he 
viewed it as “fundamentalist,” which he said he did not, but that “it was ritualistic. They 
would’ve had a more ritualist life… rather than a rational life… They would’ve simply been 
following the rituals of prayer, the rituals of hajj, etcetera, but not being free thinkers.” His 
followers, he added, “would have no place in America.”  
This is a land of the free… They would have been monsters and dummies  
walking around in America, zombies… In America, if you’re not thinking  
on your own and somebody else is dictating your life and your thinking in  
everything, you’re not human. 
 








The interviewer asked Wallace Mohammed if his decision to reject the wealthy Saudi’s 
offer effectively prevented the emergence of a “fifth column of black people in the United States 
who now would be ready to act against their own country.” Wallace Mohammed responded in 
the affirmative. “Certainly,” he said. “Yes. Because most of the madhhabs or schools as 
presented by [Islamic] leaders of this time, they do not tend to welcome thinkers who embrace 
the ideas, the great ideas of this nation, or the western world. If we… accept[ed] that way of 
thinking, I doubt if our followers would be patriotic in any degree.”
110
 
Over two decades, from 1975 to the mid-1990s, the largest African-American Muslim 
organization nurtured relationships with Saudi religious leaders and institutions that brought 
Saudi-financed religious guidance to African-American Muslims but failed in its ongoing efforts 
to draw significant cash donations rather than just services in kind from the oil-producing 
kingdom. Wallace Mohammed’s desire to move the Nation of Islam and its successor 
organizations toward the American mainstream and away from an instinctive opposition to U.S. 
foreign policy apparently complicated his relationships with Muslim leaders from foreign 
countries who tried to influence his own group’s political agenda involving the Muslim world. In 
addition, Wallace Mohammed always remained wary of sacrificing autonomy to Muslims from 
abroad and feared that accepting their money might pressure him to concede to their exertions of 
authority. 
In his thirty-three years of leadership, Wallace Mohammed managed his organization’s 
relationship with the Saudis within the scope of his own often-conflicting religious and political 
agendas. Foremost, he sought guidance in educating his followers as the organization moved 
toward conventional Sunni Islamic norms on divinity, prophets, race and the afterlife. He 
pursued respect for his group internationally. Yet he did everything he could to guard African-





American autonomy as interpreters of Islamic law, displaying strong reluctance to sacrifice this 
to Muslims from overseas. In addition, he pushed his followers to immerse themselves in Sunni 
religious practices more than they had previously, while simultaneously pushing them to 
participate in American society. Concerns related to the Black Freedom movement never 
disappeared from his rhetoric, yet he also clearly wanted to demonstrate that he was not 
instinctively opposed to U.S. government activity as his father had been, and that he cared about 
aligning with U.S. stances relating to the Cold War and subsequent exercises of overseas 














The Muslim World League in a “Muslim-Minority” Land 
   
African-American Muslims were far from the only Muslim-American group targeted by 
the Saudi kingdom’s efforts to influence Sunni Islamic practices. This chapter explores and 
contextualizes the proselytization efforts of a Saudi-financed agency, the Muslim World League 
(MWL), in a so-called “Muslim-minority” country, the United States. I argue that the MWL’s 
interaction with Muslim-Americans from 1975 to 1985 was typical of its efforts in similar 
Muslim-minority regions in the West, where Muslim communities had a minimal communal 
presence prior to the 20th century and still constitute small minorities of national populations. I 
demonstrate that the MWL directed its proselytization in the United States to people who were 
already Muslims, rather than trying to convert non-Muslims to Islam. After explaining how the 
history of Islam in the United States positioned Muslim-Americans to benefit from MWL 
activities in the 1970s, I discuss the MWL’s priorities and activities in the United States and 
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explain how Muslim organizations indigenous to North America would arise to supplant many of 
its roles.  
The Saudi kingdom created the MWL in 1962, tasking it with the pan-Islamic mission to 
organize and bolster Muslim communities in Muslim-majority and -minority countries alike, on 
every inhabitable continent. The MWL was based in Mecca but its continental and national 
branches teamed with Saudi embassies around the world to help build mosques, finance religious 
leaders’ salaries, donate religious literature, and distribute scholarships for extensive study at 
Islamic universities in the kingdom. In the United States, the MWL would simultaneously build 
relationships with both immigrant Muslims and African-American ones, the latter group 
constituting the largest single ethnic group of Muslims in the United States.  
Far from the imagined center of the Muslim world, most Muslim communities in the 
United States in the early 20th century had developed with little direct guidance or financial help 
from entities based abroad. This would change in the century’s latter decades, when the mixture 
of increased immigration, intercontinental air travel, improvements to telecommunications, the 
rise of nationalism and Islamic Revivalism in the Muslim world, and, not least of all, the 
skyrocketing of Saudi oil revenues in the 1970s,
1
 resulted in larger Muslim populations in the 
West and increasing capabilities of Muslim-majority countries to help them prosper. Western 
Muslim populations could be reached more easily than before by newly arisen missionary efforts 
from the Middle East, financed by oil revenues. 
In addition, the increases in Western Muslim populations would spur a related 
reexamination of what it meant for Muslims to live as a religious minority governed by non-
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 Islamic jurists have long believed that the habitation of Muslims in “Muslim-
minority lands,” where Islam is not the dominant religion, carries religious implications not just 
for the individual Muslims living there, but also for the worldwide Muslim community, which is 
supposed to provide assistance. The idea of “Muslim minorities” is a longstanding but fluid 
concept in Islamic discourse, one that has acquired a new dimension since Muslim immigration 
to the West began increasing exponentially in the mid-20th century.  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s distinctly assertive program of international 
proselytization has also affected the relationship between the “Muslim World” and “Muslim 
minorities.” Islam had been crucial to the self-identity of the House of Saud since its forebears 
allied with the imam Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744,
3
 but in 1962 the kingdom actually 
made proselytization an official part of its mission, one segment of an effort to increase its 
stature in the Muslim world.
4
 What propelled the Saudis in these endeavors was not just the 
religious responsibility of proselytization but also, within the context of the “Arab Cold War,”
5
 
an assertion of its own hegemony in the region. For this, it promoted a program of pan-Islamism, 
designed to counter the pan-Arab nationalism of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.
6
 The 
Saudi ruling family acted against the Egyptian state’s growing influence in the Muslim world in 
numerous ways, including the establishment of several institutions with pan-Islamic intent, chief 
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among them the Islamic University of Medina (1961) and the Muslim World League (1962).
7
 
Higher oil revenues would allow each of these Saudi creations to intensify their activities in the 
1970s; one estimate placed the amount spent on Saudi missionary activities at $70 billion.
8
 
The present review focuses on the MWL and its Saudi-financed efforts of the 1970s and 
1980s to build and bolster Muslim-American communities in the United States. It builds on 
scholarship such as Larry Poston’s Da‘wah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the 
Dynamics of Conversion to Islam (1992), which argued that during periods of Islamic revivalism 
around the world, Islamic reformist organizations have proselytized more to Muslims than to 
non-Muslims; indeed, during the post-1975 era of Islamic revivalism, the MWL followed this 
pattern in its work in the United States.  
The main sources utilized in this chapter include the Journal of the Muslim World League, 
which was published in Mecca and distributed in English and Arabic editions to subscribers and 
what the publication’s management viewed as “important individuals, institutions, and official 
agencies throughout the world.”
9
 Published monthly, it was designed
 
to help unify and 
coordinate Muslim communities worldwide on behalf of the MWL.
10
 Another periodical, the 
World Muslim League Magazine, was not an official MWL publication but received money from 
the MWL. Published in Singapore, it provided coverage of the earliest MWL meetings. Another 
source is a book written by M. Ali Kettani, who studied Muslim-minority populations for the 
Muslim World League in the 1970s. He also held the title of Special Adviser on Muslim 
Minorities, Secretariat-General, for the Organization of the Islamic Conference, another Saudi-
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 Other sources include a small trove of internal reports from the MWL’s 
North American office from the early 1980s, provided to me by the MWL official who wrote 
them, and a one-hundred-forty-seven-page booklet called the Proceedings of the First Islamic 
Conference of North America, which includes speeches and resolutions from the MWL-
sponsored event, along with background information.
12
 This chapter also benefits from 
interviews with two key officials of the MWL’s North American office during the 1970s and 
1980s, Dawud Assad and Muzammil Siddiqi. (Some of the sources utilized here can be described 
as both .primary and secondary sources; the journals and writings of people affiliated with the 
MWL, while recording the events of recent Muslim history, also evinced a distinct point of view 
on the relationship between Muslim-majority countries and Muslim-minority countries.) 
It is important, first, to describe the MWL’s basic history, goals and international 
structure. The MWL was created in May 1962 at a meeting called the “General Islamic 
Conference” in Mecca, with the goal of uniting Muslims communities internationally. It was 
financed almost entirely by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Headquartered in Mecca, it would 
eventually open branches in thirty-six countries. It was managed by a twenty-one member 
Constituent Council and represented by a Secretary-General who would sit for five-year terms. 
The resolutions creating the MWL were pan-Islamic in tone and critical of Egyptian-style Arab 
nationalism, and while the MWL was international in composition, its leaders’ activities and 
rhetoric reflected the spirit of Saudi government positions during the Arab Cold War and 
afterward. In 1984, an article in its official journal used heroic terms for the House of Saud, 
describing them as saviors in Islamic history for having creating the MWL:  
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After the end of the Khalifat, it may be recalled, there was no one  
who wanted to do something for the Muslims as One Ummah. As  
a result, the Muslims felt that they were not being taken care of. To  
fill this vacuum, the Kingdom, being the seat of the two Holy Harams,  
took the initiative and founded the League in order to serve the  




By 1988, the MWL had five hundred and twenty employees around the world, including 
four hundred and nine in Saudi Arabia and one hundred and eleven in its offices abroad.
14
 In the 
mid-1980s, its annual budget was 130 million Saudi riyals (equivalent to between $30 million 
and $33 million US), “allocated by the Government of Saudi Arabia,” and it also received 
personal donations.
15
 The MWL’s stated objectives, voiced in Resolution Twenty at the 
conference that created it in 1962, were the following: 
To convey the Message of Islam in performance of the duty imposed by  
God upon Muslims, to explain its principles and teachings, to dispel all  
doubts relating to it, to combat the serious plots by which the enemies of  
Islam are trying to draw Muslims away from their religion and to destroy  
their unity and brotherhood, and to deal with Islamic questions in such a way  
as may be conducive to the welfare of Muslims, the realization of their  




Just how the MWL accomplished the first of these tasks, “convey(ing) the message of 
Islam,” would differ from country to country depending on the nature of Muslim communal life 
there. Factors included whether Islam was the majority or minority religion in the country, and, if 
the latter, whether it was of recent vintage, as in the West, or had a long history, as in India. In 
either case, the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam did not rank high among the MWL’s goals, 
according to its resolutions; the MWL’s secretary-general Omar Nasseef said as much in 1984 in 
an interview with the organization’s newspaper: “It is not our mission. We are not interested in 
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increasing the number of Muslims. They are already one billion. We want to take care of their 
quality.”
17
 M. Ali Kettani, in the article “Da‘wah  among Muslim Minorities,” published in 1980 
in the Journal of the Muslim World League, placed missionary work to non-Muslims very low on 
his priority list for da‘wa efforts, beneath the organization of existing Muslim communities and 
the education of Muslim children and adults to prevent assimilation.
18
 
Most of the MWL’s missionary works, then, while conveying Saudi authority worldwide, 
were concerned with nurturing existing Muslim communities and creating bonds among existing 
Muslim groups. To do this, it opened branch offices around the world, meant to “serve as 
permanent, active centres for the propagation of the Message of Islam.” It established an 
international body of scholars to issue fatwas “to state authoritatively what Islam has to say on 
all matters.”
19
 It invited prominent Islamic missionaries to Mecca to exchange views and 
coordinate efforts. It increased the number of Islamic periodicals in the vernacular, so as to 
increase locals’ understanding of sacred texts, while ultimately stressing Arabic as a unifying 
language.  
At its formation in 1962, though, the MWL demonstrated little interest in Muslim-
Americans or other Muslim minorities in the West, groups comprising a tiny portion of the 
worldwide Muslim population. The resolutions creating the MWL, passed by the General Islamic 
Conference in Mecca on May 18, 1962, did state concern for the fate of Muslim minorities in 
India and Ethiopia, and in countries under Communist governments, but they contained no 
specific mention of Muslims in Europe or the United States. Decades later, in the early 2000s, 
surveys would estimate the Muslim-American population in the low seven digits, but in the early 
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1960s when the MWL was formed it was much smaller; two estimates were thirty thousand in 




Yet even at its creation, the MWL envisioned the eventuality of working with Western 
Muslims. The nineteenth resolution passed at the General Islamic Conference called on the 
MWL to, in the future, contact Muslim minorities “in various countries” to “become acquainted 
with their conditions and assist them in disseminating Islamic culture and safeguarding their 
religion.”
21
 In 1964, when Malcolm X traveled to Saudi Arabia to make hajj, the MWL offered 
to fund twelve scholarships to the Islamic University of Medina for the organizations he had 
recently created in the United States and supplied him with an imam, Shaykh Ahmed Hassoun, 
for his community.
22




In the mid-1970s, the interest in Muslim-minority countries expanded dramatically when 
the MWL raised its level of missionary activity around the globe. In April 1974, at an MWL-
sponsored “Conference of Islamic Organizations” (Motamar al-Munazzamat al-Islami) in Mecca, 
the assembled delegates resolved to systematize missionary efforts (da‘wa) internationally. They 
recommended establishing “full-fledged institutions… for the Islamic Da‘wah” and helping 
existing Muslim institutions to produce “full-time Muslim preachers and coordinate various 
activities.”
24
 Significantly, they recommended that a separate organization be set up on each 
continent to coordinate da‘wa efforts; these “continental committees” would operate under an 
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international body, a “Supreme Committee for the Co-ordination of Islamic Organizations in the 
World.” This international body, whose members would reflect diverse Muslim populations, 
would have three representatives from Africa, three from Asia, and one representative each from 
Latin America, North America, Europe and Australia, as well as from various organizations; it 
would eventually become the MWL’s Supreme Council of Mosques.
25
   
 
The MWL Expands in the USA 
Islam has always been a religion of proselytization, since long before the era of nation-
states. It might be asked, then, what circumstances arose to inspire government-funded 
missionary efforts. Stated justification, made in conference resolutions, contended that the 
existing centers of Islamic missionary work in Muslim-minority lands exhibited “conspicuous 
weakness” and could not effectively combat the “cultural invasion to which Islam is exposed,” 
an invasion said to include the forces of Communism, Bahaism and Ahmadism.
26
 As a result, 
“the Conference declares that it is absolutely necessary for Islamic Da‘wah  to be based on 
systematic planning both in terms of its activity and in its means and methods.” Its resolution 
advised planning to train and educate preachers in religious matters, as well as in “contemporary 
problems in the Islamic world.”  
The use of non-Saudis to do this work constituted an important part of the MWL’s 
approach. The MWL, though financed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, tended not to use Saudi 
nationals for its on-the-ground work in other countries. Instead, it relied on well-connected local 
leaders who knew the cultural landscape and could more productively interact with local 
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 In 1975, the MWL would tap two such Muslim-American immigrant leaders, Dawud 
Assad, a Palestinian-American, and Ahmed Sakr, a Lebanese-American, to found and manage its 
North America office and become members of the MWL’s international Supreme Council of 
Mosques. Both men were established leaders in the scattered yet growing Muslim-American 
community.  
Dawud Assad, who was born in Palestine in 1926, had fled after the Deir Yassin 
massacre in 1948, in which many of his relatives were killed. Finding temporary refuge in Jordan, 
he emigrated to the United States in 1951. He attended Rutgers University in New Jersey and 
then Northeastern University in Massachusetts, from which he graduated with an engineering 
degree. He then found work as chief engineer for a company called Servisco that regularly sent 
him to its twenty-seven plants in twenty states across the country. Assad used these trips to help 
organize local Muslim-American communities. Upon arrival, he would check local phonebooks 
for Middle Eastern restaurants and Muslim-sounding family names. He would then schedule 
meetings of local Muslims, at which he would prod them to organize a non-profit organization; 
he even provided copies of the relevant government forms. “I’d say, do you have an Islamic 
organization here? How many families do you have?”
28
  
In interviews in 2014 and 2015, he noted with disapproval the religious practices 
associated with organizations such as the Federation of Islamic Associations of the United States 
and Canada that existed in the United States in the 1950s. “It was mostly for Lebanese people 
who came from Lebanon and Syria,” he recalled. “Most of them worked in the Ford company, in 
cars, mechanics. They didn’t know much about religion. They used to have dancing as part of 
                                                          
27
 Larry Poston discussed various proselytization methods favored by Muslim groups in the United States, including 
mobilization of local Muslims, in Larry Poston, Islamic Da‘wah  in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the 
Dynamics of Conversion to Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 122-134.  
28
 Dawud Assad, Palestine Rising (USA: XLibris Corporation, 2011), 37-54. Also, author’s interview with Dawud 
Assad, Monroe, New Jersey, May 2, 2015.  
171 
 
their program [at FIA annual conferences].” He added, “We had to convince them, ‘If you want 
to do it, you should do it outside, but not in the conference.”’
29
 He also protested the practice of 
voting on the conference menus, where one voting choice included pork. “Some things, you 
don’t vote on!” Assad said.
30
  
He became president of the FIA in the early 1970s, and his efforts became known widely 
enough in Muslim circles that in 1975 he was invited to Mecca for an organizational meeting of 
the MWL’s Supreme Council of Mosques. He and twenty-nine other American Muslims, part of 
a three-hundred-person international audience at the meeting, made the trip. The organizers 
announced that the Supreme Council of Mosques would have fifty members -- twenty-eight of 
them permanent members and twenty-two with two-year terms. To Assad’s surprise, he and 
Ahmad Sakr, a native of Lebanon who had become a prominent Muslim-American community 
leader as well, were chosen for permanent Council seats from North America, ahead of 
prominent Muslim-American imams with more formal religious training. As Assad recalled,  
I was surprised. I’m an engineer! I didn’t go to Azhar University. I just had  
my education from teachers and imams. When they [classically trained imams  
on the American delegation] asked the people [MWL officials in Mecca] why,  
they said, ‘Listen, you people, imams, you are paid. But those people there  
[Assad and Sakr], they have been serving Islam since the 1950s and 1960s,  
and they never asked for one thing. Now these are the people we need, the  
people who know the country, the customs of the country’… When they told  




For Assad, accepting the role meant leaving his engineering job to work full-time for the MWL. 
He and Ahmad Sakr would open and manage the MWL’s North American operations in 
Manhattan, at the United Nations building.  
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Sakr was born in Beirut and studied Islam in his youth with the grand mufti of Lebanon 
as his tutor. He graduated from the American University of Beirut and received his Ph.D. from 
the University of Illinois, where in 1963 he was one of three men to found the Muslim Students 
Association. In later years, he would serve as acting president of the American Islamic College 
in Chicago and, in the 1980s, would found the Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America. 
He would publish dozens of books and booklets on Islam.
32
 His decision to work for the MWL in 
the mid-1970s was controversial within Muslim-American leadership circles, because the MWL 
was viewed as a foreign organization, as opposed to the homegrown Muslim Students’ 
Association, which Sakr had helped found.
33
 (While the Muslim Students Association did 
receive funds from other countries, it was a membership organization run entirely by students in 
the United States.) Still, for Sakr, the draw of working for the Saudi-financed MWL was too 
much to resist. “The Muslim World League had more resources, so they could do more,” recalled 
Muzammil Siddiqi, who headed the Department of Religious Affairs for the MWL’s North 
American office in New York from 1976 to 1980.
34
 “That’s why he joined then and he helped 
establish [their] office in New York.”
35
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The MWL’s use of local Muslims rather than Saudis in its branches around the world 
helped ensure that its workers would understand the cultural aspects of discrete Muslim 
communities and adapt their message to specific populations. This practice would distinguish the 
nature of the organization’s work from country to country. At the same time, in its use abroad, it 
would come to sully the MWL’s reputation in the United States, because among the MWL’s 
employees on other continents were men who would be closely tied to al-Qa‘ida and other 
groups classified as terrorist organizations. Abdallah Azzam, who was known as the godfather of 
global jihad and who served as a mentor to Osama Bin Laden, headed the MWL’s office in 
Peshawar, Pakistan, during periods of Islamic resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Another MWL functionary in Pakistan was Wael Julaidan, a co-founder of al-Qa‘ida along with 
Bin Laden in 1988.
36
 Ihab Ali worked for the MWL in the 1980s and 1990s while relaying 
messages to Bin Laden regarding the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya.
37
  
In addition, in the United States shortly after 9/11, a charity called the Rabita Trust -- 
created in 1988 by the MWL’s then-secretary-general -- was designated a terrorist organization 
by the U.S. Treasury Department, due to connections between some of its workers and al-
Qa‘ida.
38
 Another organization created by the MWL, in 1978, the International Islamic Relief 
Organization, was believed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to have “extremist 
connections” that included “the Palestinian group Hamas, Algerian radicals, and the Egyptian 
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precursor to al-Qa‘ida, Al-Gamaat al-Islamiya.” The head of the IIRO’s Philippines’ branch was 




Muslim minorities  
Basic questions over whether and how Muslims should live in Muslim-minority lands 
date to the early centuries of Islam, when some Muslim populations fell under political control of 
non-Muslims and contemporary Islamic jurists issued opinions on whether they should stay there 
or migrate to “Muslim lands.” A sampling of questions broached in various rulings reveals the 
extensive scope of the inquiries: Should Muslim-minority populations attempt to build up 
Muslim communities if none exists where they are, or should they stay there just temporarily and 
then migrate to the Muslim-majority world? What constitutes the proper practice of Islam in a 
non-Muslim land? Can Muslim minorities vote for political leaders in a secular state not bound 
by Shari‘a? Can they own businesses that sell liquor or pork to non-Muslims? Can they join an 
army that demands unalloyed loyalty to their non-Muslim government?
 40




Opinions of the jurists in these matters manifested their stated concerns to preserve or 
strengthen the worldwide Muslim community, reflecting contemporary geopolitical realities and 
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perceived breakdowns of the Muslim world that are embedded in the oft-cited dichotomy of Dar 
al-Islam (the land of Islam) and Dar al-Harb (the land of war). Broadly speaking, this discourse 
suggests that Muslims should live in the former and migrate from the latter, though definitions of 
both are disputed and have allowed for different approaches.
42
 Much of the discourse includes an 
explicit third option, a Dar al-Ahd (the House of Pact), which is an intermediate category where 
Muslims, while not in political power, were formally allowed to practice their religion.  
Three related historical experiences from Islam’s first decade – in Mecca, in Medina and 
in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) -- provide distinct frameworks to analyze the judicial discourse on the 
permissibility of living as a Muslim minority, and under non-Muslim political control. The 
example from Mecca harkens to Islam’s earliest years, when many of the prophet Muhammad’s 
fellow tribespeople rejected his message, causing him to flee (to Medina). Mecca during this 
short period is viewed as having been inhospitable to Muslims in every way, and therefore a 
place Muslims were mandated to leave. Medina, on the other hand, was where the prophet 
Muhammad first established a secure religious community, a Dar al-Islam. As leader, he 
established a Muslim-led government, making Medina a place to which Muslims were expected 
to migrate. Abyssinia played the third role, the Dar al-Ahd, where a non-Muslim ruler protected 
the religious rights of early Muslims fleeing Mecca at Muhammad’s direction in 615.
43
 While it 
is true that no Muslim-majority state existed as an option at the time, Abyssinia can stand in as a 
broad middle ground – a place that was neither Muslim-led nor Muslim-majority yet was clearly 
hospitable to the practice of Islam. 
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The narrative of the prophet Muhammad’s migration from Mecca to Medina, on the other 
hand, aligned with the opinion that Muslims had to migrate to lands under Islamic control. In 622, 
the prophet commanded his followers in Mecca, where persecution remained, to migrate to 
Medina, where he would become the leader.
44
 This narrative would motivate jurists and 
theologians to emphasize the duty of a Muslim minority to migrate; one such ruler was Ahmad 
al-Wanshahari (d.1508), who ruled that Muslims must emigrate even if Christian rulers are both 
just and tolerant.
45
 These stricter views on residence, effectively narrowing the definition of Dar 
al-Islam, were voiced by Islamic reformers in the 1700s and 1800s such as Usman dan Fodio and 
from revivalist groups in the 1900s such as the Muslim Brotherhood. To these reformers, 
enforcement of Shari‘a law was necessary for a location to be considered Dar al-Islam, and 
anywhere else – even if rulers claimed to be Muslim – was Dar al-Harb.  
The Abyssinian experience – as well as a fourth early experience, in Nubia in 652 -- 
helped promote a more expansive view by some jurists, that Muslims could live under non-
Muslim rulers as long as they were allowed to practice their religion; in these cases, migration to 
Muslim-majority regions would not be mandatory. Some even viewed this permission as 
sufficient to view a region as part of Dar al-Islam. The Abyssinian and Nubian experiences 
became increasingly relevant during the 700s when Muslim populations emerged in non-Muslim 
lands such as India and China; during the 1200s when Mongols and Christians conquered land 
formerly ruled by Muslims; and in the 1800s and 1900s when non-Muslim countries came to 
colonize much of the Muslim world.
46
 Among the opinions justifying the experiences of Muslim-
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minorities in these regions is one from eleventh-century jurist al-Mawardi, that “If [a Muslim] is 
able to manifest [his] religion in one of the unbelievers’ countries, this country becomes a part of 
Dar-al-Islam. Hence, residing in it is better than migrating because it is hoped that others will 
convert to Islam [through him].”
47
  
Differences aside, the reality is that for centuries, large Muslim populations have resided 
in Muslim-minority lands controlled politically by non-Muslims.
48
 An estimated one fifth of 
Muslims currently live in Muslim-minority lands,
49
 and while it is unlikely that most seek out 
juridical rulings on the issue, these rulings have long fueled elite discourses on the Muslim-
minority experience, stretching into the twenty-first century. Popular understandings of them 
continue to inform the lived experiences of Muslims in Muslim-minority lands who struggle with 
issues similar to those faced by immigrants and religious minorities of other backgrounds, such 




Yet the expanse of Islamic history provides little guidance on this subject for the Muslim-
minority experience in the United States, a place that has never been under Muslim rule and 
where most Muslims have migrated voluntarily from Muslim-majority lands. “For such an action 
by Muslims,” Bernard Lewis writes, “there is no precedent in Islamic history, no previous 
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The MWL and Muslim-minorities 
The MWL’s activity reflected al-Mawardi’s views, in its recognition of proselytization or 
da‘wa as an important and necessary rationale for remaining in a Muslim-minority land. In 1978, 
the Journal of the Muslim World League published a speech by the secretary-general of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference to that effect: 
Well organized and strong, this one-third [of the worldwide Muslim population]  
can help to spread the message of Islam throughout the world and can constitute  
a source of support for the “Ummah” in case of distress. Weak, it would be  
threatened with destruction and would, consequently, bring in its wake irreparable  
loss for the Muslim world.
52
 (emphasis added) 
 
What it means to “spread the message of Islam” can vary; the popular implication of such 
conversion discourse involves seeking converts from outside one’s religion. Yet instead of 
devoting significant resources to this, the MWL focused most of its efforts on strengthening the 
religious practices and bonds of existing Muslim populations, according to the views of MWL 
workers. There is historic precedent for this; often, especially during periods of Islamic 
revivalism, Muslim missionaries focus their proselytizing on other Muslims. Poston, in 
summarizing the views of Abul A’la Mawdudi, wrote that the goal is to “first purify themselves 
if they are to present a credible witness to the remainder of the earth’s population.”
53
  
The essence and of rationale for the MWL’s effort seems captured in part in the book 
Muslim Minorities in the World Today by Kettani, who, as noted, studied Muslim-minority 
populations in North America and Europe for the MWL in the 1970s.
54
 In 1985, Kettani 
published his book as an expansion of his previous work, adding his assessments of Muslim 
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minorities on other continents.
55
 Kettani supported the general thrust of Saudi proselytization 
efforts, and his book serves as a valuable primary source to help demonstrate a mindset behind 
Saudi-financed missionary work. His father, Shaykh Mohammed Al-Muntasir Kettani, had 
helped King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to gather support in the 1960s for the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, in Islamic North Africa.
56
  
While the bulk of Kettani’s book consists of summaries of Muslim-minority communities 
in each country around the world, it is the introduction and conclusion that are most useful here. 
They assert both that the Muslim-majority world should proactively help Muslim-minority 
populations, and that the Muslim-minority communities themselves carry a religious duty to 
coalesce under regional or national organizations; doing so can further “the gathering of all the 
Muslims living within a given non-Muslim political entity.”
57
 In a passage that tacitly urges 
communal backing for Saudi-financed organizing efforts, he writes,  
It is the Islamic duty of every Muslim, especially in a non-Muslim environment,  
to become organized with other Muslims. The organizational set-up should be  
aimed at establishing a viable Muslim community… The organization should  
express the Islamic identity of the Community, and this identity alone should  




Kettani wrote that most Muslims in Muslim-minority communities unfortunately 
possessed a weak sense of Islamic identity and were unaware of the duty to organize. It would 
take the community’s leaders, therefore, to bring them together. “To do this,” he wrote, “the 
organization should have some financial means to start with. In this respect, the help of Muslims 
of dar-ul-Islam becomes necessary.”
59
 The existing Federation of Islamic Association of the 
United States and Canada, he said, was “far from satisfactory.” Significant aid from Dar al-Islam, 
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he wrote, was necessary to build Muslim-minority communities into stronger entities that could 
religiously nurture second- and third-generations of Muslim immigrants. This help would 
prevent assimilation that could “nibbl[e] at the Islamic characteristics of the minority until it 
disappears altogether.”
60
 (Here, again, the concerns were similar to those voiced in many 
immigrant and religious-minority communities.)  
 The mindset promoted by the MWL, then, is decidedly against emigration back to Dar 
al-Islam, instead favoring social and political involvement in the new Muslim-minority country. 
“A Muslim community cannot be enclosed in a ghetto-like mentality. It should be capable of 
interacting with members of the non-Muslim community so as to fulfill its duty of da‘wah,” 
Kettani writes. And yet, da‘wa to non-Muslims seems a minor concern in this treatise. The 
overarching goal was a plan to help existing Muslim-minority communities financially stand on 
their own, foster new generations of Muslims, and participate in the American polity without 
losing their religion.  
Kettani did favor limits on foreign involvement in these Muslim-minority communities. 
He wrote that immigrant Muslims should avoid close links to their home countries, and he 
criticized some of the assistance that Muslim governments gave to Muslim minorities abroad. 
For example, he said that while it was beneficial to help Muslim-minority communities select, 
train and finance their own imams, that Muslims from outside should not participate or otherwise 
interfere in the selection. He noted that in previous years, “several Muslim countries… sent 
imams to different communities around the world,” and while some were very successful, 
“others had no commitment to the communities they served and created more problems than they 
solved.”
61
 He also worried that direct help from embassies of Muslim countries might lead 
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Muslim minorities to be viewed by compatriots as “foreign bodies in their midst.”
62
 The 
organizational effort he praises most is that of Saudi King Faisal in 1969 to create the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, which he calls “a humble but no less certainly important 




Changes in the Muslim-American population 
The nature of the Muslim-American population was not static. By the 1960s and 1970s, it 
had already undergone several changes. It had transitioned from “being unnoticed” within the 
overall population, to, in the latter half of the century, “positions of greater visibility and more 
obvious public participation.”
64
 In 2002, Yazbeck and Smith could write, “The call to prayer, one 
of the most evident signs of Islamic presence, has moved, in the United States, from the world of 
make-believe a century ago to a visible, regular feature of the more than two thousand organized 
Muslim communities across the country.”
65
 
The earliest phase dated to the early antebellum period, when the only known Muslim 
populations in North America consisted of slaves taken from regions of western Africa with 
large Muslim populations.
66
 Their Islamic practices, and those of any descendants, are believed 
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to have largely died out by the early 1900s, to the extent that scholars posit that no Muslim-
American today practices Islam as inherited from enslaved African ancestors.
67
 During the 1930s 
some African-Americans told interviewers that they recalled their once-enslaved grandparents 
having observed rituals that in retrospect were clearly Islamic, but there is no apparent 
connection between these slaves’ practices of Islam and the later practice of Islam by early-
twentieth-century African-American Muslims such as the Ahmadiyyas, the Moorish Science 
Temple of America, and the Nation of Islam.
68
 These groups would face criticism by Sunni 
immigrant groups in decades to come, but each developed sizable followings among African 
Americans. 
Through most of the 20th century, African-American Muslims would comprise the 
largest single racial or ethnic group of Muslim-Americans. Yet over time, immigrant Muslims 
and their children have come to comprise a majority of the Muslim-American population, during 
what history professor Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and sociologist Adair T. Lummis have 
identified as five main stages of immigration starting from 1875.
69
 These immigrants’ diversity 
of religious practice, as well as their varied political and socioeconomic backgrounds, formed the 
setting for the Muslim World League’s activities in North America. 
The first phase, from 1875 to 1912, included young Arab men from the Levant. Unlike 
later Muslim immigrants to the United States, these early arrivals were largely uneducated and 
unskilled; their main reasons for emigrating were economic, and after making money many 
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returned to the Middle East. Still, significant numbers remained in their new country.
70
 “Settling 
mainly in industrial centers,” Haddad and Lummis wrote, “they had difficulty integrating into 




As would remain true in later decades, the size of the Muslim-American population 
during this early period is hard to estimate. Not only does the U.S. Census Bureau not tally the 
population by religion, but the Levantine immigrants cannot be assumed to have been Muslim; 
most were probably Eastern Orthodox Christians.
72
 Further complicating matters is that while 
U.S. immigration officials maintained information on an immigrant’s country of national origin, 
prior to 1899 they recorded anyone from the diverse Asian Ottoman regions as coming from 
“Turkey in Asia.” As religion professor Kambiz GhaneaBassiri notes, “Albanians, Macedonians, 
Bosnians, Herzegovinians, Croats, Serbs, and others living in the European Ottoman territories 
were all categorized as coming from ‘Turkey in Europe.’”
73
 While Syrian-American narratives 
have cited a supposed eagerness by immigrants to flee the degradations of Ottoman rule, this 
stated rationale may merely reflect the immigrants’ later desires to fit in with an American public 
inclined unfavorably toward the Ottomans. Kemil Karpat argues that financial motives were 
supreme, evidenced by the return to their native countries by many immigrants after they made 
money in the United States.
74
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Haddad and Lummis’s second phase, from 1918 to 1922, included relatives of earlier 
arrivals during the years that British and French colonial rule supplanted Ottoman control. Yet 
large numbers of Muslim immigrants apparently returned home during this period as well. 
GhaneaBassiri estimated that by the mid-1920s, twenty thousand Muslims had immigrated to the 
United States.
75
 Many of these immigrants were more ritually observant than Muslims in 
already-settled Muslim-American communities, who met with criticism from the new arrivals. 
Indeed, the Muslim-to-Muslim missionary spirit of later immigration waves was not entirely 
absent in earlier decades; in one example, from 1921, the Ahmadi missionary Muhammad Sadiq 
published in his newspaper, the Moslem Sunrise, an open letter to the Muslim-American 
community, criticizing the majority of them as “Moslems in name only – Islam not playing 
practical [sic] part in your every-day life. Nay, even your names are generally no more Moslem 
because you have adopted American names.”
76
  
In the third phase, the period from 1930 to 1938, relatives again comprised the bulk of 
Muslim immigration. These were years when U.S. immigration law had recently implemented 
low quotas and caps. During this period, higher percentages of Muslim immigrants than before 




Immigrants in the fourth phase, from 1947 to 1960, tended to be wealthier than their 
predecessors and came from across the Muslim world, not just the Middle East. Many were also 
better educated, having been raised in elite families in India, Pakistan, Eastern Europe and the 
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Soviet Union. Haddad and Lummis cited multiple reasons behind this phase of immigration: 
“They came to America,” they wrote, “as refugees or in a quest of a better life, higher education, 
or advanced technical training and specialized work opportunities, as well as for ideological 
fulfillment.”
78
 Indeed, from 1948 to 1965, the number of students in the United States from 
Muslim-majority countries increased from 2,708 to 13,664.
79
 Immigrants from this phase were 
more likely to be critical of U.S. foreign policy than were those from previous periods, many of 
whom had linked their religiosity to American democratic ideals.
80
 Many in this stage were 
refugees from Palestine who were critical of U.S. support for Israel. Others were members, or at 
least supporters, of the Muslim Brotherhood.
81
  
This fourth phase would give rise to two national Muslim-American organizations for 
immigrants that preceded the MWL’s presence in the United States. The first, the Federation of 
Islamic Associations of the United States and Canada (FIA), originally called the International 
Muslim Society, was formed in 1952 by a Muslim U.S. Army veteran named Abdallah Igram 
whose complaint about the lack of religious identification options for Muslim on U.S. dog tags – 
for burial rights if they were killed – led to an “I” option starting in 1954. The goal of FIA was to 
unite Muslims in North America and “promote and teach the spirit, ethics, philosophy, and 
culture of Islam” among themselves and their children.
82
 Its program did not actively oppose 
assimilation. FIA annual conventions included dancing and live music, its constitution urged 
North American Muslim communities to organize into local associations, and, GhaneaBassiri 
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noted, a main goal was “to root Islam within local American communities and to make it an 
important aspect of their lives in America.”
83
  
Another immigrant organization, the Muslim Students Association, favored a different 
approach, one that fostered direct ties between immigrant Muslims and their home countries. The 
MSA was founded in 1963 by immigrants at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign who 
had belonged to Islamist movements in the Muslim world but fled to escape persecution from 
nationalist governments there. Within five years the MSA had 105 local associations at colleges 
in North America, and had received funds from Muslim-majority countries including Kuwait and 
Pakistan; in 1965, as GhaneaBassiri notes, it even sent a delegation to a MWL meeting in Mecca 
in hopes of internationalizing its efforts. Most of its members, he adds, related to the Islamic 
revivalism occurring in various parts of the Muslim world. They were unlikely to view American 
foreign policy or secular aspects of U.S. culture in positive terms. Islam, according to noted 
revivalists of the twentieth-century such as Hasan al-Banna of Egypt, Abul A’la Mawdudi of 
British India and Pakistan, and Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, could not be set apart from politics or 
public affairs, even – nay, especially -- in the modern world. Islam was supposed to constitute 
one’s primary identity, above nationalism, ethnicity or anything else. As al-Banna wrote, in a 
treatise on the Muslim Brotherhood’s mission, “Islam is an all-embracing concept which 
regulates every aspect of life, adjudicates on every one of its concerns and prescribing for it a 
solid and rigorous order.”
84
 Sayyid Qutb posited that the governments of Muslim nations, where 
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laws and ways of life were “not based on complete submission to God alone,” needed to be 
removed by force and replaced by rulers who would institute Islamic law.
85
  
Arriving later, and during periods of Islamic revivalism, many MSA members tended to 
dismiss the Islamic practices of pre-existing Muslim-American communities -- and even of the 
FIA -- as religiously lax. MSA members viewed themselves as more knowledgeable about Islam 
and as better-equipped to import knowledge to the immigrants who preceded them. As 
GhaneaBassiri observed, while the FIA and earlier immigrants “were more concerned about 
mutual understanding and coexistence with others in American society, the founders of the MSA 
were gravely interested in the propagation of Islam.” He continued, 
In sum, the MSA was a pan-Islamic umbrella organization led by a  
utopian, mission-oriented immigrant Muslim student population which  





These attitudes toward proselytization would continue to play important roles during 
Haddad’s and Lummis’s fifth wave, which started in 1967. This would be the largest wave, its 
size largely a result of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which abolished 
nation-based immigration quotas in place for four decades. This new law favored the admission 
of relatives of previous immigrants, professionals, refugees, and workers in areas with labor 
shortages.
87
 The majority of immigrants to the United States in subsequent decades would be 
from Asia and Africa; in all, the number of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries would 
rise tenfold from 134,615 in 1960 to 1,554,821 in 2000.
88
 The number of mosques built in the 
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1970s was five times the number founded in the 1950s or 1960s.
89
 Meanwhile, notable trends 
from the fourth phase continued: These immigrant Muslims had higher levels of education, 
adhered to stricter versions of Islam than did the earlier phases of Muslim immigrants, and were 
less likely to approve of American foreign policy. In addition, they were more likely than 
previous groups of immigrant Muslims to build mosques and national institutions and to do 
missionary work (da‘wa).
90
 The Muslim Students Association, originally formed in 1963, would 
devise in the mid-1970s a new list of priorities for “Islamic work” that reflected this shift, the 
new goals including “production and dissemination of Islamic knowledge… in its original purity 
in all fields necessary to building an Islamic civilization” and “building and/or establishing 
institutes such as schools and community centers.”
91
 For the MWL, the time seemed right for 
coordinated assistance by an international organization like itself.  
 
Approaches in Muslim-Minority and Muslim–Majority Lands 
The nature of the MWL’s work differed from continent to continent. In Muslim-majority 
countries and in regions with sizable, historic Muslim minorities, it promoted more assertive 
religious and political paths than in newer Muslim-minority regions of the Americas and 
Australia. During the mid-to-late 1970s, the MWL held separate conferences in Africa, Asia, 
Australia, North America, and South America that were designed to organize Islamic activities 
on each continent. The resolutions passed at these conferences, summarized in this section and 
the next, reveal the varied approaches. They also demonstrate that despite the Saudis’ centralized 
attempts to influence Islamic agendas around the Muslim world, the MWL’s activities reflected 
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the influence of “local” non-Saudi MWL workers who often did not themselves share the Salafi 
religious orientations that were dominant in Saudi Arabia. The resolutions reveal the MWL as an 
organization that, while centralized in Mecca, did not speak with a unified voice internationally. 
For example, as we will see, while one continental branch of the MWL was warning Muslims to 
avoid the West, another was firmly committing itself to bolster Western Muslim communities. 
In Asia, the continent with the highest number of Muslim-majority countries, the MWL’s 
representatives met in 1978 in Karachi, Pakistan. Attendees took strong stances that ran counter 
to twentieth-century Western ideals of governmental neutrality toward religion. For example, a 
resolution called for “Muslim governments” to “put an end to the Christian missionary 
institutions in their countries” and to bar Christian missionary literature from entering “the 
countries of the Muslim world.”
92
 Regarding what were called “Anti-Islamic Movements,” 
conference resolutions denounced Bahais, Freemasons and Zionists, urging the closing of Bahai 
centers but saving its most critical sentiments for Qadianis (a branch of the Ahmadiyya 
movement); indeed, a resolution cited Qadiani “leaders’ baseless claims to prophethood,” 
“distortion of Qur’anic texts,” and “Abolishing of Jihad (Fight in the cause of Islam).”
93
 One 
resolution urged Muslim groups to proclaim Qadianis “heretics and non-Muslims.” Another said 
they should be boycotted and “should not be able to bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries.” 
Another one read, 
Every Muslim body, organization or association should work for putting  
curbs on the Qadiani temples, schools and orphanages and in all other  
places where Qadianis practice their foul and destructive activities. They  
should also pick out and chase away Qadianis from their midst, and warn  
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Resolutions also expressed an aggressive approach toward perceived enemies of Islam 
and an attitude of suspicion toward the West. For example, one resolution warned Muslim 
parents against “sending their children at a young and impressionable age to the Western 
countries where they are likely to fall prey to un-Islamic influence.” Another commended 
governments that “intend to model their legal systems according to Islamic Shari‘ah” and asked 
other governments “to follow their lead.”
95
 It even said that “conscientious Muslims” working in 




 Africa was another continent where the MWL had a presence, much of which involved 
building mosques, schools and Islamic centers. MWL rhetoric presented Africa as a place where 
Muslims needed religious guidance due to the continent’s previous exposure to allegedly faulty 
versions of Islam reflecting “the stress of early Islam on the simplicity of the faith.” Many 
African Muslims were said to lack connections to “world Islam” and thus, it was implied, 
remained in need of outside guidance.
97
 In May 1976, in Nouakchott, Mauritania, the MWL 
sponsored a conference of African Islamic leaders, at which attendees established an “African 
Council for Islamic Coordination,” choosing Dakar, Senegal, as the continental headquarters.
98
 
In North America, South America and Australia, continents with newer and smaller 
Muslim-minority populations, none of the MWL conferences adopted resolutions that were 
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directly critical of other religions or Islamic groups.
99
 The emphasis, instead, was on helping 
fledgling Muslim communities grow through organization and guidance from national and 
continental committees reporting to the MWL’s Supreme Council of Mosques. In 1977, at the 
Islamic Conference for South America and the Caribbean, a central committee was “charged 
with the task of establishing Masjids in areas where Muslims have no Masjids.”
100
 The North 
American conference, which will be discussed in the next section, favored similar approaches. 
And at a meeting in late 1977 of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils, attended by 
MWL officials, the council president praised the MWL’s guidance in organizing the continent’s 
Muslim groups, voicing confidence they could overcome past disunity.
101
 
Notwithstanding its various continental approaches, the MWL presented the importance 
of its work in universal terms, and itself as the one organization in the world suited to coordinate 
the continental Muslim communities into a unified international body. In April 1977, the MWL 
held what it called the “First Islamic Conference of North America,” a title stressing the 
organization’s own importance by discounting the annual gatherings of other Muslim 
organizations in North America that had occurred for decades. The MWL’s journal noted, 
perhaps self-servingly, that “[s]ome Islamic circles are of the opinion that the need has become 
quite urgent for the establishment of a Supreme Islamic Council in North America to bring the 
Muslims of North America together and to attend to their religious, cultural and social affairs.”
102
 
This attitude was also present at the Australia meeting, where the president of the Australian 
Federation of Islamic Councils charged that “the Islamic attitude” “has not been developed fully 
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in the present leadership in the Muslim community.”
103
 In a different speech, the Australian 
praised the missionary efforts of Saudi Arabia and the MWL, which had recently provided $1.2 
million for mosques and Islamic centers:
104
 
When the Muslims of Australia commenced their journey towards  
solidarity and started organizing themselves under the umbrella of  
one organization… it was Saudi Arabia out of the whole Muslim  
world and it was the Muslim World League out of all the Muslim  
organisations [sic] which came forward and took the lead in taking  




In this religiously diverse Muslim environment, the MWL’s task of appealing to wide swaths of 
the Muslim community was a delicate one that required an awareness of regional differences. Its 
approach in the United States would reflect both the Muslim-American population’s minority 
status as well as its newness.  
  
The “First Islamic Conference of North America” 
The First Islamic Conference of North America opened on April 22, 1977, in Newark, 
New Jersey. It drew approximately three hundred Muslims from across the United States and 
Canada and a few dozen more from the Middle East, all of them descending on a Holiday Inn 
hotel near Newark International Airport to participate in a grand attempt to plan the future of 
Muslim-American life. The guest list included representatives from one hundred forty-six 
mosques across the country, from California to Massachusetts; officials from twenty-four 
Canadian mosques, from Nova Scotia to British Columbia; and, most prominently, MWL 
officers including Dawud Assad and Ahmad Sakr, who managed the MWL’s North American 
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office, as well as the MWL’s Secretary-General, Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Harakhan, who flew 
in from Mecca.   
The booklet compiling the proceedings of the First Islamic Conference of North America 
begins with an Introduction by Ahmad Sakr. It was written after the conference and reads now as 
both a proud postscript and an assertion of authority by the MWL to coordinate and supervise the 
growth of Islamic communities in the United States and around the world.  Throughout the 
conference, MWL officials would use language that portrayed themselves – and, by implication, 
the Saudis – as the leaders of the Muslim world. The Introduction to the booklet began:  
In convening the FIRST ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OF NORTH  
AMERICA, the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami)  
took a big step forward in its world wide effort in the cause of Islam.  
As for the Muslims of North America, the Conference was the first  
of its kind, held on a continental level in which delegates of 169 Muslim 
organizations, centers, mosques, institutions and societies from all over  




Sakr noted also, in the introduction, that the MWL's decision to hold the conference had been 
made in 1974 at the aforementioned Mecca gathering, which started “a long-range program for 
organizing and coordinating endeavours in the cause of Islam in different parts of the world.”
107
 
He then listed a slew of existing problems facing Muslim-American life: a lack of 
organization, a dearth of Islamic education, the lack of a “dedicated leadership that could 
maintain a viable Muslim community,” and an American culture that was alien to Islamic values.  
Realizing that the situation called for organized work, coordination of  
activities and the setting up of priorities and planning for a better and  
meaningful future, the Muslim World League decided to hold the Islamic  
Conference of North America… to bring together the Muslim community  
organizations, centers, societies, institutes and mosques for mutual  
consultation and discussion of various problems facing the Muslim  
community. 
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Implicit in Sakr’s introduction is a broad critique of the contemporary Muslim-American leaders, 
including the Federation of Islamic Associations and the Muslim Students Association, which 
themselves held annual conferences. This alleged problem is simultaneously presented with a 
remedy – an improved leadership structure for Muslim-American communities -- for which the 
MWL is portrayed as uniquely suited, given its previous experience coordinating Muslim 
communities around the world at similar conferences.  
Yet the MWL's financial advantages did not lead to an unmistakable perch atop other 
groups. It is clear that inter-organizational rivalries were never absent. In a sermon (khutba) 
delivered on the conference’s first day, MWL Secretary-General Al-Harakhan included Quranic 
citations and praise for Islam as the “religion of justice, brotherhood, equity, cooperation, deeds 
of virtue, piety and abstinence from acts of evil and indecency.” But he also warned against 
jealousy and attributed contemporary problems facing the Muslim world to transgressions of 
Muslims themselves, whom he said had forsaken Islamic teachings.
108
 In addition, he stressed 
the importance of “unity of Muslims and the closeness in their ranks and their mutual support in 
works for the benefit of the community, to raise its standard and to increase its strength and 
honor.”
 109
 In this context – at a conference coordinated by his Saudi-financed organization – his 
emphasis on unity and against jealousy could be seen as gentle pressure on the assembled to 
follow the MWL leadership for the sake of unity, and to not resent the wealthy Saudis.
110
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The next speaker, Muhammad Abdul Rauf, also addressed organizational rivalries. Rauf, 
born in Egypt, was a graduate of al-Azhar University who worked at times for the Egyptian 
government and would, during his career, run several Islamic institutions around the world, 
including prominent Islamic centers in New York and Washington, D.C., and a university in 
Malaysia.
111
 In his speech, he lamented “[t]he ugly rivalry for positions of leadership among 
those who pose as servants of Islam in America – even to the practice of some who, greedy for 
success and recognition, approach influential personalities in Muslim countries, portraying 
themselves as the only sincere followers of Islam,”
112
 though just whom he is criticizing here is 
unclear. Rauf also worried openly that existing Muslim leaders in the United States knew too 
little about Islam; he claimed a “superficiality of Islamic knowledge on the part of many who 
pose as leaders of Islam in America; ignorance of the details of shari‘a and the death of 
knowledge of the background of early Islamic movements.”
113
  
Among the hopeful recipients of MWL largesse was Wallace Mohammed, whose 
organization of African-American Muslims had the largest showing at the conference. During 
the late 1970s, as mentioned in Chapter Three, the Saudi government and the MWL courted 
Wallace Mohammed in the United States and overseas, and Wallace Mohammed courted them 
back, partially through positive articles in the periodicals of their respective organizations. In his 
speech at the Newark conference, Wallace Mohammed praised the relationship.  
We are blessed to have our brothers, our distinguished brothers of great  
repute and excellence come to the United States, from the holy city of  
Mecca from Arabia, to encourage us, to give us support, to encourage  
us to unite, to encourage us to move forward in Islam and they are not  
people with weak support. They have the knowledge and they have the  
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Ahmad Sakr, in another speech, presented the MWL as ready to serve Muslim-Americans 
and invited his audience to call upon the MWL’s Department of Islamic Affairs (Department of 
Da‘wah), its Department of United Nations, and its Department of Administration for help. He 
told them to “call upon them [MWL staff members] for any service you may like them to render. 
The Rabita office is to serve and help the Muslims, not to take the leadership or to impose itself 
on others,” he said. “On the other hand, it requests you to assume leadership so that you could 
develop your organizations and help the Muslim community around you.”
115
  
 How should we interpret this statement regarding the MWL’s role in Muslim-American 
communities? Sakr was asking the audience to accept the MWL’s help, while presenting the 
organization’s leadership aspirations as selfless and minimal. “The Rabita is trying its best from 
Mecca,” Sakr said, “to see what it could do for the Muslims and what the Muslims could do for 
themselves in all parts of the world including North America.” The MWL, he said, had helped 
fund “well-qualified scholars” to serve Islamic centers as imams and teachers, paid imams to 
proselytize in prisons, and “rendered considerable help to various Islamic centers – whether it is 
for its youth camps, summer schools, or other programs.”
116
 
Another speech, by the head of the MWL’s main office in Africa, portrayed the Muslim 
World League as already having been effective around the world. Mustafa Cisse, executive 
committee chair of the Islamic Coordinating Committee of Africa, praised the aforementioned 
African version of the meeting that was held in 1976, at which participating groups had agreed to 
establish a continental council. Previously, Cisse said, African Muslim organizations were 
“divided and in a state of disarray. Today, however, Islamic organizations in our continent are 
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cooperating sincerely through the African Islamic Coordinating Council.”
117
 This appears as an 
attempt to persuade the attendees, through the good example of the African experience, to let 
their newly established MWL-sponsored organizing committee take the lead in Muslim-
American communal decisions. 
On April 23, 1977, the second day of the conference, a resolution established a body 
called The Islamic Conference of America, designed to serve as a coordinating body for all 
Muslim-American organizations. Others recommended guidelines for operating Islamic day 
schools in the United States and advised that the MWL should appoint pedigreed foreign imams 
to North American mosques. Delegates also recommended publicity for scholarships that 
allowed Muslim-Americans to study Islam at universities abroad and in the United States. Along 
with financial help, the delegates offered cultural and moral advice. Another recommendation 
included advice to parents to improve the quality of Islamic teaching at home and to better 
discipline their children.
118
   
      
How It Worked  
It seems, then, that the MWL maintained a desire to take on the preeminent role in 
Muslim-American communal life. Yet to establish itself as a force in North America would 
require much more than holding a national conference. The MWL’s largest influence was felt 
through donations of seed money to Muslim-American organizations and through the financing 
or training of imams and religious teachers for American mosques.  
These efforts and others are reflected in internal annual reports from its American bureau 
that were filed to the MWL’s international headquarters in Mecca, as well as from interviews 
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with officials. Collectively, these sources reveal MWL concerns with issues both broad and 
narrow in Muslim-minority life. By the mid-1980s there were five official committees on the 
“Local Council of Masajid in the United States of America,” the subgroup of the Supreme World 
Council of Mosques that served as the MWL’s national presence in the United States. These 
committees focused on Preaching and Education (helping to provide and train imams for 
American mosques); Media (countering anti-Islamic messages in the media); Improvement and 
Help (providing funding to mosques); Social Service Programs; and African-American Affairs. 
Of these committees, the most prominent was for Improvement and Help, which focused on 
funding new mosques and on providing mosques with trained imams in the United States.  
On November 23, 1982, at a meeting in Paterson, New Jersey, a city with a large Arab-
American community, MWL officials in the United States concluded that they had “the 
obligation of providing aid to the Muslim communities which still do not have mosques of their 
own in their towns… to help them perform their role in spreading the call for Islam and the 
Islamic education.”
119
 To qualify for this aid, a mosque or fledgling Islamic organization had to 
join the MWL’s Local Council of Masajid, which became sort of a national membership 
organization for mosques. Twenty mosques were represented at the organization’s founding 
meeting in Philadelphia in March 1978.
120
 By 1979, the number of member-mosques had risen to 
thirty-seven; by 1980, to fifty-seven, the vast majority of which had forwarded requests for 
financial aid from the MWL; by 1984, to one hundred thirty; and by 1985, to one hundred fifty-
one.
121
 Dawud Assad recalled in an interview that the MWL, through this Local Council, gave 
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money to sixty to seventy mosques during these years, with most recipients receiving between 
$30,000 and $50,000; the maximum for any one organization was $500,000. In 1982, according 
to the annual report he submitted to Mecca, “24 Islamic Associations” received about $1 million 
among them. Recipients included the Islam World Association of Troy, Michigan, which 
received $50,000 to establish a mosque, and the Islamic Center of New England, which received 
$100,000 to help build its school in Quincy, Massachusetts.
122
 (Larger donations in the high six- 
or low-seven-figures would come not from the MWL’s coffers but from the Saudi embassy in 
Washington D.C., which, for example, provided more than $1 million for the $25 million 
construction of the Islamic Center of New York during the 1980s.
123
) 
Requests for assistance actually predated the founding of the Local Council. Muzammil 
Saddiqi, director of religious affairs for the MWL’s North American office in the late 1970s, 
recalled that “once the Muslim World League established an office in New York, we started 
receiving a lot of requests from communities that wanted to build mosques, ‘We want to build 
that! Help us, help us!’”
124
 
The MWL’s office in North America worked closely with the Saudi embassy in 
Washington, D.C., to ensure that together their efforts would reach the highest number of 
mosques in the most productive ways.
125
 Any financial decisions by the MWL in the United 
States ultimately needed approval from the Mecca headquarters. As Assad wrote in 1985, 
The [Local] Council evaluates the cost required for the provision of the  
activities of these mosques and centers… then it transfers the evaluation to  
the Association Office in New York to be in turn transferred to the General  
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Grant distribution was one method of aiding mosques while simultaneously asserting 
Saudi authority over Muslim-Americans. Another was by sponsoring imam-training programs. In 
1978, one year after the First Islamic Conference of North America, the MWL’s North American 
office sponsored a training program for African-American imams, at Wallace Mohammed’s 
request. As noted in Chapter Three, the main six-week training session included workshops on 
Islamic rituals, history, law and jurisprudence, as well as basic Arabic. Approximately one 
hundred people attended, about half of them imams from Wallace Mohammed’s organization, 
which had recently begun moving toward mainstream Sunni Islam after decades under a racialist 
theology. “It was a learning experience for the imams,” said Muzammil Saddiqi, director of 
religious affairs for the MWL’s North American office in the late 1970s, offering an opinion that 




The nature of the MWL’s imam-training programs for other Islamic organizations was 
different. While Wallace Mohammed’s organization had full-time imams, most mosques in the 
United States could not afford that. Instead, they used part-timers who held other day jobs. As 
Saddiqi explained, many of these part-timers lacked any formal religious training and knew little 
about the Qur’an. “So you have a doctor [as an imam], or any person who is more articulate…,” 
he said. “He becomes a spokesman for the mosque. But he does not have religious knowledge, so 
he needs some help on that.”
128
 To suit this reality, the MWL would more often hold training 
sessions for part-time imams. In the mid-1980s, the MWL would sponsor weeks-long training 
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sessions for such imams, led by shaykhs from Mohammed Ibn Saud University of Riyadh and 
the Islamic University of Islamabad. It also would hold shorter weekend sessions.
129
   
In addition to training imams already in the United States, the MWL imported between 
thirty and forty imams from the Muslim-majority world to serve at American mosques, either as 
imams who would lead the mosque or as specialists in Arabic or Islamic studies who held 
subordinate roles.
130
 In the mid-1980s, the MWL arranged with the grand mufti of Lebanon for 
ten imams from his country to move to the United States and work at immigrant-run mosques 
there; as mentioned in Chapter Three, it also arranged for six foreign shaykhs with training in 
classical Islamic studies to work at Wallace Mohammed’s mosques. Some of these arrangements 
worked well; Imam Hamad Ahmad Chebli, from Lebanon, was originally sent by the MWL to a 
mosque in Louisiana and then to South Brunswick, New Jersey, where since 1986 he has served 
the Islamic Society of Central Jersey. Other arrangements were beset with problems. Cultural 
clashes often plagued the relationships between foreign shaykhs and the Muslims at Wallace 
Mohammed’s mosques. And many immigrant mosques in the United States simply did not want 
to accept the MWL’s help, for fear there would be strings attached.
131
 As Haddad and Smith 
wrote, “imported imams… tend[ed] to propagate the official policies of the sponsoring 
government or the ideologies to which they subscribe.”
132
 In an academic study of eight mosques 
during the 1980s, by Haddad and Lummis, leaders of three of these mosques said they had 
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rejected MWL offers of full-time paid imams who would be selected for them. As two Muslim-
Americans in the study told the authors: 
The Muslim World League wanted to send us an imam who speaks English,  
Albanian and Arabic, but the Albanian community in this mosque did not  
want that kind of help; they wanted to be themselves. 
 
I know there are imams in the U.S. sent by Saudi Arabia. But I think most  
people in our congregation, and I also speak for myself as part of the  





This resistance helps demonstrate that Saudi money appeared to come with a price, at least 
through the lenses of many Muslim-American organizations that wanted to make their own way 




The Muslim World League’s strategy in the United States reflected a juridical view to 
expand the scope of Islamic life in Muslim-minority lands. While the MWL broadly favored the 
Islamic revivalist agenda of reformers such as Hasan al-Banna, Abul A’la Mawdudi and Sayyid 
Qutb on the need for the integration of Islam and public life, the organization’s work bolstering 
Muslim communities in the West effectively rejected assertions by well-known Islamic 
revivalists that the only places suitable for Muslims to live were those governed by Shari‘a. The 
MWL’s activities abroad aligned with different juridical opinions saying that as long as Muslims 
could publicly practice their religion, a region could be viewed as acceptably falling within Dar 
al-Islam. 
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In the United States and other Muslim-minority countries in the West, the MWL provided 
aid to fledgling Muslim-minority communities. Between 1975 and 1985, the MWL contributed 
at least $10 million to these communities in the United States, providing seed money for 
mosques, Islamic schools and Islamic centers; financing imams’ salaries; training imams; and 
providing Qur’ans.
134
 In these years the MWL played an important role in bolstering Muslim-
American communal life, mostly through financial grants to dozens of mosques and Islamic 
associations.   
While the MWL’s lofty self-image led it to call its national gathering of April 1977 the 
“First Islamic Conference in North America,” the MWL was not the first Muslim organization to 
host national conferences in the United States; the Federation of Islamic Associations and the 
Muslim Student Associations both predated the MWL’s presence. In addition, other influential 
Muslim-American organizations were growing or being founded in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) was founded in 1971, followed in 1982 by the Islamic 
Society of North America (ISNA), an outgrowth of the Muslim Students’ Association. ISNA, an 
outgrowth of the MSA, ICNA, the Council on American Islamic Relations, and the North 
American Islamic Trust, as well as the Muslim Students Association itself, would eventually 
surpass the MWL in prominence. Crowds at the annual conferences of these organizations can 
reach five digits; ISNA now regularly attracts thirty-five thousand people. In time, the MWL 
would become overshadowed by these U.S.-based Muslim groups whose growth effectively 
challenged the MWL’s Saudi-financed religious authority. This was, actually, in keeping with M. 
Ali Kettani’s views that the aid from the Muslim world to Muslim-minority communities should 
be geared toward self-sufficiency, self-management, and the growth of domestic Islamic 
knowledge and authority.  
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Concerning matters of religious authority in the United States, the most important new 
organization was the Fiqh Council of North America, which in 1988 expanded its role. 
Previously a branch of the Muslim Students Association in the 1960s, and later affiliated with the 
Islamic Society of North America, its main task had been issuing non-binding rulings for North 
American Muslims on when the new moon was viewed to start the holy month of Ramadan, a 
disputed issue in Muslim communities around the world. But in 1988 the Fiqh Council became a 
“larger and more authoritative body of Muslim scholars (ulama),” to “effectively confront the 
many legal issues facing Muslims in North America.”
135
 This represented an important moment 
in the growth of the Muslim-American community, because this body was based in North 
America, and one qualification for membership on its nineteen-member council was five years of 
North American residence.
136
 This rule was designed to foster a distinctly Muslim-American 
scholarly perspective that would require no consulting with Muslims abroad when considering 
matters of religious import. 
Rulings by the Fiqh Council of America remain non-binding, of course, and many 
Muslim-Americans continue to look abroad for religious guidance. Yet the Fiqh Council and 
other groups have bolstered the communal Islamic infrastructure from what it was in the 1970s 
and 1980s, when the Muslim World League filled a void to help build the community.  
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A Salafi Movement among African American Muslims 
 
 
A self-identifying Salafi movement among African Americans, fully birthed only in the  
1990s, provided the starkest example of sustained Saudi influence on African American Muslims. 
African American Salafis, like other Salafis, devoted themselves to replicating the practices of 
the first three generations of Muslims, striving to purify the practice of Islam. They believed that 
Muslims who weren’t Salafi were practicing corrupted forms of the religion. Salafis eschewed 
ties to these other Muslims, criticizing them as innovators who did not uphold the “true Islam.” 
During the 1990s, thousands, maybe tens of thousands, of African American Salafis nurtured 
communal connections to Islamic authorities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, consulting by 
telephone, online or in person about communal issues and application of Islamic religious law to 
life in the United States.  
Followers of the Salafi movement distanced themselves from American cultural norms, 
bolstering their sense of transnational identity and promising inclusion in the single group of 
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Muslims said to be bound for paradise. In this chapter I argue that these attractions bore 
similarities to what had drawn thousands from previous generations of African Americans to the 
Nation of Islam. Whereas the NOI had promoted a racial cosmology unknown to the broader 
Muslim world, and where Wallace Mohammed’s organization later resisted Saudi influence 
while transitioning to Sunni Islam, African American Salafis broadly accepted guidance from the 
Saudi religious establishment and closely identified with the international Salafi movement. 
Indeed, avoidance of the NOI’s heterodoxies was a powerful push toward Salafism for many 
African American Muslims. This chapter contrasts the transnationalism of the Salafi movement 
not only with the old Islamic transnationalism of the NOI but also with the newer Islamic 
transnationalism of Wallace Mohammed’s movement, in the Salafis’ willingness to broadly 
accept religious guidance from Saudi Arabia. While charting the African American Salafi 
movement’s growth and the communal conflicts that helped shape it, this chapter also 
demonstrates that its existence was inextricably linked to Saudi proselytization efforts. Crucially, 
the Salafi mosques would nurture relationships with elderly shaykhs in Saudi Arabia, whose 
words from Medina would directly affect communal disputes that arose among African 
American Salafis. Fatwas and other statements made by these shaykhs, issued six thousand miles 
away, would serve as probative claims when these conflicts flared. Even when a shaykh’s Saudi 
credentials failed to trump an opposing argument, their very usage in the first place revealed at 
least the perception that African American Salafis looked to Muslims abroad – rather than to 
other Muslims in the United States -- for authority on religious matters.  
Indeed, the main force behind the Salafi movement among African Americans was the Saudi 
university system, including the Islamic University of Medina (IUM) and other Saudi 





 At least several dozen African Americans left the United States in the ensuing three 
decades to study at these universities under years-long scholarships financed by the kingdom. 
Some, after graduating and returning to the United States, secured leadership roles at mosques 
where they incorporated the Salafi teachings they had learned. These often represented stark 
departures from previous practices at the mosques.
2
  
The differences between African American Salafi mosques and other predominately African 
American mosques were easily discernible. Salafi imams, in their Friday sermons, emphasized 
the importance of hadiths – traditions of the prophet Muhammad – while stressing the difference 
between those deemed to be authentic and inauthentic transmissions of the prophet’s words and 
deeds.
3
 Attendees at Salafi mosques wore Arabian-style garb such as the thawb (long robes) for 
men and niqab (veils covering the face) for women. Board members were Salafi, and new 
policies were enforced with communal pressure: Men stopped wearing gold jewelry. Pants were 
worn above ankles (in accordance with several hadiths). Muslims followed advice to not vote 
and to not attend non-Muslim weddings. At conferences, Salafis would gather in large numbers 
to hear shaykhs from abroad and would debate religious matters for hours, taking determined 
stances on whether shaykhs elsewhere, who they perhaps had never met, were “off the path” and 
therefore to be “boycotted.” Salafi imams persistently and emphatically warned against bid‘a, 
forbidden religious innovation, and criticized Muslims who were viewed as having indulged in 
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 Imam Abu Muslimah of East Orange, New Jersey, a founding leader of the Salafi movement 
among African Americans, preached the following in 2006: 
It is an obligation to warn against deviant bid‘a. ... If someone celebrates the  
prophet’s birthday, you tell them stop doing that, it’s a bid‘a. (If) he says ‘No,  
come on, where’s your evidence?,’ you say the prophet said whoever invents  
something that’s not from this religion of ours, then it’s rejected. Celebrating  




Salafism’s profession of religious authenticity and certainty, backed by accessible proof texts 
translated into English, constituted a significant draw.
6
 Sermons at Salafi mosques repeated the 
Salafi belief, drawn from well-known traditions (hadith), that the prophet Muhammad had 
divided the world’s Muslims into seventy-three sects and that only one of them – the one with 
views promulgated by him and his followers – would avoid hellfire.
7
 Salafis also cite another 
hadith in which the prophet Muhammad is reported to have said, “The best of my community 
[i.e., Muslims] are my generation, then those who come after them, and then those who come 
after them.”
8
 This latter hadith has been used to justify the Salafi belief in the authenticity of the 
practices of the first three generations of Muslims. 
Even with Wallace Mohammed’s move away from the NOI’s racial views and toward 
mainstream Sunni beliefs, the NOI’s unusual theology remained visible in the communal rear-
view mirror, and African American Salafis strove to align with internationally respected 
interpretations of Islamic scripture and law. Salafism represented a staunch departure from the 
Nation of Islam’s pre-1975 stances on matters of the divine, prophethood, race and the afterlife. 
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It even differed, in its emphasis on hadith and preferences for certain Arab cultural norms, from 
Wallace Mohammed’s brand of Sunnism. For African American Muslims and others who self-
identify as Salafis, the term became a badge of honor signifying the single correct form of Islam.  
 In this chapter I first review the scholarly discourse that has attempted to define the term 
“Salafism” and classify its adherents. I then chart the growth of the African American Salafi 
movement through individual Saudi-educated imams. A profile of the community based on oral 
histories follows, and then I analyze important conflicts that helped shape its history, linking 
them to the siting of Islamic religious authority in Saudi Arabia, rather than the United States. I 
then examine how African Americans have responded to Salafi norms on gender roles and 
marriage. The section after that explores the transnational reach of Salafism in other countries, 
using my work and others’ recent monographs on Salafi movements around the world to revisit 
the theories of “Saudi-ization” and “deculturation” promulgated by the political scientist Olivier 
Roy, who posited that the globalization of Salafi norms promoted by Saudi Arabia has led to a 
de-emphasis of local Islamic norms affiliated with specific cultures and countries. 
 
Discourse on Salafism 
The Salafi movement among African Americans remains a neglected topic of study. As 
Islamic Studies professor Sherman Jackson observed, writing in 2005 about Islam among black 
Americans, “Everyone in the Muslim community knows… of the influence of Salafism over the 
past two decades or so. Yet, this is hardly reflected in the scholarly literature on Islam in 
America.”
9
 Jackson briefly mentioned the movement in his book Islam and the Blackamerican, 
challenging the Salafis’ beliefs that they are actually replicating Islamic practices of 1,400 years 
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ago. Abdin Chande argued in the journal Islamic Studies that African American Salafis are 
unrealistic in their attempts to build a religious society devoid of local cultural norms.
10
 The most 
extensive scholarship is a 2010 article in the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs by Shadee 
Elmasry entitled “The Salafis in America: The Rise, Decline and Prospects for a Sunni Muslim 
Movement among African Americans.”
11
 In twenty pages, ElMasry discusses the community’s 
trajectory, linking its origin to the Islamic University of Medina and a rise in Black 
Consciousness related in part to the 1993 release of the Malcolm X movie starring Denzel 
Washington. Elmasry, building on Chande’s critique, suggests that the Saudi educations failed to 
prepare future Salafi leaders for “inter-madhhab dialogue” – relations with non-Salafi Muslims – 
and other pluralistic realities of religion in the United States.
12
  
Even to the cautious user, the terms Salafi and Salafism present a slew of semantic 
challenges ranging from the basic meaning of the words, to the classification of various Salafi 
groups, to the term’s conflation with Wahhabism -- a contested term itself that refers to a Saudi 
strain of Salafism that is affiliated with the royal family and its favored shaykhs. Especially since 
9/11, Western Islamicists and political scientists have attempted to define Salafism for both 
popular and scholarly audiences, and to clarify misconceptions prominent in the media regarding 
its meaning, its global development, and its contemporary geography.  
The question of what separates Salafis from other Muslims can be fraught with complexity, 
given that other forms of Islam contain beliefs in common with Salafism. Distinctions tend to lie 
in emphasis and interpretation. Crucially, Salafis are more likely than other Muslims to espouse 
an especially strict version of monotheism, or tawhid, emphasizing that all religious devotion 
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must be for God alone. While other Muslims -- such as Sufis or Shi’i -- may pray at gravesites or 
shrines of deceased “saints,” hoping for their intercession with God, Salafis view this practice as 
polytheistic and sinful worship of the non-divine. In the name of monotheism they have 
historically opposed it, reasoning that all worship must be directed exclusively toward God, lest 
the worshiper be supposing divinity where it does not exist.
13
  
Salafis are also more likely than non-Salafis to dissect and rely on hadith in their quest to 
model the behavior of the prophet Muhammad.
14
 They express the belief that hadith deemed 
authentic are just as relevant to contemporary periods as they were to Muhammad’s era fourteen 
hundred years ago, relating to what Muhammad said about family life, clothes, manners, sex, 
personal hygiene, and other matters.
15
 They contend that attempts by other Muslims to ignore or 
contextualize certain hadiths out of practice are misguided -- even evil -- efforts to tinker with 
divine revelation. In addition, in striving to emulate the practices of the salaf al-salih – the 
“pious ancestors” – from Islam’s first three generations, Salafis continuously warn against what 
are viewed as accumulated “traditions” and teachings linked to local Muslim cultures rather than 
from the best practices and intents of the earliest Muslims. Indeed, the concept of “tradition,” or 
“imitation,” is scorned by Salafis. “Traditional” practices are deemed un-Islamic, believed to 
have been followed by other Muslims solely in deference to preceding generations who had it 
wrong. These acquired traditions, such as worshiping at shrines, are condemned as bid‘a, or 
innovations, and are constantly warned and guarded against. Many Salafis will denounce other 
Muslims as “off the path” if they are deemed innovators or if they are leaders who do not uphold 
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critical elements of Islamic law. Some Salafis will even pronounce excommunication -- takfir – 
on other Muslims. The criticism of non-Salafi innovators aligns with a notion popular in Salafi 




Their quest to recapture the purest religious habits of the earliest Muslims has also led many 
Salafis to disavow close followings of the established Islamic legal schools of thought, or 
madhhabs, which had developed in the centuries following the prophet Muhammad’s death. As 
the Sunni world’s four main schools of thought – known as Hanbalism, Hanafism, Malikism, and 
Shafism – were not present in the earliest decades of Islamic history, Salafis believe that each 
contains religious innovations representing departures from the earliest, purest Islamic practices. 
Salafis prefer, instead, what is called ijtihad, or individual reasoning that relies on the study of 
hadith, to resolve issues not directly addressed in the Qur’an.
17
 (Critics charge that most Salafis, 
lacking a classical Islamic education, will themselves follow a particular Salafi shaykh without 
truly reasoning for themselves.)
18
 As will be shown later, the historic reluctance of the Saudi 
religious establishment to formally identify with a madhhab, despite its broad linkages to 
Hanbali legal school, has contributed to discord among Salafis in both Saudi Arabia and the 
United States. 
In attempting to classify and explain the political distinctions among various Salafi groups, 
scholars of Islamic Studies and Middle Eastern politics have broadly divided Salafis into three 
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categories: quietist, activist, and jihadi.
19
 The Salafi movement among African American 
Muslims is a quietist movement, and therefore that group of Salafis is the focus of this study. But 
a review of all three types is in order here, because their differences help illuminate their distinct 




Quietist or pietistic Salafists eschew all overtly political activity, from partisan activism to 
political violence. They contend that involvement in party politics increases the odds of dreaded 
dissension (fitna) among Muslims. Their societal engagement, instead, consists of attempting to 
purify Islam from religious innovations believed to have accumulated over centuries into 
corrupted religious “traditions.”
21
 They tend to support the leadership of their national rulers, 
imperfect as they may be.
22
 Saudi royalty is closely aligned with quietist Salafism within the 
kingdom, benefiting from its doctrinal opposition to violence against political rulers -- which of 
course leads to support for the monarchy itself. Saudi kings have appointed to high positions 
quietist shaykhs who condemn political resistance against the House of Saud. In 1991, the 
kingdom’s highest ranking shaykh, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Bin Biz, granted theological backing to the 
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House of Saud’s controversial decision to permit American troops in Saudi territory during the 
Gulf War. This was widely viewed as an example of quietist loyalty to the ruler. Many quietist 
Salafis – including groups of African Americans – have aligned themselves with Shaykh Rabi al-
Madkhali, a former dean at the Islamic University of Medina who is discussed later in the 
chapter. These “Madkhali” Salafis partly define themselves in opposition to “Qutbis,” the alleged 
followers of Sayyid Qutb, the mid-twentieth-century Egyptian who favored overthrows of 
governments that were deemed un-Islamic. 
Salafis in the second group, activists, favor political activism that is non-violent as a means 
of acquiring political power to ensure that Islamic law is followed. In Saudi Arabia, Salafis of 
this type are aligned with the Sahwa Movement and “Suriri groups” that have publicly criticized 
the Saudi kingdom as corrupt and un-Islamic. In Egypt, Salafi groups have migrated to this 
activist category from the quietist realm since the Arab Spring of 2011, which Richard Gauvain 
argues complicated quietist efforts to remain on the political sidelines.
23
 As Bernard Haykel 
writes, Salafis in this group “have adapted some of the teachings as well as the political 




Salafis in the third group, jihadists, are the ones best known in the West due to their violence 
and continual calls for the re-establishment of a caliphate.
25
 The most prominent examples are al-
Qa‘ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Al-Qaeda’s Creed and Path, a document 
laying out the group’s beliefs, states that any political leader who institutes anything other than 
God’s rule is an infidel “who has abandoned the Muslim community and has followed the rule of 
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the age of pre-Islamic ignorance [jahiliyya].”
26
 These rulers and their supporters are then 
identified as legitimate targets for “armed and violent rebellion” against whom “every Muslim” 
has an individual duty to fight.
27
 In associating modern Muslim (and non-Muslim) countries with 
jahiliyya, and deeming such people as targets for violence, al-Qa‘ida was incorporating part of 
the worldview of Sayyid Qutb, who had favored the replacement, by any means, of governments 
deemed un-Islamic.  
Quietists can seem less overtly political than other types of Salafis, in that they do not 
actively seek political change. And yet their self-professed apoliticism carries political 
ramifications of its own. In Saudi Arabia, where quietist Salafis back and are backed by the royal 
family, this support undercuts nascent political opposition to the regime. In the United States, the 
refusal of quietist Salafis to engage the political process can be said to have political 
ramifications for African American communities as well, though the African American Salafi 
population represents a small minority of the African American Muslim population, and likely a 
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Saudi Universities and African American Salafis 
The Salafi movement among African Americans would not resemble its current form but for 
the existence of the Islamic University of Medina (IUM) and other Saudi colleges formed in the 
mid-20th century. The majority of IUM students were non-Saudi, and the university’s stated goal 
was for all of them – African American and otherwise – to return to their home countries upon 
completing their studies. Even those who left before completing a degree program could return 
home to reputations as Islamic authorities, by dint of their time in the kingdom. In the 1970s and 
1980s, at least dozens of African American Muslims won scholarships to study for years at a 
time at these universities in Medina, Riyadh, Mecca and Jeddah, where they would learn Islamic 
jurisprudence, missionary work (da‘wa), and the Arabic language, all helpful tools for Muslim 
leadership back home. In their home countries, the prestige of having studied at a Saudi 
university often helped returnees secure leadership roles in Muslim-American 
communities. Many of these graduates self-identified as Salafis and maintained contacts with 
their former professors at the kingdom’s universities. Eventually, as a result of their leaders’ ties 
to Saudi universities, not to mention their own faith in answers from abroad, regular members of 
the mosques would form their own relationships with these Saudi shaykhs through telelinks 
(electronic connections between shaykhs in Medina and Muslims in the United states via 
telephone and Internet chat rooms) or visits to the kingdom, where top shaykhs are readily 
accessible for consultation.  
As noted, the type of Salafi Islam associated with African Americans has unquestionably 
been quietist; even the conflicts that riled the community have pitted one quietist strain against 
another one. To explore why this is true, it is instructive to review the ideological history of 
Saudi universities, which spawned the movement. When the Saudi royal family created the 
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universities during the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was engaged in the so-called Arab Cold 
War with Egypt.
29
 After Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1961 nationalized al-Azhar 
University, the oldest and most prestigious institution in the Sunni Muslim world, the House of 
Saud decided to bolster its own university system. To staff its newfound educational 
infrastructure, the kingdom offered jobs to Muslim Brotherhood members who, in opposition to 
Nasser’s regime, had been exiled from Egypt. When Egypt joined with Syria in the late 1950s to 
form the United Arab Republic, exiled Muslim Brothers from Syria would also find refuge and 
teach in Saudi Arabia.
30
 Prominent Muslim Brothers, then, would staff the university, and 
globally known Islamic revivalists such as Abul A’la Mawdudi of Pakistan held advisory roles 
designing curricula.
31
 These revivalists believed Islam should regulate every aspect of life and 
that the religious realm was naturally linked to “public affairs.” They professed the belief, as had 
Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna, that Islam constituted a Muslim’s primary identity 
-- above nationalism, cultural traditions, or anything else. Within the kingdom, the spirit of these 
revivalists was captured in a 1970 text known as “Educational Policy in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia” that tasked education with “conveying the understanding of Islam in a just and 
comprehensive manner” and “inculcating in [the individual student] an Islamic epistemology so 




The policy reflected the Islamic worldview of the Muslim Brotherhood more than that 
preferred by the kingdom, highlighting how influential the non-Saudi visitors had become within 
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Saudi Arabia. Two different camps had formed at the university system: one camp was 
concerned foremost with promoting monotheism (tawhid) and Islamic purification, while the 
other camp emphasized what was called “Islamic culture” – a structure of knowledge that 
stressed the “totalizing character of the Islamic conception of the world with respect to values, 
systems, and ideas, and the critique of the humanist legacy they contain.”
33
 While some who 
taught and studied at the kingdom’s universities would become associated with Salafi-jihadi or 
activist movements,
34
 it would be the quietist Salafi professors who most influenced African 
American students.  
The highest-ranking religious figure in Saudi Arabia during the growth of the African-
American Salafi movement was ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Bin Baz (d.1999). His early history with the 
monarchy had been turbulent, though; there are reports that in the 1940s, while in his mid-thirties, 
he had criticized the Saudi king for allowing U.S. oil companies too much access to the Arabian 
Peninsula.
35
 After a prison term and repentance, he began to ascend the religious ranks and 
became revered in the kingdom’s Salafi circles. He was the first vice president of the Islamic 
University of Medina, recruiting many of its new professors. He later became the university’s 
president and held other esteemed positions including head of the Committee of Senior Scholars 
and, in 1993, Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia.
36
 For Bin Baz’s aforementioned support of the Saudi 
king’s decision to allow Western (non-Muslim) troops into the country after Saddam Hussein 
invaded Iraq, he was reviled by Osama bin Laden, a critic of the Saudi regime from a decade 
prior to 9/11. But while ostensibly a quietist, Bin Baz and his number two, Muhammad al-




 Among the teachers were Muhammad Qutb (brother of Sayyid Qutb), who taught at the Islamic University of 
Medina, and Abdallah Azzam, who taught at King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz University in Jeddah. Among the students were 
Safar Al-Hawali (of the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia), who studied at umm al-Qura in Mecca, and Osama Bin 
Laden, who studied at King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz University.  
35
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Uthaymin (d.2001), maintained widespread support through long-term alliances with competing 
factions in the kingdom.
37
 
As early as 1964, when Bin Baz was vice president of the IUM, African American Muslims 
were offered scholarships there. That year, Malcolm X, who had just left the Nation of Islam, 
was given twelve scholarships for members of his Muslim-American organization. But not until 
the 1970s and 1980s did larger numbers of African Americans study in the kingdom. Upon 
returning home, several of them, settling back in New Jersey where they were raised, managed 
what in the 1990s became the heart of the African American Salafi movement in the United 
States. The home mosque was called the Islamic Center of East Orange, and it was founded by a 
Newark man named Ahmed Burhani who was formerly a member of the Nation of Islam and 
then Wallace Mohammed’s movement. Burhani received a scholarship to study Arabic and 
Islamic jurisprudence at King Saud University in Riyadh, a consolation prize after he lost a 
leadership struggle in 1976 at the main Newark mosque of Wallace Mohammed. When Burhani 
returned to the United States in 1979, he found himself less enamored with Wallace 
Mohammed’s organization, and he founded the Islamic Center of East Orange the following 
year. There he taught a mainstream form of Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy — not Salafism, a word he 
didn’t use — but he markedly distanced himself from mosques affiliated with Wallace 




Burhani would not oversee the East Orange mosque during its Salafi era. In November 1993 
the mosque’s board replaced him with a Newark man named Dawud Adib, who also had studied 
in Saudi Arabia. Adib, a former NOI member himself, widely described as a charismatic speaker 
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and leader, secured the top job after having studied two years at the IUM. Due to his speaking 
engagements around the country and his enthusiasm for sermonizing on hadiths, the Islamic 
Center of East Orange became known nationally as the hub of Salafism for African Americans. 
Adib introduced detailed study of hadith at the mosque. He successfully urged men to wear white 
robes to Friday prayers, and women to cover in darker tones. More women wore veils (niqab) to 
cover their faces. Mosque board members had to agree to abide by Islam’s ban on paying interest 
for cars and homes — a rule uncommon for board members even in immigrant mosques. Adib 
urged mosque attendees to explicitly refer to themselves as Salafis, an approach favored by 
Shaykh Bin Baz and Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani, another internationally prominent Salafi 
leader.
39
 Burhani, contrasting Adib’s successor’s approach from his own, recalled, “When I had 
become an imam, everyone was just starting to become introduced to orthodox Islam. People 
were not really sure about themselves, and my approach was to gradually get people to assimilate 




 Yet Dawud Adib’s tenure at the Islamic Center of East Orange lasted less than two years. 
In February 1995, he was replaced by another African American Muslim who had been educated 
in Saudi Arabia. Like his two predecessors, Abu Muslimah hailed from New Jersey. Abu 
Muslimah, unlike Burhani and Adib, actually completed a degree program in the kingdom, at 
IUM.
41
 Lecturing around the country as his predecessor did, Abu Muslimah in the mid-1990s 
strengthened the mosque’s reputation as a national center for Salafism among African 
Americans. In 1997, he oversaw the purchase of a former National Guard armory for $325,000, 
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moving the mosque there from its smaller structure on Lincoln Street in East Orange and 
renaming it the Islamic Center of America or, in Arabic, Masjid Ahlus-Sunna (Mosque of the 
People of the Sunnah). Easily visible from its location along the Garden State Parkway, the 
armory building could – and frequently did – accommodate a thousand people for Friday 
prayers. In his sermons, Abu Muslimah would sternly instruct on Islamic theology and behavior.  
Leave off the dirty, filthy character of the kufar [non-believers] ...Purify your  
souls from this bad character! Purify yourselves so that you can be successful!  
Purify yourselves from riba [interest] and usury!
42
 Get out of those mortgages!  
Give back those car notes! Cut up your credit cards!... Purify yourselves from  
living far from the centers of the Muslims! Move to where the Muslims are! Live  




Practices at the mosque turned even stricter. Abu Muslimah persistently warned against 
forbidden religious innovation — bid‘a — and criticized Muslims who he said indulged in it. 
 
“Like a small Mecca” 
The Saudis had a ripe target in Newark. The city’s black populations have long shown 
unusually high levels of interest in Islam, dating to the Nation of Islam’s heyday in the 1960s. 
And while Chicago is the capital of the African American Muslim world, having served as the 
base for Elijah Muhammad, Wallace Mohammed and Louis Farrakhan, Newark has drawn 
protracted attention for its African American Muslim history. Some twentieth-century histories 
of African American Islam begin with the 1913 founding, in Newark, of the Moorish-Science 
Temple by Noble Drew Ali of North Carolina.
44
 About 20 years later, a disciple of Ali’s, a man 
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later known as Elijah Muhammad, would become the Nation of Islam’s national leader.
45
 The 
Newark NOI mosque, known in the movement as Temple number twenty-five, developed a 
reputation in the 1960s for strong loyalty to the cause, a loyalty related to its militant minister 
James Shabazz, nicknamed the “Son of Thunder” for his sermonizing style. Shortly after the 
1965 assassination of Malcolm X, it became known that the three men convicted of his murder 
had prayed at Newark mosques, and a legend developed among African-American Muslims in 
the area that men from Newark were called on for the killing because only they were deemed 
capable by national NOI figures. In 1970, assassins would fatally shoot Minister Shabazz. 
When I first learned this history as a reporter in 2007 and 2008, I suspected the locals were 
exaggerating their reputation in the ways any local branch of a national organization might build 
itself up to an inquirer late to the scene. In July 2008, two months before Wallace Mohammed 
died, I was fortunate to secure a brief interview with him. I asked whether the locals were 
exaggerating their national reputation within the organization. Without hesitating, he recalled an 
incident from about five years earlier when he was giving a speech at a convention in the 
Midwest. From the podium, he had noticed something strange: Everywhere he looked, it seemed, 
he saw someone from the Newark area.  
We usually know the mannerisms. They’re different, the Muslims of Newark  
from the mannerisms of the Muslims of other parts of the United States: the  
way they talk, the way they move, their aura. I noticed it... I asked for a showing  
of hands, and hands went up. I told them to stand: ‘Let me see the Newark area.’  
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A simple explanation for this is hard to come by. Why should Newark have a stronger NOI 
presence than other cities? Wallace Mohammed cited the leadership of Minister James Shabazz 
from the 1960s. “He was the one who built a very strong following there in Newark,” he said. 
“And after him, it was the persons he influenced... He was very high-spirited. He was a very 
militant man, very strong man.”
47
  
Whatever the reason for Newark’s outsized role in the NOI and Islam’s place among African 
Americans there, the area in the 1990s became an unofficial headquarters of the African-
American Salafi movement. The Islamic Center of East Orange hosted regular national 
conferences that would draw more than a thousand attendees.
48
 Dozens -- maybe hundreds – of 
Muslims even moved to East Orange from around the country to be within walking distance of 
the mosque. “It was like you were living in a Muslim country,” said Umar Lee, a former member 
of the community who in 2007 wrote a well-read blog about African American Salafis.
49
 “No 
other place around it could do it like East Orange, if you were attracted to Salafi... You could do 




Abu Muslimah, Dawud Adib and a third African American Muslim who studied in Medina, 
Abu Usamah, ranked high among the most popular Salafi speakers, giving recorded lectures to 
large audiences at mosques and conferences around the country. “It got to a point,” wrote Umar 
Lee, “where it was not strange to find people who had 300-400 tapes in their collections.”
51
 Their 
popularity was especially high in Philadelphia, which in the following decade would overtake 




 Another Saudi-inspired Salafi community was located in northern Virginia, and while it included African 
Americans, it was dominated by immigrant Muslims. 
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East Orange as the movement’s hub. In the mid-1990s, due to their speaking engagements and 
the sale of cassette tapes with their sermons, these Saudi-educated imams began to eclipse the 
popularity of the nationally known Imam Siraj Wahhaj among selected groups of African 
American Muslims in Philadelphia.
52
 Wahhaj, a former Nation of Islam minister who had left 
Wallace Mohammed’s movement to start his own Sunni mosque after a Muslim World League 
training event in 1977, had built his own national reputation as an Islamic authority and speaker 
at Muslim-American fundraising events.
53
 But he did not identify as a Salafi, and by the mid-
1990s Muslims inclined toward Salafism came to prefer Abu Muslimah and others who were 
more proficient in Arabic and had studied more extensively at Saudi universities.
54
  
The certainty with which Abu Muslimah expressed himself on religious matters – a certainty 
widely associated with Salafis’ assuredness that they practice the only correct form of Islam – 
served to both attract and alienate members of the community. On one hand, his religious 
message, his educational pedigree, and his assuredness helped draw massive crowds to his 
mosque and to lectures around the country. On the other hand, a growing number of detractors 
had come to see him as unnecessarily forceful when disagreed with or when he felt crossed. He 
was known to publicly denounce other Muslims in the community by name as dangerous to 
Islam or “off the path.” In perhaps the most notable instance, in March 1996, he vehemently 
condemned an upstart mosque that had opened a mile and a half from his own Islamic center. 
After the new mosque – named Masjid As-Haabul Yameen, and known as the Fourth Avenue 
Mosque – held its first Friday prayer service, Abu Muslimah publicly called it a masjid dirar -- a 
Qur’anic term that means “mosque of harm” -- and told his mosque’s attendees not only to 
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“boycott” the new mosque but also to not return the Islamic greeting of peace to people who 
went there.
55
 Numerous Muslim leaders tried to intercede, including the head of a U.S.-based 
immigrant Salafi group called the Qur’an and Sunnah Society, who solicited an opinion from 
Shaykh Albani overseas  This was an attempt to influence Abu Muslimah through the opinion of 
one of the world’s most prominent Salafi scholars. Shaykh Albani said he believed Abu 
Muslimah’s characterization was improper, and that the new mosque was far enough from the 
first one. But Abu Muslimah continued to defend his use of the term, saying Shaykh Albani had 
been given incorrect information about the situation.
56
 
The new mosque struggled at first, while attendance surged at Abu Muslimah’s mosque, 
which in 1997 purchased the armory building on the Garden State Parkway – widely viewed as a 
symbol of the community’s strength. “Abu Muslimah was not someone I agreed with all the 
time, but I tremendously respected his leadership ability,” said Umar Lee. “He was able to take a 
very working class community of African American Muslims and was able to move from a small 
house mosque into a huge armory building… They were able to do a lot of volunteer work to fix 
it up, to create a school and a community where people all over the country wanted to move. It 
was a major accomplishment.”
57
 
In addition to transforming their religious practices, the movement introduced newfound 
disciplines and kindnesses into the rhythms of daily life. Abu Muslimah described the impacts in 
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a manner reminiscent of how African American converts from earlier eras spoke of the 
transformative nature of the NOI.  
You were really trying to be a believer, really trying to perfect your  
character, really trying to develop a relationship with your Lord, things  
that were missing in our lives growing up. It was the big thing here.  
Everyone was proud to learn the new verse from the Qur’an, to practice  
the new practice. Where else would you find men from the ghetto giving  
each other gifts, especially something insignificant, showing the thought  
counts… We began practicing things that we would consider… corny,  




Still, others recall the period as a divisive one. At the Fourth Avenue Mosque, which 
regularly draws several hundred people for Friday prayers, many attendees say that due to their 
experience at Abu Muslimah’s mosque and the “masjid dirar” incident, they view “Salafi” self-
identification as unnecessarily divisive. While members of the Fourth Avenue mosque take many 
religious cues from Salafism, they do not self-identify as Salafis. They say they find some 
practices of self-identifying Salafi mosques to be excessive and some people at Salafi mosques to 
be overly judgmental of other Muslims.  
That said, many approaches to Islamic authority among Fourth Avenue attendees are similar 
to those at self-identifying Salafi mosques. For example, in interviews, many at the Fourth 
Avenue Mosque – and in the broader Salafi community as a whole – readily cited hadiths to 
explain routine decisions and practices. A man named Shakoor Mustafa, who left Abu 
Muslimah’s mosque for Fourth Avenue after the split, keeps twenty-eight volumes of hadith on 
his book shelves at home and refers to his collection nearly every day. Mustafa, who does not 
identify as a Salafi, said, “I believe if there’s something I want to understand, I cannot get a 
contemporary view of that understanding. I have to get the select view, predicated on something 
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from someone who is a salaf.”
59
 He cited a hadith when he explained to me his habit of dying his 
entire crown red with henna, rather than just his beard as many other African American Salafis 
do.  
One of the things I read (in a hadith) once was that the prophet saw a  
boy and he saw him with his hair half cut... He said, ‘Tell your mother  
to either shave your head bald or cut it even, don’t make it like that.’  
Balance is the objective Allah describes in the Qur’an... So for me,  
when I saw that he (the prophet) said ‘dye your beard,’ what I did was  
also do my hair and my eyebrows because I didn’t want them uneven.  
I don’t see anybody else doing that but I did that just to complete and  




Mustafa regularly invokes hadith in conversations, frequently starting sentences with the 
phrase “The prophet said….” To a teen boy at a restaurant one evening: “Be careful of rap. The 
prophet said, ‘The devil likes poetry.’” To a man he wanted to quickly re-pay the twenty dollars 
he owed: “The prophet said, ‘Pay the man his money before the sweat dries on his brow.’” 
Discussing a recent illness, he cited a verse from the Qur’an on the healing power of honey, from 
a chapter on bees. He says he takes a teaspoon every hour when he needs to quash a viral 
infection, and says other people should too. 
Like many others in the community, Mustafa has sought religious advice from Islamic 
authorities abroad. During the 1990s, friends planted doubt in his mind over the Islamic 
permissibility of his day job as a Newark police officer. He resolved the issue for himself during 
an upcoming pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, seeking out the second highest-ranking Saudi shaykh, 
Muhammad al-Uthaymin. Through a translator, Shaykh Uthaymin reassured Mustafa it was 
indeed permissible to be a police officer, as long as he did not oppress Muslims. “I was really 
honored to meet him, and to have from him this kind of sanction,” Mustafa recalled. “When 
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people question me about it I can say, ‘I got a number of references for you, first and foremost 
Shaykh Uthaymin.’” 
Walking with me outside the Fourth Avenue mosque after Friday prayer, Mustafa reflected 
on the warm communal vibe. Approximately two hundred people from the service, dozens of 
them local government workers, mingled in the open air while respecting religious rules against 
gender-mixing. Women covered their hair, though fewer were veiled than at self-identifying 
Salafi mosques; most wore a jilbab, a loose-fitting over-garment. On the avenue, halal 
restaurants, Islamic clothing shops, and book sellers did brisk business. Men congenially called 
each other “shaykh” and spoke of their next trip to “Saudi.” Mustafa mused: “It’s like a small 
Mecca... You feel like you’re floating because you’re experiencing some of the idealism of a real 
vibrant Muslim community. Here is a place where your name is safe, your honor is safe, your 
person is safe, your property is safe. It’s a real thriving community. Short of my trip going to 
Mecca, this is like the closest thing I can experience here.”
61
  
During the mid-1990s, Mustafa attended the Islamic Center of East Orange but left after Abu 
Muslimah called the Fourth Avenue Mosque a “masjid dirar,” which Mustafa felt was an 
extreme response. He avoids calling himself a Salafi, saying he believes the atmospheres of self-
identifying Salafi mosques are overly judgmental. “I hate,” Mustafa said, “for anybody trying to 




Salafi vs. Salafi 
The community’s ascent was thickly intertwined with two other major communal conflicts, 
both of them related at least partially to directives and statements issued in Saudi Arabia. 
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Community members held shaykhs associated with the kingdom in high regard and often relied 
on their words from abroad as valued evidence for their own Islamic positions in the United 
States. In the late 1990s, the foreign shaykhs’ writings and recorded statements would contribute 
to a schism that roiled the African-American Salafi movement and eventually caused its center of 
gravity to shift to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, ninety miles southwest.  
The first of these disputes involved the question of whether to name a single national leader – 
an “emir of the Salafis.” The controversial idea stemmed from a fatwa issued by Shaykh Bin Biz 
that said Muslims in Muslim-minority countries could elect such a leader to help guard their 
communal interests. In December 1998, a group of seventy-five Salafi leaders from across the 
country nominated a two-person slate, meant to be approved by a larger communal vote: The 
proposed emir was a Saudi-educated imam of Egyptian descent named Muhammad Sayed Adly, 
who had been close to African American Salafis. Abu Muslimah was the proposed deputy emir. 
But opponents charged it was an unnecessary, divisive idea, and a power play by Abu Muslimah, 
who remained a polarizing figure. 
Supporters cited Shaykh Bin Baz’s fatwa as a rationale, arguing it should be applied to Salafi 
communities in the United States.
 63
 “The expectation…was, it would be face-changing for 
American Islam,” recalled Ahmed Burhani, who favored the plan. “It was going to give this body 
of people a titular head to lead the way.” The proposed amir, Shaykh Adly, attempted to garner 
support at a meeting attended by hundreds on July 3, 1999, telling the audience a national leader 
could help move their movement forward. “Islam is not only memorizing a few books about 
aqidah [creed] and afterwards sitting in every masjid debating with each other about certain 
issues,” Adly said that day. “This position of uniting ourselves, and having [an] amir as single 
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head to lead our efforts toward pleasing Allah subhana wa ta ‘ala [is] to bring ourselves together 
as Muslims, to unite our efforts, to try to establish a better program to improve our conditions.”
64
   
Yet the prevailing winds opposed the idea. Adly and Abu Muslimah never garnered enough 
support, and the idea was denounced by a U.S.-based immigrant Salafi group called the Qur’an 
and Sunnah Society, which had formed in the late 1980s. Another issue was the presence of Abu 
Muslimah’s name on the slate. At the meeting in July 1999, Shaykh Adly openly fretted that 
“[s]ome people keep believing very strongly [that] this a game Abu Muslimah started and 
Mohammed Adly [is] only a front for him.”
65
 He denied this was true and cited Shaykh Bin 
Baz’s fatwa. He also presented what he viewed as additional evidence – support by the second 
most prominent shaykh in Saudi Arabia, Muhammad al-Uthaymin. Months earlier, upon hearing 
that another Muslim in the community planned a trip to the kingdom, Adly had asked this man to 
present their community’s dilemma to Uthaymin, and to ask whether he supported the idea of an 




The second dispute proved more divisive and consequential, pitting Abu Muslimah against 
the aforementioned Shaykh Rabi al-Madkhali of Saudi Arabia. Clearly, Abu Muslimah never 
intended to cross paths with Madkhali, a former professor at the IUM who, while not of first- or 
second-tier prominence in Saudi Arabia, had developed loyal followings among groups of 
quietist Salafis abroad, including in England and the United States. Madkhali, born in the 
kingdom in 1931, had been a professor on the Faculty of Hadith at the Islamic University of 
Medina. In the 1990s he was firmly ensconced in the quietist camp of Salafis that is loyal to the 
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Saudi royal family, professing that Muslims should focus on religious purification rather than 
political activism. In his writings he freely refuted those he believed in error, especially political 
activists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Sahwa political reform movement in 
Saudi Arabia.
67
 In the 1990s, after receiving lavish public praise from one of the most prominent 
Salafi shaykhs in the world, Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Shaykh Madkhali would develop loyal 
followings abroad with Salafi movements in other countries, including the United States and 
England.
68
 Madkhali became involved in African American Salafi affairs more than any other 
foreign shaykh, his views often leading to turbulence at American mosques that raised questions 
over the sighting of Islamic religious authority.
69
  
In the late 1990s, Abu Muslimah found himself on the receiving end of Medina-to-New-
Jersey criticism from the Saudi shaykh that would spread to Muslim circles internationally and 
turn many of his own African American followers against him. The conflict stemmed from a 
passing statement made by Abu Muslimah during a lecture at his mosque, in 1996, that religious 
authorities in Saudi Arabia taught not Salafism but the Hanbali methodology of Islamic thought.  
Al-Hamdulillaah I can easily say that I studied in the University of Madeenah,  
that they aren’t teaching the Madhhab [methodology] as-Salafee, in the  
University of Madeenah, nor are the scholars of Arabia known to the scholars  
of the Da‘wah As-Salafiyyah, in this world, and the bigger ones that are calling  
to this Da‘wah[. B]ut that these scholars there in Arabia they’re known as  
Hanbalee scholars, and that’s their madhhab [methodology], and they teach it  
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This proved a controversial statement. Throughout the 1900s the term Salafism had 
increasingly become a badge of honor in the kingdom, along with a guiding principle that anyone 
who identified with an Islamic madhhab or “school of law” named for a historic imam from 
Islam’s early centuries – Imam Ibn AHanbal, Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik and Imam Shafi‘i, 
being the main examples -- could not be Salafi, as those schools identified with regional 
“traditions” said to have differed from what the very earliest Muslims intended. A variant of Abu 
Muslimah’s observation had been made by the internationally renowned Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-
Albani in the 1960s, contributing to his exile from Saudi Arabia after having taught there from 
1961 to 1963. Just as the issue had proved problematic for Shaykh Albani, so would it prove 
damaging to Abu Muslimah.  
Upon hearing Abu Muslimah’s statement, one of his listeners – my sources did not recall his 
name – was apparently dismayed, and he complained about this alleged smear to an American 
man known as Abd al-Rahman, who was an IUM student at the time. Abd al-Rahman was 
visiting the United States at the time and secured a cassette recording. Once he returned to 
Medina for university classes, he played the tape for his fellow students. In late 1998, when Abu 
Muslimah made hajj, he was asked to meet with Shaykh Madkhali, a staunch defender of the 
Salafi bona fides of Saudi religious leaders like himself. The meeting, held in a hotel room in 
Medina, would take the form of an unofficial trial, where Abu Muslimah was the defendant, Abd 
al-Rahman the prosecutor, and Shaykh Madkhali the judge. More than a dozen other Salafi 
observers, most of them students, filled the room.
71
  
According to several people who were present, and a detailed (and polemical) account posted 
on the Internet, Abu Muslimah was asked, in front of Shaykh Madkhali, whether he had claimed 
Saudi scholars were not Salafis. He denied saying it. But Abd al-Rahman played the cassette. 
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Abu Muslimah then defended his statement by saying, “We did not hear the scholars of Arabia 
say they are Salafi.” Shaykh Madkhali is said to have responded, “You are a hidden Hizbi 
[partisan]
72
 and a liar. You are an enemy to the Da’watus-Salifiyyah [Salafi Mission] [sic] and I 
have seen the likes of you many times before!”
73
  
In the United States, this eventually served as a devastating verdict against Abu Muslimah’s 
credibility. Rabi al-Madkhali was not widely known at the time, and his criticism was not widely 
circulated immediately, but after some of his followers learned about it the following year, they 
berated Abu Muslimah upon his arrival at the Germantown mosque in Philadelphia to give one 
of his weekly sermons, preventing him from speaking.
74
 Word of this spread, and many African 
American Salafis, always conscious of remaining “on the path,” stopped attending Abu 
Muslimah’s mosque in East Orange. Friday attendance declined from over a thousand to 
approximately half that, the imam’s reputation damaged among large contingents of African 
American Salafis. 
Abu Muslimah showed no willingness to concede ground to Rabi al-Madkhali’s views. But 
in an effort to calm tensions, a number of other shaykhs from IUM had urged Abu Muslimah to 
write a letter of rectification saying that the Saudi shaykhs in Medina were indeed Salafis. He did 
so, hoping to put the issue behind him. Still, afterward he publicly stated that he had not changed 
his position, and that he wouldn’t let outsiders “bully” his community: 
The only time we’re changing is if it Qur’an changes or we made  
a statement in opposition to the Qur’an, or the only time we’re  
changing is when the Sunnah change or we say something in op- 
position to the Sunna, but outside of that, nobody is going to come  
and bully us to make us change something cause you don’t like  
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what we’re saying or you disagree with us. We’re men just like  
the rest of the people are men.”  
For his opponents, this new statement served as a second transgression, and they subsequently 
had Rabi al-Madkhali condemn Abu Muslimah in stronger terms that explicitly advised Salafis 
to avoid his mosque. They would publish accounts of their conversations with Madkhali in a 
seventeen-page document called Uncovering the Hidden Hizbee: Aboo Muslimah, Abdullaah 
Tawfeeq, Imam of Masjid Ahlus Sunnah, which would become available online, easily accessible 
to the entire Salafi community in the United States and interested people abroad.
75
  
Within two years, a contingent of once-active members of Abu Muslimah’s mosque in East 
Orange would leave to start a new one, Masjid Rahmah, in adjacent Newark. It opened the first 
week of September 2001. The immediate conflict leading to the break involved a hajj committee, 
known as Brothers United, which organized pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia. It was owned and 
managed by a small group of individuals who attended the mosque, but before long Abu 
Muslimah began insisting that the mosque manage the program. When he publicly criticized the 
individuals for not turning the business over, they considered leaving the mosque. They 
consulted people in Saudi Arabia who told them Abu Muslimah was not a Salafi and that they 
should start a new mosque.
76
  
To Abu Muslimah, the involvement of Rabi al-Madkhali represented an effort to prevent 
Salafis in the United States from developing religious authority. “Shaykh Rabi felt slightly 
envious or jealous that ‘Those people are their own leaders,’” Abu Muslimah said in an interview 
in 2015. He lamented that many African American Muslims were all too willing to go along with 
Madkhali, seemingly hesitant to view an African American as a religious authority. He also said 
the incident ran counter to the spirit of instruction at the IUM:  
 
In our last year, often times they referred to us as the ‘scholars of your  
countries, the judges of your countries.’ The teachers were being polite  
with us in that way, calling us shaykh or judge or religious authority of  
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your country. ‘How do you view such as such?’ ‘What would you do, 
such and such?’ That’s what I understood from it.
77
 
A different view was offered by Abdul Wasi, a member of the aforementioned hajj 
committee, Brothers United, that Abu Muslimah sought to disband. In his estimation, people 
such as Abu Muslimah, who had earned a Master’s Degree at the IUM, could be valuable 
resources for spreading the call of Islam in the United States, but only those with a Ph.D could be 
relied on for authoritative interpretations of sacred scripture and oral traditions. He cited Tahir 
Wyatt, an African American from Philadelphia scheduled to earn his Ph.D at the IUM in 2017, 
as an example of someone who, if he moves back to the United States, could be such an Islamic 
authority in the country. He explained his reliance in the 1990s on Saudi shaykhs, or “scholars.” 
 
Some people are under the impression that there are scholars in America.  
When we use the word “scholars,” … there are no actual scholars in America,  
no scholars in the West. What we do have in the West is, we have students.  
We have students who have graduated [from Islamic universities abroad]…  
They are what we would call da‘is, people who bring the message [of Islam],  
but they are not scholars. In the Islamic world they’re not considered scholars,  
even with those degrees. 
 
Gender and Polygamy 
Women in the African American Salafi movement are much more likely to wear a veil 
(niqab) covering their faces than are African American Muslims in other Islamic movements. 
Gender separation appears to be enforced more stringently. In sermons, and in books sold outside 
mosques, it is stressed that women should not leave their homes without a husband’s permission 
and should not be receiving calls from men they are not married to.  
In 2007, I interviewed an African American woman in her twenties outside the Fourth 
Avenue Mosque in East Orange, after a Friday juma prayer, as at least one hundred other 
Muslims milled about in the high point of the weekly social scene. She did not want to tell me 
her name, but she said she had recently become Muslim. She expressed bewilderment over her 
new husband’s anger whenever her male friends called the home. “If a guy calls and asks for me, 
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I’ll get in trouble. If a woman calls, I won’t,” she said. Our brief conversation was overheard by 
a second African American Muslim woman, who joined the conversation, saying, “That’s not 
weird. That’s protocol.” She then whispered what was presumably some advice to the first 
woman. When the first woman walked away, the second woman explained to me further: “Once 
you become Muslim, you don’t have friends of the opposite sex, not in the sense of ‘We buddy-
buddy’,” she said. “...They say that when man and woman are together, that shaytan [the devil] 
makes three.”  
The rate of polygyny in the African American Salafi community appears to be higher than in 
Wallace Mohammed’s group; some Salafi leaders estimated that between five to ten percent of 
African American Salafi men have, at some point, had at least two wives at a time. While 
Wallace Mohammed generally discouraged polygyny, tending to stress the need for equal 
treatment of wives and the benefits of legal marriage licenses, which he knew were impossible to 
secure for polygynous arrangements, Salafi imams emphasized that polygyny is a permissible 
Islamic rite mentioned in the Qur’an. It is often encouraged in imams’ sermons and the literature 
sold at the Salafi mosques. A book entitled A Concise Manual of Marriage, sold outside Masjid 
Rahmah in Newark and written by Shaykh Uthaymin, warns that “the limiting of man to one 
wife (only) has the potential to result in evil and the fulfillment of lust by other avenues.” On a 
tape sold at Masjid Rahmah, in a sermon called “Righteous Wife,” an African American imam 
from Britain named Abu Khadeejah, speaking at a Masjid Rahmah-sponsored conference, 
acknowledges that current wives are often traumatized when a husband announces he will marry 
again. But he said a “transgression” occurs only when that wife lashes out at her husband, 
 
It is upon you, my sisters, to be patient... so long as your husband is a good  
individual, meaning good with the religion... So what if he goes and gets  
married again? Is he not still your husband?... Just because he has taken a  
second wife he has become the most evil man upon the earth?... This is not  
from the behavior of a righteous woman.
78
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A full-throated Salafi defense of polygyny in the West was put forth by Imam Bilal Philips of 
Canada and his wife Jameela Jones. Philips, born in Jamaica, is a Salafi imam who was educated 
in Saudi Arabia and Great Britain and who has since developed an extensive international 
following.
79
 Their book Polygamy in Islaam, first published in 1985 and reprinted at least four 
times, confronts Western discomfort and nervousness over polygamy. The authors note that 
women outnumber eligible men and too often cannot find a husband, and that Jesus is not known 
to have forbidden polygamy. Most important, they write, polygyny is allowable by divine decree, 
made permissible in the Qur’an, and Allah’s laws “are not bound by considerations of time and 
place, but stand applicable whenever circumstances permit.”
80
  
The authors observe that while Western legal conventions criminalize polygyny, they do not 
prosecute adultery, and that therefore adulterous men bear no legal responsibility for women they 
sleep with outside of marriage, unless a pregnancy results and paternity is detected through DNA 
tests. Polygyny, they say, is a better alternative in that it offers legal male guardianship to more 
women. Even if it painful for the first wife to have to share her husband, they write, polygynous 
arrangements are beneficial for other women and for society at large.
81
  
Still, the moment a husband tells his first wife he wants a second wife, is a moment neither 
forgets. “Of course the women, as we know, always feel it is something that they did wrong,” 
said a man known as Abu Dawud, who attended Masjid Rahmah and lived married to two wives 
for five years. “They always [say], ‘I’m always trying to make you happy!’... But they are 
educated to understand that everything in the world is not about you.” His first wife, to whom he 
is still married, accepted his taking a second wife after initial reluctance, he said. "I was showing 
her the benefit in it — She will receive a reward from Allah for allowing her husband, who she 
feels is exclusively hers, ... to share with someone who needed a husband at the time.”
82
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Unmarried women in these communities hold different views about being approached by 
married men looking for a second wife. In 2008, while walking to meet someone outside the 
Fourth Avenue Mosque for an interview, I walked past two women talking in hushed tones, but 
loud enough for me to hear; the first woman seemed aghast that a married man had proposed 
such an arrangement to her. On a different occasion, another woman spoke enthusiastically about 
having male companionship without having to devote her entire life to a husband. A third woman, 
who had previously been married and divorced twice, spoke positively about one day becoming 
a second wife. “When I was a non-Muslim,” she recalled, “I had a problem with my boyfriend 
looking at another woman, or my husband looking at another woman.” It was bad for her self-
esteem, she said. But were she in a polygynous marriage, she speculated, “I’d know this [other 
woman] is his wife. And I’m his wife. And it’s permissible by Allah for him to do that. As long 




 It is difficult to compare the extent of polygyny among African American Salafis to that 
in other Muslim groups in the United States. It is likely more prevalent than in Wallace 
Mohammed’s movement, given the differences in how the movements’ leaders discuss it. But 
the extent to which polygyny among Salafis is a departure from practices of other African 
American Muslim Sunni groups is difficult to estimate, because based on anecdotal evidence it 
was not uncommon in earlier movements such as Dar al-Islam.  
 
Saudi Arabia, the “Saudi-ization” Question and “Deculturation” 
I have argued that it is hard to imagine the African American Salafi movement existing in 
anything resembling its current form without the influence of Saudi religious leaders and the 
kingdom’s university system. Shaykhs linked to the kingdom were significant -- and often the 
ultimate -- sources of religious authority for many African American Salafis. Still, the nature and 
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extent of “Saudi-ization” internationally -- that is, the degree to which Saudi Arabia has 
influenced Islamic movements around the world – remains a matter of dispute. The political 
scientist Olivier Roy laid the groundwork for the debate, arguing in 2006 that the Islamic world 
should be viewed not as a territorial entity, but instead in abstract or imaginary terms 
unconnected to national, continental or cultural boundaries. The transnational influences of 
Salafism, he contended, have bolstered this “deterritorialized” Islam, serving to eradicate ethnic, 
local and tribal religious traditions in favor of the universalistic Salafi ideals that are taught at 
Saudi universities. Indeed, the reduction of local religious and cultural influences on Islamic 
practices is a central goal of the Islamic movement in Saudi Arabia that started in the 1730s with 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who strove to “purify” or “cleanse” Islam from traditions 
believed to have sullied the “true Islam” practiced by the earliest Muslims.
84
 Roy argues that as a 
result of the religious and intellectual networks that formed through Saudi networks, “‘local’ 
Islams are giving way to global Salafism in many Islamic teaching institutions… and none of the 
cultural markers is retained.”
85
  
Many scholars have argued that Roy overstated the extent of this Saudi influence. Bernard 
Haykel has written that while Saudi missionary operations were critical in helping spread Salafi 
ideals, they were not sufficient to sustain the movements in different countries; other religious 
forces and Islamic traditions similar to Salafism in the host country were necessary as well.
86
 
Along those lines, Madawi al-Rasheed observed that Saudi religious leaders were unable to 
control former students once they returned to their native countries, noting that “as transnational 
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processes gather momentum, they escape the control of those who initiate them.”
87
  Indeed, the 









 – demonstrate the import of both Saudi 
influence and local politics and cultures in the development of Salafi movements in different 
countries.
92
 Collectively, these monographs demonstrate that local political realities – which 
increasingly show willingness among Salafis to actively oppose their national governments – 
often help shape the development of local Salafi communities, even if their leaders previously 
studied with quietist, apolitical Salafis in Saudi Arabia. In Yemen, where Saudi-educated quietist 
Muqbil al-Wadi was the leading Salafi figure, Laurent Bonnefoy argues against the very concept 
of Saudi-ization; Bonnefoy contends the idea is overly tied to state-centric viewpoints that 
undervalue “transnational actors” – that is, regular people with grievances – who are at the center 
                                                          
87
 Madawi Al-Rasheed, “Saudi Religious Transformations in London,” Transnational Connections in the Arab Gulf, 
Madawi Al-Rasheed, ed. (London: Routledge, 2005), 164. 
88
 Richard Gauvain, Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). 
89
 Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2012). 
90
 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in 
Jordan (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press: 2001). 
91
 Robert G. Rabil, Salafism in Lebanon : From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2014). 
92
 The aforementioned monographs collectively demonstrate that national political realities, distinct in each country, 
dramatically affect an essential component of Salafism – the degree of Salafi political involvement. In Yemen, the 
main Salafi leader, Muqbil al-Wadi, was an apolitical quietist who had studied in Saudi Arabia and been close to 
Shaykh Bin Baz. Yet during the 1900s, at the dawn of Yemeni electoral politics, some of al-Wadi’s former students 
formed a Salafi political organization – al-Hikma. Al-Wadi would criticize Hikma members for their political 
activism.
92
 In Egypt, where Hosni Mubarak’s government oversaw the formal removal of Islam as the “religion of 
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 And in Jordan, where 
the Muslim Brotherhood is active politically but is perceived as weak due to its alliance with the government, Salafis 
are more loathe to enter the political system, worried that doing so will mean replicating the Muslim Brother’s path 
toward compromising their ideals. Similar narratives are told in chapters of Roel Meijer, ed., Global Salafism: 
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of the religious exchanges.
93
 These regular people are not mere puppets of state interests, he says; 
they are independent actors whose allegiances reflect their own agency. As he writes,  
These actors have the ability to bypass states and act within the specific social  
spaces that have appeared to fill the gaps of inter-state and institutionalized relations.  
Much of their interactions occur in what Peter Mandaville defines as ‘translocality,’  
stressing the local dimension and the ‘situatedness’ of these actors as well as their  
capacity to cross territories. These gaps are indeed never fully deterritorialized and 
disconnected from their local contest as they connect places, imaginings, ex- 




And yet in the United States, where there is no centuries-old tradition of Salafism, Saudi 
religious leaders have maintained significant influence in Salafi communities. Saudi Arabia has 
undoubtedly affected the Salafi religious culture, which would not exist in its current form but 
for graduates of Saudi universities and other returning students. Roy’s critics argue convincingly 
that he overstates the extent to which local Islamic cultures have been eradicated, yet these same 
critics can understate the extent of the Saudi influence that does exist.  Part of Bonnefoy’s 
argument against Saudi-ization is that Yemen’s top Salafi, despite having studied in Saudi 
Arabia, issued many opinions against the Saudi regime, and that Salafism in Yemen was more 
likely to oppose than support the Saudi monarchy. In Bonnefoy’s telling, this opposition 
signified a lack of Saudi impact on Yemen’s Salafi community. But I would argue that 
Bonnefoy’s reasoning is overly reliant on a narrow conception of Saudi Salafism that privileges 
kingdom-friendly quietism over the mixture of religio-political beliefs that exists in Saudi 
universities and in Saudi society in general, where support for the quietist approach is far from 
universal. Protest movements are not foreign to the kingdom, especially since the 1990s, and 
political activism among Salafis abroad hardly indicates a lack of Saudi influence. 
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That said, the extent of Saudi-ization is probably more identifiable in the United States, 
among African American Salafis, than for Salafis in most other countries. It is true that Muslims 
from other countries influenced African American Muslim movements starting in the early 20th 
century, starting with the Ahmadiyya movement of British India, but since the 1970s those 
efforts have been dwarfed by Saudi-financed missions. Yet in the Muslim-majority world, where 
Salafi movements and their organizational infrastructure have existed for centuries, the extent of 
Saudi influence is less clear.
95
 In Yemen, India and West Africa, several contemporaries of 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab -- Shaykh Muhammad al-Shawkani, Shaykh Waliullah Dehlawi 
and Shaykh Uthman don Fodio, respectively – led movements often described as Salafi in nature. 
In the 1860s, interaction with shaykhs of the Ahl al-Hadith of India, a Salafi movement, 
influenced the way Saudi Salafis would stress avoidance of individual madhhabs in favor of 
ijtihad. More recently, Shaykh Albani developed loyal groups of Salafi students in Jordan and 
Syria. Still, even in Muslim-majority countries Salafism is often associated with Saudi influence. 
Richard Gauvain, in his book on Salafism in Egypt, observed that many Egyptian Salafis 
understand creedal aspects of Islam through the teachings of Shaykhs Bin Baz, Uthaymin and al-
Albani. Gauvain cited an anecdote of his meeting with one particular shaykh, who was affiliated 
with the Cairo-based Salafi group Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammidiyya, who responded 
defensively when Gauvain told him that others in Egypt had recommended a work by the Saudi 
Uthaymin as the best work on ritual. The shaykh responded with the name of a fellow Egyptian 
who had also written on the topic.
96
  
While Saudi influence on the African American Salafi movement is obvious, the extent of 
Saudi-ization is debatable. Leaders and non-leaders alike acknowledge that, as in every religious 
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community, the personal discipline associated with these teachings is not easy to maintain. A 
widely used term, “off the deen (religion),” refers to un-Islamic behavior, like drug use or sexual 
impropriety, by Salafis. And yet it seems a stretch to argue that forays into “street life” signify a 
lack of Saudi-ization. Even in the kingdom, where Salafism is the predominant form of Islam, 
widespread adherence to Salafi norms cannot be assumed; witness the presence of the so-called 
Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, whose “religious police” 
patrolled Saudi streets with sticks from the 1980s to 2007.  
Yet Salafi and Saudi are not synonyms, begging the question: If there have long been Salafis 
elsewhere, why is the term so frequently associated with the type of Sunni Islam observed in 
Saudi Arabia? The historian Henri Lauziere has suggested that the widespread association of 
Salafism with Saudi Arabia stems mainly from a single French writer’s misuse of the term in 
1921, which set off an imprecise, confusing historical narrative about Salafism.
97
 The unwitting 
culprit was Louis Massignon, who, starting in 1919, applied the term Salafi to refer to a late-
nineteenth-century religious movement of Islamic reformists and their followers.
98
 This 
particular set of Islamic reformists included Jamal al-Din al-Afghani of Syria, Mohammed 
Abduh of Egypt, and Rashid Rida of Syria, whose main stated quest was to reform Islam and 
Islamic culture to meet challenges presented by Western countries and empires. This emphasis 
differed significantly from that of the Saudi Salafis associated with Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab and his ideological descendants, who linked their mission to challenges facing Islam 
from within, rather than from the West.
99
 Lauziere observes that neither Afghani nor Abduh ever 
used the word Salafi to describe themselves, yet after Massignon in 1921 applied the label to 
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them retroactively, the epithet caught on with other Western (and non-Western) writers who 
referred to them. (Confusion would increase because Rida, later in life, actually migrated 
ideologically toward the religious worldview favored by Saudi religious leaders.) Lauziere 
further links the confusion to the name of a private business called the Salafiyyah Bookstore (al-
Maktaba al-Salafiyya), which opened in Cairo in 1909. This outlet sold books that were not 
limited, in any sense, to “Salafi” writers in the theological sense of the term; instead, its literature 
reflected the concerns of Abduh’s modernist movement. According to Lauziere, the name itself 
“willy-nilly intertwined the term salafiyya with the elevation of Arabs and Muslims in the 
modern world,” and thus “expanded the scope of this adjective well beyond its original 
theological meaning and associated it with a broad and multifaceted reformist program.”
100
  
In 1912, the Syrian-born proprietors of the Salafiyya Bookstore entered business with Rashid 
Rida, a main disciple of Muhammad Abduh.
101
 In 1916, one of the original proprietors, al-Khatib, 
moved to Mecca to assist Sharif Husayn, who had just launched the Arab Revolt. In 1928, a 
branch opened in Mecca, selling “Hanbali and Wahhabi books that suited local patrons”
102
  but 
also literature that would not have met their approval.  
 
Conclusion  
During the spring of 2015, in the days leading up to the Islamic University of Medina’s 
commencement, the school’s administration requested that the graduates not wear their Arabian 
robes to the ceremony, despite having grown used to them while studying there. Instead, they 
urged their departing students to receive their diplomas in garb more familiar to their homelands, 
where in coming weeks and months it was hoped they would secure positions as Islamic 
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 The idea was to display the diversity of the graduating class, which included 
students from fifty countries, as well as the diversity of the greater Islamic world. Yet it also 
served to highlight a dilemma the graduates would face at home, where they would be, on the 
one hand, far removed culturally from the confines of a Saudi Islamic university, and, on the 
other hand, equipped with an education suiting them to usher Arabian Salafi norms into Muslim 
environments that were not yet familiar or hospitable to Salafism. 
African Americans in the Salafi movement made different choices than the African American 
Muslims who came before them, whose communities had lacked the immersion with Saudi 
cultural norms and ongoing relationships with religious leaders from another country that 
African American Salafis developed in the 1980s and 1990s. Whereas Wallace Mohammed’s 
movement had resisted much if not most of the guidance from the Saudi and Saudi-educated 
religious leaders sent to teach them, African American Salafis tended to accept the principle that 
the best Islamic leaders had been educated abroad, often in Saudi Arabia, and that teachings of 
Saudi religious leaders merited regular consultation.  
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With his educational pedigree, Tahir Wyatt, an African American man from Philadelphia 
who was born in 1978, might have been expected to develop a place of unrivaled leadership 
within the Saudi-inspired Salafi movement among African Americans. From 1996 to 2016 he 
was a student at the Islamic University of Medina, poised to earn his doctorate in Islamic creed 
(aqida) in his final year. In 2013 he became the first English speaker to be given a teaching chair 
at the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, one of the two holiest sites in Islam. And throughout his 
years as a doctoral student he traveled the United States during breaks to speak at mosques, 
building a national reputation for his knowledge.  
Yet during the final five years of his studies, Wyatt’s Salafi credentials came under intense 
attack by Shaykh Rabi al-Madkhali and his small groups of loyal, vocal Salafi followers in 
Europe and the United States. Madkhali, a quietist Salafi, was the shaykh who had criticized 
Imam Abu Muslimah of East Orange during the 1990s, not to mention a slew of other Muslim 
leaders around the world.
 1
 Wyatt and Abu Muslimah’s situations were not entirely similar; Abu 
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Muslimah, it will be recalled, had raised Madkhali’s ire by publicly denying the Salafi 
credentials of Saudi scholars. Tahir Wyatt, on the other hand, stood accused of a more passive 
violation; in 2011 he had declined a request by Madkhali to denounce a particular Egyptian 
shaykh, Abul-Hasan al-Ma‘ribee, who Madkhali had publicly condemned as overly political and 
of harboring sympathies for Sayyid Qutb, the late Muslim Brotherhood leader who had favored 
rebellion against any government that did not institute Shari‘a law (meaning, in Qutb’s 
estimation, all governments in the world).  
Madkhali had first criticized Ma‘ribee in 2002 and soon began demanding that others 
publicly denounce him as well. A reluctant Wyatt, who countered that he had never even met 
Ma‘ribee and that other Saudi scholars advised him against such a condemnation, refused 
Madkhali’s demand. For this stance Madkhali criticized him as being off the Salafi path, a 
charge that gained traction with Madkhali’s British followers, who were associated with the 
website Salafi Publications, whose credo -- “Exposing Deviant Ideologies, Extremism, Terrorism 
and their Proponents” – refers not only to violent and politically active Islamist groups but also 
non-Salafi Muslims, who they view as deviants within Islam. The situation intensified in 2011 
when a Salafi mosque in Newark, New Jersey, scheduled an educational conference that initially 
listed both Madkhali and Wyatt on the program – Madkhali via telelink and Wyatt in person -- 
among nine speakers. Madkhali insisted on Wyatt’s removal from the program. The Newark 
mosque, Masjid Rahmah quickly complied, removing him from the schedule. But when other 
Saudi shaykhs -- among them a Saudi Salafi named Salih as-Suhaymi -- vouched for Wyatt’s 
Salafi credentials, the mosque administration reinstated Wyatt to the program and removed 
Madkhali. Shaykh Madkhali would be reinstated soon thereafter, but Wyatt remained on the 
program. Masjid Rahmah’s imam, Abu Muhammad al-Maghribi, who resigned from his position, 
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In the years to come, Wyatt would be repeatedly denounced by Madkhali’s followers at the 
aforementioned Salafi Publications over his refusal to condemn the Egyptian shaykh as Madkhali 
had demanded. To Shaykh Suhaymi, who had defended Wyatt before the 2011 conference, the 
preference for Madkhali over Wyatt by vocal Western Salafis boded poorly for the autonomy of 
North American Muslims over their religious affairs. He called for Muslims in the United States 
to not undercut developing leaders from their own country – such as Wyatt –and criticized the 
leader of Salafi Publications for sowing dissension. “The solution is in your hands, O American 
Muslims,” Suhaymi advised, according to a translation. “You should accept those who come 
from your people and are known to have sound minhaj [religious path]. You must learn from him 
and accept what he says.”
3
  
As recounted in Chapter Five, Madkhali’s criticisms had long served to marginalize other 
Salafi leaders – African American and otherwise-- around the world, and it is worth noting here 
that within Saudi Arabia itself, Madkhali has never held the rank of a top-tier theologian. While 
he studied under the most prominent Salafi shaykhs as a student, and had himself served as chair 
of the Sunnah department at the IUM’s College of Hadith, he lacked the status of Shaykhs Abd 
al-Aziz Bin Baz and Muhammad al-Uthaymin , or the massive followings of Shaykhs Nasir al-
Din al-Albani or Muqbil al-Wadi, the latter a quietist Salafi based in Yemen.
4
 But starting in the 
1990s Madkhali developed increasingly vocal followings in Western countries, especially 
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England and the United States, after receiving significant praise from Shaykh Albani, revered as 
perhaps the world’s most prominent quietist Salafi. Yet as Madkhali began criticizing more and 
more Muslim leaders, even Albani, whose praise had launched Madkhali’s ascent, came to 
publicly question his approach.
5
 Madkhali’s influence further increased in the West during the 
first years of the twenty-first century after the deaths of all four of the aforementioned shaykhs – 
Bin Baz, Uthaymin, Albani and al-Wadi.  
 
Even without this cadre of detractors, Tahir Wyatt could have faced increasingly 
sophisticated competition for prominence as a Muslim leader, given the increased breadth of 
Sunni leadership and educational infrastructure in the United States. In 1996, two American 
converts to Islam – Zaid Shakur, who is African American, and Hamza Yusuf, who is white -- 
founded the small Zaytuna Institute in California with the goal of producing U.S.-raised Islamic 
leaders who could rule on matters of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and reduce the perception that 
American Muslims needed to travel overseas to study Islam and Islamic teachings. In 2010, 
Zaytuna received accreditation from the Western States Association and was allowed to run a 
baccalaureate program in Islamic Law.
6
 They offered college-style courses on Islam in the 
United States, in an environment where Americans would feel comfortable and at home; a co-
founder even described one of his motives as weeding out Middle Eastern cultural norms from 
widespread American perceptions of what it means to be Islamic. Women on campus would not 
be forced to cover their heads (though most female students did so). Gender separation, so 
prevalent in other parts of the Muslim world abroad, were not enforced either in classes or at the 
lunch table.  




 It is often referred to as the first Islamic liberal arts college in the United States. 
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Another Islamic educational effort in the United States -- more recent and more Salafi-
oriented than Zaytuna -- was the AlMaghrib Institute. Founded in 2002, it has specialized in 
weekend or dual-weekend seminars, held across the country, that are often taught by Muslims 
who have graduated from the Islamic University of Medina or other Islamic colleges abroad. 
Given this background, which is shared by its dean of academic affairs, Yasir Qadhi, an IUM 
graduate who is of Pakistani descent, AlMaghrib has been credited with “almost single-handedly 
reviv[ing] the Salafi movement in the US among Sunni American Muslim college students.”
7
 
The founders hope for a permanent campus that can support a degree-offering institution.  
Other attempts to base Islamic authority in the United States, in a non-university setting, was 
the Fiqh Council of North America, mentioned in Chapter Four. The Fiqh Council’s goal was to 
provide religious guidance to Muslim-Americans on practical matters.
8
 Formerly a small branch 
of the Muslim Students Association in the 1960s, it expanded its role in 1988 as part of the 
Islamic Society of North America. Among the qualifications for membership on its nineteen-
member council was five years of residence in North America, a rule designed to ensure its 
jurists were familiar with the culture in which they offered non-binding advice.  
None of these efforts has been specifically geared toward African American Muslims,
9
 nor to 
their specific communal concerns, so the old questions of authority and identity remain relevant: 
Given the twenty-first-century strengthening state of Islamic infrastructure in the United States, 
from where should African American Muslims seek Islamic authority? Can they now, or 
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eventually, train “their” religious leaders themselves, without guidance either from abroad or 
from immigrant-led religious institutions? What role should racial unity and concerns play in 
how religious authority is envisioned? In analyzing these issues, Sherman Jackson historicized 
Islam among African Americans over the last century into three separate parts, or “resurrections,” 
a term he wittingly appropriated from decades-old NOI rhetoric. The “first resurrection,” from 
1930 to 1975, ended with the death of Elijah Muhammad. It encompassed a period when 
increased numbers of African Americans, though still a small minority of them, turned toward 
Islam and “were said to have been delivered from the darkness of their slave mentality into the 
light of their true Blackamerican selves.”
10
 The term generally refers to the heyday of the Nation 
of Islam, whose leader Elijah Muhammad used it to emphasize the magnitude of what it meant 
for them to embrace Islam. What came next, the “second resurrection,” encompassed the decades 
after 1975, when the broad historical trajectory of Islam among African Americans remained 
largely connected to charismatic leaders -- Imam Wallace Mohammed and Minister Louis 
Farrakhan – “rather than any objective method of scriptural interpretation,” Jackson wrote.
11
 He 
posited that a “third resurrection” would look very different from what preceded it; rather than 
revolve around charismatic leaders, it would be based mainly on “the structured discourse of the 
Sunni tradition.” African American Muslims would “master” and “appropriate” Sunni traditions, 
emerging from the process as “self-authenticating subjects rather than dependent objects.”  They 
would need neither guidance from immigrant Muslims nor university educations in the Muslim-
majority world.  
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How American Muslims – African American and otherwise – have navigated relationships of 
authority with Muslims abroad and among themselves since 2000, the year that ended the period 
I have studied, has been affected by two main forces: 9/11 and the Internet. The terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 led to increased government and media scrutiny on American Muslims’ connections to 
Muslim-majority countries, with special attention falling on Saudi Arabia, home to fifteen of the 
nineteen hijackers who commandeered planes on 9/11. This extra scrutiny on African American 
Salafis, a reality despite their quietist orientation and longstanding opposition to al-Qa‘ida, could 
not have helped their efforts at communal growth. (Meanwhile, Wallace Mohammed’s 
movement had begun shifting away from Saudi Arabia before 9/11 due to the tensions discussed 
in Chapter Four, instead nurturing alliances with religious leaders in Syria and Malaysia.) 
Yet over time it is the Internet that has left a stronger imprint on both the religious nature of 
Islam and matters of authority among African Americans. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
particularistic impulses of the Nation of Islam and Moorish Science Temple of America had 
already begun facing stiff competition when changes to immigration laws attracted large 
numbers of arrivals from Muslim-majority countries who would challenge the groups’ 
heterodoxies. The internet has multiplied that effect, allowing new and prospective converts to 
juxtapose unusual cosmologies of the NOI and the Five Percenters, for example, against more 
common Sunni beliefs that can seem more authentic due to their longer histories and breadth of 
international followings.
12
 The same is true of religious texts, which are now near-universally 
available to followers and prospective followers. And the speeches and sermons given by 
Wallace Mohammed in the 1970s, which would have otherwise remained unknown to anyone 
but his devoted followers who had purchased books of his compiled works, are now widely 
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available on sites such as New Africa Radio and Youtube. The contentious and often brash 
nature of religious debate among Salafis, meanwhile, has ensured the online publication of 
nearly every position worth having or inquiring about regarding Salafi mosques, leaders, and 
organizations. Anyone using a search engine to learn about Salafism among African Americans 
will be inundated with results on any matter or leader. The internet has also helped bolster the 
influence of Salafi religious stances, which center around proof texts for positions on every issue, 
over other types of Islam. This is not to predict the advent of Saudi cultural norms in the United 
States; rather, it is to note that Salafi use of ancient texts has increasingly led non-Salafi Muslims 
to justify their own positions in writing. (This type of response is present in other non-Muslim 
religious communities as well.)  
At the same time, and with similar energy, the internet has negatively affected the 
centralization of religious organizations and movements. The posting of major criticisms, minor 
imperfections and any negative perceptions at all, are as visible to casual and determined viewers 
alike, in ways that can easily dissuade people from trying a religious approach or remaining at a 
place of worship. And even for devoted believers, who now have instant access to the same texts 
formerly restricted to religious leaders who had studied in seminaries, the internet can easily be 
used to challenge the authority of venerable institutions and organizations. Salafi chatrooms 
bring together far-flung believers to closely follow a beloved shaykh’s every word, but the 
followers can also, rather easily, check the shaykh’s references for accuracy. Indeed, the 
migration of sacred texts from purely analogue form to both analogue and digital has profoundly 
changed the ways people experience them. When people want to read a sacred text all the way 
through, or ruminate on an entire chapter, they may still favor the printed copy, which may 
occupy honored real estate in the home. But for acquiring information about a specific issue – 
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what does the Bible, the Qur’an, the Talmud or hadiths say about a given topic? – for one’s 
personal interest and practical matters, the search functions of Internet databases offer more 
promising options.
13
 The texts, writes Becker, “are no longer subject to the hierarchical 
materiality of analogue media. They are accessible via search functions and do not need to be 




Whether owing to fear of U.S. government scrutiny or a sincere desire for religious purity 
over partisan politics, the Islamic transnationalisms of the two groups studied here broadly 
resemble, in the 2010s, what they were during the Persian Gulf War of 1990 and 1991. During 
that period, Wallace Mohammed’s group supported the U.S. government positions, and quietist 
Muslim leaders associated with the Saudi royal family would have supported the kingdom’s 
military alliance with the west against Saddam Hussein.  
There are differences from that period. Wallace Mohammed’s movement in the 2010s has 
lacked the relationship with Saudi officials that it had in the final decades of the 20th century, 
having built ties to religious institutions in Syria and Malaysia. Wallace Mohammed died in 
2008, leaving his movement to split among various strains. Wallace Mohammed II leads the 
Mosque Cares movement that his father founded during his last decade, but retains no formal 
leadership over his father’s followers; indeed, the dissension that characterized itself during 
Wallace Mohammed’s period remains. As for the Salafi movement among African Americans, it 
is widely viewed as a shade of its 1990s self. It remains vibrant at individual mosques, less so as 
a national movement. The divisions discussed in Chapter Five, which split the movement’s main 
                                                          
13
 Carmen Becker, “Following the Salafi manhaj in computer-mediated environments: Linking everyday life to the 
Quran and the Sunna,” in The Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam, ed. Nicolet Boekhoff-
van der Voort and Joas Wagemakers (Boston: Brill, 2011), 426. 
14
 Ibid., 433. 
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base in New Jersey, led to a shift in the center of gravity to Philadelphia. Shaykh Madkhali’s 
continuing influence has demonstrated the power that individual Saudi shaykhs can retain over 
foreign audiences, while also offering a model for the African American leaders he has spurned 
to build and rebuild their own followings with bases in North America.  
At least some of the pieces seem aligned for Sherman Jackson’s “Third Resurrection,” a time 
when African American Muslims, to the extent they can be considered in a collective sense, are 
less organized around charismatic leaders such as Elijah Muhammad, Wallace Mohammed and 
Louis Farrakhan. In the 2010s, African American Muslims with degrees from Islamic institutions 
abroad are less rare than they were in previous decades, and efforts such as Zaytuna and 
AlMaghrib are well underway, designed to provide domestic seminaries that can train future 
Muslim leaders. This study on Islamic transnationalism, then, concludes on a somewhat ironic 
note, with the observation that American Muslims’ engagements with the Muslim-majority 
world has had the effect of making the Muslim future in the United States less transnational. I 
qualified the word “ironic” because the goals of the transnational exchanges examined in this 
study always included a stronger domestic Islamic infrastructure. It is true that African American 
Muslims, like people of other religions and ethnicities, will continue to imagine themselves as 
part of a community that transcends national boundaries. Yet the nature of their transnational ties 
could change if Islamic seminaries do manage to take hold in the United States, as Muslim 
leaders hope they will. With more options for respected and even accredited Islamic educations, 
future American Muslims may feel less inclined to move overseas to study Islam, or to otherwise 
rely on Muslims abroad for religious guidance. That day seems closer in 2016, when this study 
was published, than it was during the final quarter-century of the 20th century. Whichever 
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preferences for authority are held by the coming generations, they will play a large role in 
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